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ABSTRACT
The thesis argues that there are a number of pluralist ethical theories each one of which 
exemplifies traits that make it compatible, to different degrees, with different liberal 
doctrines. The pluralist ethical theories on which I focus are Berlinian value pluralism, 
lexical pluralism, non-linear value pluralism, value pluralism as reasonable disagreement 
and Kekes’ theory of primary and secondary values. While delineating these pluralist 
variations, I also investigate their relationship with moral relativism and moral 
objectivism. Then I proceed to examine their compatibility with different liberal 
doctrines. The liberalisms examined are Mill’s liberalism, Rawls’ liberalism in A Theory 
o f Justice and Rawls’ liberalism in Political Liberalism, while there is also reference to 
Kekes’ conservatism which is derived from pluralist premises. Then I continue by 
focusing specifically on the relationship between ethical pluralism and Raz’s liberal 
perfectionism. I present my understanding of Raz’s liberal system of ideas and I specify 
the two concepts in which I will tackle the issue of its compatibility with ethical 
pluralism. Firstly, I exercise the methodology that I have used in my discussion regarding 
the compatibility between different pluralisms and different liberalisms by examining the 
compatibility of liberal perfectionism with ethical pluralisms of variable radical 
aspirations. Secondly, I examine the compatibility in question through an inquiry into 
Raz’s theory of value. This inquiry, however, does not yield results only with respect to 
the compatibility between liberal perfectionism and ethical pluralism, since it also reveals 
a problem which relates, but cannot be completely identified with, the issue of the 
compatibility between liberal perfectionism and ethical pluralism. Namely, the theory of 
value upon which Raz bases his liberal perfectionist doctrine is too ambiguous and after 
closer inspection it becomes apparent that if liberal perfectionism is to be a valid 
doctrine, it must advocate some kind of conservatism which must be further 
complemented by a belief in meliorism.
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1INTRODUCTION
1. The Context
The liberal tradition has included many divergent attempts to justify or ground liberal 
values. Karl Popper’s and Michael Oakeshott’s attempts to ground liberalism on their 
respective theories of knowledge, Friedrich Hayek’s attempt to defend liberalism with 
reference to historical evolution and spontaneity, John Stuart Mill’s attempt to reconcile 
liberalism with classical utilitarianism and John Rawls’ attempt to replace utilitarianism 
with a set of Principles of Justice are some of the most prominent examples.
It is noteworthy, however, that in as much as these attempts aimed at justifying 
the liberal project from their respective perspectives, they also provided some of the most 
formidable critiques of liberalism. Hayek’s assertions highlighted that rationalism and 
historicism are not monopolized by philosophers such as Plato or doctrines like the 
Marxist one; instead, they are ever present in the liberal tradition. Mill, in his attempt to 
reconcile the liberal idea of freedom with rule utilitarianism, effectively demonstrated 
that the two could be in deep conflict while their reconciliation is far from obvious. 
Rawls, in his attempt to substitute the prevalence of utilitarianism as the ultimate criterion 
for public decision making, ended reshaping his liberal doctrine of Justice as Fairness 
from the ambitiously normative theory of A Theory o f Justice into the political one of 
Political Liberalism. The latter political doctrine in its turn gives rise to a number of
8
issues that are far from resolved. The best that Popper’s theory offers in terms of a 
political argument may be an argument in favor of piecemeal social engineering rather 
than a rigorous political argument with necessarily liberal implications. Finally, 
Oakeshott appears to be first and foremost a conservative; his liberal convictions being 
the result of his particular type of conservatism.
Similarly, the attempt to ground a liberal doctrine on value pluralist premises has 
been turned on its head and now poses a formidable criticism to the liberal project. I 
consider this particular criticism to be an interesting one because it involves, at some 
point or another, references to the issues that I have briefly outlined above -  rationalism, 
historicism, etc. Moreover, it is a criticism that encompasses most of the major liberal 
doctrines in the sense that if they are to be valid, they have to present an adequate 
response to it. For instance, Lakatos’ objection to Popper’s liberal system of ideas is not 
relevant to most other liberal doctrines. On the other hand, the pluralist objection to 
liberalism is applicable to the liberalisms advocated by Isaiah Berlin, Mill, Rawls, and 
Raz.
In the thesis I will pay special attention to the last of these liberalisms (Chapters 
Four, Five and Six will be devoted to it) for two reasons. The first reason is that the 
existing secondary literature on Raz’s liberal doctrine is very small in comparison to that 
of the other theories. This is an important reason which, nevertheless, I do not consider to 
be sufficient for the production of a thesis. The second reason is that Raz’s liberalism is 
one that stems explicitly from value pluralist convictions. One may claim the same about 
Rawls’ and Mill’s liberalisms as well, since Rawls’ doctrine is an attempt to 
accommodate ‘the fact of pluralism’ and Mill’s doctrine -  despite being avowedly
9
grounded in utilitarianism -  is inspired by the Herderian German romantic tradition 
which holds that there is not one, but a plurality of lifestyles through which human beings 
can flourish. However, none of these two doctrines is as intimately and as strongly 
connected to value pluralism as Raz’s doctrine. In this sense, and despite Raz’s 
commitment to a more “positive” view of freedom in the context of his perfectionist 
liberalism, Raz’s liberalism resembles Berlin’s, which develops its notion of freedom as 
negative liberty from a strong and deeply rooted commitment to value pluralism.
2. The Problem
The main subject matter of the thesis is Raz’s liberal perfectionist theory which has many 
ambiguities and inconsistencies, most salient of which is its relationship with pluralism. It 
is my aim in this thesis to challenge the claim that liberal perfectionism collapses on 
value pluralist grounds and to clarify its ambiguities.
In the first part of the thesis I deal with the claim that liberal perfectionism 
collapses on pluralist grounds, to which I will refer as “the pluralist critique of 
liberalism”,1 in a general manner and I make the argument that different pluralisms are 
compatible with different liberalisms. By doing so I argue that despite the fact that liberal 
perfectionism is, indeed, incompatible with Berlinian pluralism, it is still compatible with 
less radical pluralist variations. The purpose of this argument is twofold. First, it deals 
with a strong objection which applies to many liberal theories and to liberal perfectionism 
in particular. Second, this argument lays the ground for the argument in the second part
1 I will sometimes also refer to this critique as “the pluralist challenge to liberalism” or “the pluralist 
objection to pluralism”.
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of the thesis whose aim is to aid liberal perfectionism in overcoming its various 
ambiguities and inconsistencies. If needed, the argument of the first part can be 
approached as an independent argument that addresses the relationship between 
liberalism and pluralism in general. However, for the purposes of the present thesis, 
whose subject matter rests with liberal perfectionism, the argument of the first part of the 
thesis is an integral part of the overall argument and a necessary requirement of the 
argument in the second part. To put it differently, the argument of the first part together 
with the argument of the second part form the overall argument of the thesis, while at the 
same time the validity of the argument of the second part is conditional upon the 
argument in the first part.
In the argument of the second part of the thesis I argue that in order for Raz’s 
liberal perfectionism to be consistent, it must advocate certain characteristics; these are 
conservatism with both Oakeshottian and Kekesian aspects and a belief in meliorism. 
Both of these characteristics are incompatible with radical value pluralism. Nevertheless, 
the argument of the first part of the thesis, according to which it is credible to argue that 
liberal perfectionism is compatible with less radical pluralist variations, allows for the 
argument in the second part without endangering the overall validity of the liberal 
perfectionism system of ideas.
In my discussion of Raz’s liberal perfectionism I will refer to a number of his 
works and not just The Morality o f Freedom2, where he mainly develops the liberal 
perfectionist argument. This is because I find that many of his latter works, such as
2 Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1986)
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Engaging Reason3 and Ethics in the Public Domain4 address, either directly or indirectly, 
the equivocal aspects of his argument which I try to clarify and improve in this thesis. 
Whether it was Raz’s intention to create a body of work which addresses the issues that 
arise from his argument in The Morality o f Freedom is of no importance. What is 
significant is the fact that much of Raz’s subsequent work touches on issues, such as 
theory of value issues, which are vital for the clarification of the liberal perfectionist 
argument in The Morality o f Freedom. Consequently, my aim in this thesis is not to try 
and give an argument which will render all of Raz’s body of work consistent; it may not 
be. My aim in the thesis is to examine Raz’s theory of liberal perfectionism and it is with 
reference to the latter that I examine some other of Raz’s works and arguments.
As I have already stated, my general discussion of the pluralist challenge to 
liberalism is a prelude and will lead to my more specific discussion of Raz’s attempt to 
reconcile liberalism with pluralism. The claim that liberalism collapses on value pluralist 
grounds, can be broken down into three main steps.
The first has to do with an acknowledgement of what is entailed in a value 
pluralist ethical theory. Generally, when one refers to the theory of value pluralism one 
does so with respect to Berlin’s elaboration of it. The latter holds, as John Skorupski 
correctly puts it, that value pluralism ‘does more than record the fact that choice often 
involves conflicts, moral or other, and that choosing can be difficult and sometimes even 
an appalling thing to do’.5 Berlin alleges that value pluralism is the 'conception that there
3 Raz, J.; Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press: 1995)
4 Raz, J., Engaging Reason: On The Theory o f Value and Action: (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
5 Skorupski, J.; Ethical Explorations (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1999), p. 65
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are many different ends that men may seek and still be fully rational'.6 Furthermore, these 
ends are often incommensurable and incompatible with each other. The incompatibility 
of these rational ends does not only mean that two or more of them might not be 
combined in one single life, such as the life of a rock star and a monk. In addition, it 
implies that the choice between different worthwhile values, such as the idea of choice 
and the idea of the right to life -  as they appear in the abortion debate -  may be a radical 
choice between incommensurables which are mutually exclusive. Two implications can 
be derived from the above. First, moral conflicts as understood in value-pluralism are 
objective features of ethical life. Another implication of value pluralism is the irreparable 
loss that might be entailed in some of our moral choices. In a nutshell then, the first step 
of the argument that poses the problem in question is an acknowledgement of the value 
pluralist theory as one which encompasses claims to the objective, plural, 
incommensurable and agonistic -  that is to say, inherently conflictual -  nature of the 
ethical domain.
The second step of the pluralist critique of liberalism refers to the argument 
according to which the fulfillment of the moral requirements that stem from value 
pluralism necessitates the establishment of a liberal philosophical framework. This 
argument can be found in both Rawls and Raz. In A Theory o f Justice, Rawls’ liberal 
doctrine starts by assuming the plurality of the ethical domain and tries to devise a 
normative political theory that will pay adequate respect to this plurality by preventing 
the primacy of utilitarianism in the political process. In Political Liberalism, Rawls’ point 
shifts from a normative into a political one, but the purpose is similar to that presented in
6 Berlin, I.; "The Pursuit o f the Ideal" in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, edited by Hardy, H.
(Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1990), p. 11
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A Theory o f Justice to the extent that it argues for the indispensable need of liberal 
institutional values -  at least in the context of the western democratic state -  which will 
safeguard the ‘fact of pluralism’. Similarly, Raz bases his argument for a perfectionist 
liberal doctrine which prioritises autonomy on value pluralist premises. Unlike Raz, 
Rawls aims to side-step the question of whether value-pluralism is in some sense true; but 
both assume that a type of pluralism is an established fact.
The third step of the critique is to verify the plural yet objective nature of the 
ethical universe that was presented in the first step, but to invert the argument of the 
second step and claim that it is not the case that liberalism can be necessarily derived 
from value pluralist ambitions. On the contrary, if  one were truly a value pluralist, one 
would have to accept that liberalism could be at odds with other objectively worthwhile 
lifestyles. That is, there are worthwhile lifestyles for which it is not only the case that 
they do not require liberalism as an essential ingredient, but which are actually 
incompatible with liberalism.
In the case of Raz’s perfectionist theory, the pluralist critique of liberalism 
questions the plausibility of a normative argument for the prioritization of autonomy 
within a liberal context.
3. The Responses to the Problem and the Problems with the Responses
There have been three main responses as to the above problem. The first response argues 
that the pluralist critique of liberalism is unanswerable and as a consequence the liberal
14
project, whether Rawlsian, Berlinian, Millian, or Razian, is unsalvageable on normative 
terms. John Gray is the main advocate of this view.
Glen Newey points out that Richard Rorty argues for a position similar to this.8 
However, it appears to me that Rorty’s argument is from a different perspective. Whereas 
Gray uses a value pluralist standpoint to argue for the impossibility of making a 
normative argument specifically for liberalism, Rorty’s argument is an instantiation of his 
contention about the impossibility of foundational political justification. When I refer to 
the forcefulness of this first response in the thesis, I will refer to the one which is 
formulated by Gray.
Gray’s argument against Raz’s liberal perfectionism is exemplified in his 
criticism of the functional and the cultural arguments.9 He argues that these two 
arguments, which he identifies in Raz’s work and whose aim is to make a normative case 
for the priority of autonomy in modem liberal contexts, fail if one takes into account 
Raz’s commitment to value pluralism. This is because a commitment to value pluralism 
would entail the admission that there are worthwhile lifestyles that do not require Razian 
autonomy as a necessary ingredient. Even more so, there might be valuable lifestyles 
which cannot flourish under conditions which promote autonomy. As a consequence, a 
convincing normative argument for the compatibility of autonomy based liberalism with 
pluralism is not possible.
The second response, which is advocated by liberals who belong in the Kantian 
tradition, holds that the critique from pluralism is unsuccessful and that liberalism does
7 Look at Gray, J.; Mill On Liberty: A Defence. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1996), 
Postscript; and Gray, J.; Two faces of Liberalism. (Polity Press: 2000)
8 Newey, G., After Politics: The rejection of Politics in Contemporary Liberal Philosophy (Basingstoke, 
New York: Palgrave, 2001)
9 Gray, J.; Two faces of Liberalism. (Polity Press: 2000)
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not, after all, fail on value pluralist grounds. The best reason for this response is that 
liberalism is a political doctrine. Yet, there are two issues with this response. First, on a 
general level, even if liberalism is a political doctrine, it is not certain that it can avoid 
making at least some normative claims. Second, and more importantly for my thesis, Raz 
is not a political liberal. Raz’s liberal perfectionism has very strong normative 
foundations both in terms of its explicit advocacy of value pluralism as well as in terms 
of it commitment to parochial value theory, which I discuss in Chapters Five and Six. 
Thus, contrary to this second response, the pluralist critique of liberalism in general and 
of Raz’s liberal perfectionism in particular is still relevant.
The third response is that the tension between liberalism and pluralism described 
above occurs because of fundamental flaws in the theory of value pluralism. More 
specifically, this response holds that value pluralism collapses into ethical relativism and 
it is because of this that the issue of the incompatibility between liberalism and pluralism 
arises. The claim that value pluralism collapses into moral relativism can be traced back 
to Leo Strauss and his criticism of Weberian pluralism, which for him seems to be 
nothing more than relativism with nihilistic implications. The idea of value pluralism 
itself might be traced even further back, since Berlin claims that he salvaged Herder’s 
value pluralism from the misinterpretation that it was merely an expression of moral 
relativism.
As the pluralist critique of liberalism is based on value pluralist premises and as 
value pluralism is equated with moral relativism, this third response does not offer 
anything more than a critique of liberalism from a moral relativist standpoint. This also 
means that the defence against this moral relativist criticism does not need a new set of
16
arguments; it suffices to approach the pluralist critique of liberalism in the manner one 
would approach a moral relativist critique of liberalism.
In the case of Raz’s liberal theory, this third moral relativist critique would hold 
that no normative case can be made for the prioritization of autonomy, since from a 
simple moral relativist perspective no normative case can be made out of any moral 
demand -  such as the one that stems from Raz’s revised harm principle for the 
prioritization of autonomy. In order to reply to this, one would merely have to reject the 
assertion that value pluralism collapses into simple moral relativism. In this case, the 
pluralist critique of liberalism would produce either one of the previous two responses 
which I have presented in this section. In fact, as I will show in Chapters Five and Six, 
Raz’s advocacy of parochial value theory is an explicit rejection of moral relativism. By 
advocating parochial value theory Raz contends that value pluralism is an objective 
ethical theory. Consequently, the criticism that pluralism collapses into moral relativism 
is one which does not apply to Raz’s liberal perfectionism, since the latter rejects moral 
relativism at a very early stage in its development.
At the core of this third response to the pluralist critique of liberalism was the 
assertion that value pluralism collapses into moral relativism. There are thinkers like 
Glen Newey, nevertheless, who attack value pluralism on very much the opposite 
grounds; that is, on the grounds that it fails to insulate itself from monistic ethical 
tendencies.10
It is true that value pluralism does exemplify some rather relativistic traits, as it is 
also true that there are some aspects of it that, when pressed, can reveal strong monistic
10 Look at Newey, G., After Politics: The rejection o f Politics in Contemporary Liberal Philosophy 
(Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave, 2001), Ch. 4
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tendencies. In Chapter Two, however, I investigate the claims of the value pluralist 
ethical theory and in the process of doing so I find this response to the pluralist objection 
to liberalism to be flawed; value pluralism -  at least Berlin’s view of it -  cannot be 
equated with either moral relativism or monism. As a consequence, at least prima facie, 
Raz’s advocacy of some foim of value pluralism is compatible with his commitment to 
moral objectivity in the context of parochial value theory.
Value pluralism aspires to be something different, neither a relativistic nor a 
monistic doctrine. Whether some of the ambiguities of the theory of value pluralism are 
due to a lack in the philosophical or the conceptual tools needed in order to make a 
conclusive argument about its truth, or whether these ambiguities are indication of a 
deeper fact of the matter, are not issues that I aim to resolve in the thesis. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I am assuming the truth of some form of value pluralism. As a 
consequence, those who are convinced that value pluralism is a bogus ethical theory 
should limit themselves in being interested not in the truth, but only in the validity of my 
argument.
In the thesis then I argue that the third response to the pluralist critique of 
liberalism does not fully appreciate the issues at stake since it misconceives the 
fundamentals of the critique in question. The other two responses are diametrically 
opposed to each other. One claims that liberalism collapses under the demands of value 
pluralism whereas the other claims that liberalism can withstand these demands; the 
disagreement is absolute.
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4. The Alternative Response and the Cost of Being Liberal
The aim of the present thesis is to provide a fourth response that will aid the breakup of 
this deadlock. I argue for the plausibility of a response which appreciates the full force of 
the pluralist challenge to liberalism, but which refuses to see this challenge as its 
tombstone. At the core of my argument is the claim that the pluralist critique of liberalism 
assumes that there is a single uncontroversial conception of pluralism; this, I argue, is a 
mistake. In the first part of the thesis I explore a plurality of pluralisms from Berlin’s 
radical pluralism to various pluralist theories such as lexical and reasonable pluralism. 
Without turning the dissertation into a discussion of meta-ethics and a proof or disproof 
of value pluralism, I examine the variety of candidate theories of pluralism and their 
relation to liberalism as a prelude to examining Raz’ own peculiar approach to pluralism 
and liberalism and their potential reconciliation. I argue that a reconciliation between 
liberal perfectionism and radical pluralism is not possible. However, liberal perfectionism 
can be compatible with less radical versions of pluralism.
This is a very important observation. When I examine liberal perfectionism in 
greater detail in the second part of the thesis, I find that if liberal perfectionism is to be a 
coherent liberal theory it has to incorporate within its system of ideas some conservative 
traits, while at the same time liberal perfectionism will also have to commit to some form 
of meliorism. These characteristics, which may not be fully compatible with Berlin’s 
radical pluralism, can be compatible with other pluralist variations which are less radical, 
such as Kekes’ pluralist theory of primary and secondary values.
This is the cost of being liberal. If one is to consider oneself as a liberal, one will 
have to play down some of her pluralist ambitions since radical pluralism cannot be
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compatible with any liberal theory. However, limiting one’s pluralist ambitions does not, 
of course, make one automatically a non-pluralist; at first instance, it merely makes one a 
non-radical pluralist.
At the centre of this argument is the claim that the responses to the pluralist 
critique of liberalism do not take into account the possibility of subtle differentiations 
between different kinds of pluralistic ethical outlooks. This is a very different position 
from the third moral relativist response to the pluralist critique of liberalism that I 
presented earlier and which claims that value pluralist ethical theory is false. The position 
that I present here is that one can be an advocate of one type of pluralism amongst many, 
since it is not the case that there is only the possibility of either an affirmative or a 
negative answer to the question “are you a pluralist”? This question is more meaningful 
and relevant if it reads “if you are a pluralist, what kind of pluralist are you”?
If this is the question that is asked instead, one might find out that what many 
liberals actually endorse is not Berlinian radical value pluralism. Instead they endorse 
some other pluralist variation which, on the one hand, can still be considered pluralistic 
and which, on the other, because it is more tamed, can be consistent with a liberal 
doctrine without having to be subject to the otherwise devastating pluralist objection to 
liberalism.
Two arguments similar to the moral relativist response to the pluralist critique of 
liberalism might be advanced against my suggestion of tackling the problem by 
distinguishing between different types of pluralisms, whose compatibility with different 
pluralisms I then examine. The first is that there is only one true theory of pluralism, 
which is radical and agonistic, while any watered down version of it cannot properly be
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counted as pluralism. As I have already indicated, there is no single uncontested account 
of value pluralism. Consequently, the statement that alternative variations of pluralism 
cannot be considered to be viable pluralist alternatives is weak. The second objection to 
my proposed response is that the alternatives that I propose to Berlinian value pluralism 
are not true, since they cannot withstand the weight of philosophical scrutiny. My 
response to this criticism in the thesis is that -  at least for the time being -  the existing 
conceptual tools at our disposal are inadequate both in proving that any one pluralist 
variation is false as well as in concluding that Berlinian pluralism is a more plausible 
pluralist theory than any one of the alternatives that I present. The inverse is of course 
also the case; it cannot be proven that Berlinian pluralism or any of its variations are true. 
Since this is the case, as I again have indicated before, I will assume the validity of the 
pluralisms that I present. A necessary consequence of this is that if we acquire new 
conceptual tools, or the use of the existing conceptual tools is such that pluralism is 
proven false then, even if valid, my argument here will be untrue since it would be based 
on false premises.
In a nutshell, the thesis deals with the question of the compatibility between 
liberalism and pluralism as this is prompted from the consideration of the question in 
Raz’s liberal theory. The main thrust of my argument is that Berlin’s discussion of value 
pluralism does not exhaust the terrain, as all the responses to the aforementioned problem 
assume. Without getting involved in the meta-ethical discussion on the proof or disproof 
of any variation of value pluralism, I argue that different pluralisms are compatible with 
different liberalisms. This discussion is a prelude to the examination of Raz’s own 
particular attempt to reconcile pluralism and liberalism in his perfectionist theory. During
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my examination I will also investigate other aspects of Raz’s liberal system of ideas, such 
as his view of autonomy and his theory of value as these pertain to his value pluralism 
and liberalism.
In order to make the schematic comments above more specific I will now present 
a summary of the argument in the thesis as this develops in each of the chapters.
5. The Argument for the Alternative Response
5.1. The Idea o f Value Pluralism
In the second chapter of the thesis I investigate the idea of value pluralism as it is 
presented in Berlin’s writings. I deem this to be a necessary task for three reasons. First, 
Berlin’s idea of value pluralism is at the very core of the pluralist challenge to liberalism. 
Furthermore, the alternative solution that I give for the pluralist objection to liberalism 
rests heavily on a reappraisal of what one ought to understand when one refers to Berlin’s 
value pluralism. Second, I elaborate on Berlin’s value pluralism in a manner that points 
out the inconclusiveness of the view that it is merely moral relativism or even, at the 
other extreme, monism. Third, the strengths, shortcomings and characteristics of the 
Berlinian view of value pluralism will be a constant reference for the presentation and 
evaluation of the pluralist variations in the third chapter of the thesis.
I start my elucidation of Berlin’s pluralism by identifying the basic characteristics 
of pluralist ethical theories in general. These I find to be universalism, pluralism, 
incommensurability (both internal and external) and incompatibility. It is generally due to 
variations on the intensity of these characteristics that one can talk about different types
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of pluralism. I then move on to investigate the relationship between Berlinian value 
pluralism and moral relativism.
The relationship between the two has been intimate not only in the context of the 
history of ideas but also in terms of the nature of Berlinian value pluralism. For example, 
despite its claim to universality, Berlinian value pluralism provides no explicit list of 
generic human goods. Lacking an objective list of human goods, it has been argued, 
Berlin cannot avoid moral relativism.
On the other hand, Berlinian value pluralism is different from standard versions of 
moral relativism in that when the former refers to the incommensurability of values and 
lifestyles, it refers to something different from clashes of Weltanschauungen. On the 
contrary, for Berlinian value-pluralism rational judgment is a possibility in some 
contexts. Furthermore, Berlin’s advocacy of universal intelligibility is another reason for 
its distinction from at least some kinds of moral relativism. This is because the advocacy 
in question refers to Berlin’s commitment to universal features of human nature and as 
such is an indication of his objectivism. Moreover, though he does not specify their 
contents, Berlin elsewhere refers to the existence of pan-human generic goods. Whereas 
this initially appears to be a project similar to the Enlightenment one, since Berlin appeals 
to universal human traits and needs, his methodology is mainly historicist and, 
consequently, less rationalistic than the Enlightenment approach. In general, the 
argument that value pluralism collapses into moral relativism is inconclusive.
I proceed by investigating the claim that pluralism, when put under further 
scrutiny, collapses into monism. It is true that there are some similarities between the two 
doctrines. One of them is that they can both accept the possibility of moral loss -  a
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position rejected by most versions of ethical relativism. Nevertheless, a monistic doctrine 
does not commit to an agonistic nature of the moral universe. Another indication of the 
divergence between monism and pluralism is that pluralists argue for the fact of pluralism 
partly from an empirical/phenomenological point of view whereas monists normally 
argue for an overarching value or principle from a rationalistic point of view. It is true 
that pluralist ethical theories -  and Berlin’s is no exception here -  have some affinity to 
rationalism. This affinity, however, is less potent than the monistic affinity to rationalism. 
Even pluralisms which are closer to monism than Berlin’s value pluralism -  like some 
versions of lexical value pluralism -  are generally less rationalistic than straightforward 
monistic doctrines. Furthermore, in the pluralist ethical theory well informed and rational 
individuals or groups do not agree on an overarching value; monism, in contrast, is about 
the agreement of rational individuals or groups on what this overarching ideal is. Even 
pluralist variations that tend to argue in favor of this kind of agreement -  like John 
Kekes’ primary and secondary value distinction and lexical pluralism -  claim that the 
overarching value is not singular; that is, they claim that there is a plethora of overarching 
values.
My conclusion with regards to the above is that there are very strong reasons to 
differentiate the pluralist doctrine from monism. Moreover, there are reasons that 
differentiate it from moral relativism.
In order to clarify the traits of the Berlinian pluralist doctrine I then contrast it 
with the Aristotelian and the Kekesian pluralist accounts.11 The Aristotelian and the 
Berlinian views on pluralism are similar in that their ethical theory is based on a
11 Kekes, J.; The Morality o f Pluralism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)
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conception of what it is to be human -  though this is more apparent, it has to be said, in 
the Aristotelian than in the Berlinian theory. The two are also similar in terms of the 
importance they place on the political, historical and social circumstances in conjunction 
with which their normative prescriptions are best realized. The Aristotelian doctrine 
flourishes in conjunction with the polls whereas the Berlinian one flourishes best under 
conditions of freedom as negative liberty. They differ, very importantly, on the fact that 
the Aristotelian ethical theory sees that rational deliberation can, in principle, always 
yield a right answer as the intrinsically different valuable things in life can exist in a 
harmonious whole. On the contrary, as I have already mentioned, Berlinian pluralism is 
agonistic in die sense that an irreparable loss of value sometimes cannot be avoided even 
when moral deliberation occurs under fully rational conditions.
Kekes defines as primary values those which correspond to generic human needs 
which always have priority over any other considerations. He defines secondary values as 
those about which there can be reasonable disagreement. Thus, Kekes’ argument for the 
distinction between primary and secondary values is both an epistemological one as well 
as an ontological one (primary values are defined in accordance with human needs). As a 
consequence, primary values are more important than secondary values and are ranked 
lexically in the sense that the fulfillment of the former presides over that of the latter. In 
this sense, Kekes’ pluralism is an instantiation of lexical pluralism -  which I develop in 
Chapter Three -  and as such the two share many strengths and weaknesses as well as 
many of the similarities and differences that each of them has with Berlinian pluralism.
Specifically, Kekes asserts that there is consensus both in terms of the content of 
the primary values as well as in terms of their priority over secondary values. If
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consensus is not reached then Kekes would claim that the agents in question are 
unreasonable. On the contrary, Berlinian pluralism would hold that there can be cases 
where there is lack of consensus between reasonable agents for values that Kekes would 
classify as primary.
There are clear differences between the two theories but there are also similarities. 
Berlin’s theory ultimately holds that negative liberty should have priority over other 
values -  if only to safeguard those other values -  very much like Kekes holds that there 
are values that have priority over others. Moreover, I argue that in Berlin’s case this 
primacy is derived, to some extent, from a view of human nature. Likewise, Kekes’ 
theory was based on a specific conception of human needs.
In Kekes’ ethical pluralism primary values, which are always assigned a priority, 
are need-sensitive and refer to essential human requirements. The values which belong in 
the group of secondary values are not repugnant; it is just the case that their fulfillment is 
secondary. It is noteworthy that Kekes does not examine the possibility of clashes 
between primary values. In radical Berlinian value pluralism there is no hierarchy of 
values -  just the distinction between worthwhile and condemnable values. As I will go on 
to argue in Chapter Three, there is a linear hierarchy in lexical pluralism between 
worthwhile values while there is also recognition of the existence of a group of repugnant 
values which is not part of this hierarchy. In effect, Kekes’ distinction is a more 
unrestricted version of a more elaborate lexical pluralism since in the theory of primary 
and secondary values Kekes does not account for conflicts between primary values 
whereas in lexical pluralism if a conflict occurs, there is a specific hierarchy which has to 
be followed in order to solve the conflict in question.
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19Finally, I go on to investigate Ronald Dworkin’s argument against pluralism. 
Dworkin argues that value pluralist theory is the exemplification of not very well thought 
out moral judgments. I find this position to be unconvincing, albeit impossible to prove 
wrong. More importantly, though, I argue that this criticism cannot give us a conclusive 
disproof of pluralism.
To conclude, in this first step of my argument I examine the theory of Berlinian 
value pluralism which is the pluralism that the pluralist objection to liberalism uses to 
make its case. Then, by arguing that it is a doctrine that has not been proved to be 
reducible to either monism or moral relativism I effectively reject the third response to 
the pluralist critique of liberalism. By presenting Berlinian pluralism and contrasting it 
with Aristotle’s and Kekes’ pluralisms I also delineate an area of pluralist discourse with 
reference to which I will elaborate on the pluralist variations in the third chapter of the 
thesis. Finally, I do not refute but instead reverse Dworkin’s argument against pluralism 
and turn it into a contention in favor of the assumption of the truth of radical pluralism 
rather than its falsehood.
5.2 Different Pluralisms for Different Liberalisms
The second step of my argument is presented in Chapter Three where I expound the idea 
that there is not one but a multiplicity of pluralist ethical theories and then go on to link 
these with different liberalisms. My point here is to stress that Berlin’s discussion on the 
issue, though important, does not exhaust the terrain. As a consequence, the pluralist 
critique of liberalism is weakened.
12 Dworkin, R.; “Do Liberal Values Conflict?” in Dworkin, R., Lilia M. & Silvers B. R. [eds.J; The
Legacy o f Isaiah Berlin. (New York: New York Review of Books, 2001)
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Lexical value pluralism is a hierarchical theory, which defends the position that 
there is an absolute value that should be fulfilled or a minimum standard of some kind 
that should be satisfied before the fulfilment of other values takes effect. What lexical 
pluralism has in common with Berlinian value pluralism is the universalistic, pluralistic 
and incompatibility components. They are different in that even though lexical pluralism 
does subscribe to the idea of incommensurability, it does so in a much more restricted 
manner so as to be able to make rational hierarchical rankings between values, which 
Berlinian pluralism claims is impossible to do rationally. There are two ways for this 
ranking to take effect. One is to substitute for the values some common medium of 
measurement and the other is via the advocacy of a rationalist theory of knowledge. 
Lexical pluralism does the latter and in this it is reminiscent of the hierarchical rankings 
in Aristotle’s pluralistic ethical theory (or even, to some extent, Kekes’). This rationalist 
inclination shows that lexical pluralism is closer to monism than Berlinian pluralism is, 
but the two can still be shown to be distinct since, whereas monism does not commit to 
the idea of incommensurability at all, lexical pluralism does -  although in a less radical 
way than Berlin’s pluralism. I argue that Rawls’ liberalism in A Theory o f Justice13 and 
Mill’s liberalism are compatible with this kind of pluralism -  the former, however, with 
important qualifications regarding Rawls’ idea of basic liberties. A strong indication of 
Mill’s compatibility with lexical pluralism is the fact that the latter is consistent with the 
theory of higher and lower pleasures as well as with Mill’s positivistic view about the 
accumulation of moral knowledge and human progress. On the other hand, I argue that 
Rawls’ liberalism in Political Liberalism14 is incompatible with lexical pluralism. Finally,
13 Rawls, J.; A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press: 1971,1999)
14 Rawls, J.; Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 1996)
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even though lexical pluralism does not guarantee the priority of autonomy in Raz’s 
liberal perfectionism, it does nevertheless still allow it; consequently, the two are not 
necessarily incompatible.
In The Morality o f Freedom15 Raz expresses the idea of incommensurability as a 
non-linear ordering, i.e. as an ordering that fails the test of transitivity. This take on 
incommensurability is but one aspect of his pluralist theory which is supplemented by his 
theory of parochial values.16 Despite the overall Aristotelian appeal of his system of 
ideas, his view of incommensurability is as radical as that of Berlin’s. The difference 
between the two is that Berlin’s is expressed in a somewhat historicist manner whereas 
Raz’s is expressed in deductive analytical terms. The implications of what Newey calls 
‘non-linear pluralism’ when he refers to Raz’s take on incommensurability, are the same 
as those of Berlinian value pluralism despite the more analytical method that Raz uses in 
demonstrating it. It is because of this that no more shall be said in terms of this pluralist 
variation and its compatibility with the various liberal doctrines that I examine.
Another pluralist variation found in the writings of Charles Larmore and the later 
Rawls is value pluralism understood as reasonable disagreement. Rawls’ aim in Political 
Liberalism is to argue that the prescription of action in terms of reasonable pluralism is a 
political one. His liberalism in Political Liberalism is compatible with reasonable 
pluralism -  even though this compatibility does not make the liberalism in focus 
necessarily true. On the contrary, neither Mill’s, nor Raz’s, nor Rawls’ liberalism in A 
Theory o f Justice are compatible with reasonable pluralism. The latter is incompatible 
with Mill’s liberalism because of complications with respect to the limits of toleration
15 Raz, J., The Morality o f Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1986)
16 I discuss Raz’s theory of parochial values mainly in Chapters Five and Six.
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and its relation to public or private sphere activities. In Rawls’ case in A Theory o f  
Justice, pluralism understood as reasonableness cannot guarantee the priority of basic 
liberties and as result the two are rendered incompatible. Finally, Raz bases the priority of 
autonomy on a specific view about moral objectivity which is hostile to the idea of 
reasonable pluralism.
Moreover, I argue that none of the above liberalisms is compatible with radical 
pluralism. Specifically, I find that Mill’s doctrine with its theory of higher and lower 
pleasures is an Aristotelian pluralist doctrine, albeit one which cannot account for the 
agonistic and incommensurable nature of the Berlinian pluralist ethical outlook. Another 
reason for its incompatibility with Berlinian value pluralism is not that Mill’s liberalism 
endorses a theory of moral and human progress as such, but instead because it endorses 
the specific theory of progress that it does. Rawls’ liberalism cannot accommodate radical 
pluralism because an admission to the truth of the latter would compromise Rawls’ 
argument for the promotion of basic liberties. Rawls’ liberalism in Political Liberalism is 
incompatible with radical pluralism because an advocacy of the latter would undermine 
the strengths of the application of reasonableness -  if such a concept could be even 
devised under radical pluralism -  in the public sphere. Moreover, it appears that there is 
some compatibility between Kekes’ pluralism and all of the liberal variations which I 
examine. The latter observation is very important since it will be a central theme in my 
evaluation of Raz’s liberalism in the remainder of the thesis.
To conclude, no liberal theory is compatible with radical pluralism, but different 
liberal theories are compatible with different pluralist variations. This argument 
concludes the first part of the thesis and is indispensable for my discussion of Raz’s
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perfectionist theory and its potential reconciliation with pluralism, which takes place in 
the second part.
The reason for this is as follows. In the second part of the thesis I argue that 
within liberal perfectionism there exist two conflicting tendencies; those of radicalism 
and conservatism. I contend that if liberal perfectionism is going to be a coherent liberal 
theory, it will have to settle with its conservative inclinations at the expense of its radical 
ones. The characteristics of this conservative interpretation are incompatible with 
Berlin’s radical value pluralism whereas, on the contrary, they are compatible with 
Kekes’ pluralist theory of primary and secondary values and could even be compatible 
with lexical value pluralism -  as the latter can allow for the prioritization of autonomy.
5.3 Raz ’ Liberalism: The Arguments and the Problems
The argument in the second part of the thesis complements the argument of the first part 
of the thesis as my interpretation of Raz’s theory develops out of the latter. In the course 
of this interpretation I also engage in a discussion of Raz’s conception of autonomy and 
his theory of value as these pertain to his value pluralism and liberalism.
In this part of my argument I present Raz’s arguments for liberal perfectionism 
and I indicate a number of problems that will be taken up in the remaining chapters of the 
thesis. First, I examine Raz’s three arguments against anti-perfectionism. In examining 
his first anti-perfectionist argument which is directed against the overruling of ideals I 
identify a deep seated objective theory of value and a number of practical problems that 
have to do with one’s obligation to obey authoritative political directives. Furthermore,
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Raz’s argument on this issue exemplifies some rationalistic traits that would definitely be 
at odds with the ethical convictions of a radical value pluralist.
Raz’s second argument against anti-perfectionism asserts that perfectionism is not 
coercive. I find his view that the overruling of some ideals for the promotion of others by 
‘soft means’ is not coercive disputable. In doing this I discuss the challenges that 
modernity poses for Raz’s theory.
The third argument against anti-perfectionism proposed by Raz makes a case for 
the compatibility between perfectionism and pluralism. This is a claim which I accept 
because of my argument in the first part of the thesis, where I discussed how pluralist 
variations different to Berlinian pluralism can be compatible with different liberal 
theories. Consequently, it is possible that liberal perfectionism can be compatible with a 
variety of pluralisms, but not radical pluralism.
Then I examine the role that autonomy plays in Raz’s liberal perfectionist 
doctrine and I briefly refer to the issue of the compatibility between autonomy-based 
liberalism and value pluralism; an issue which I discuss in even greater detail in Chapter 
Five. At this stage of the argument I establish the prevalent role that autonomy has in 
Raz’s doctrine and I examine the two arguments identified by Gray in Raz’s work; the 
functional and the cultural arguments.
After doing this I elaborate on Raz’s conception of the autonomous agent, which 
is also complemented with a more detailed discussion of the compatibility between Raz’s 
conception of autonomy and radical value pluralism in Chapter Five. For the time being 
my aim is to establish the content of Raz’s view on the issue so as to be able to refer back 
to it when I make the complementary argument later in the thesis.
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Finally, in the conclusion to the chapter I identify the two directions with respect 
to which Raz’s liberalism needs to be improved and clarified. These two directions, with 
which I deal in the remaining chapters, have to do firstly with the compatibility between 
liberal perfectionism and pluralism and, as a consequence, secondly with Raz’s theory of 
value -  the content of which is ambiguous and at times inconsistent. My examination of 
Raz’s theory of value will be important because it further specifies the kind of value that 
autonomy really is. If autonomy is an objective value, then the normative argument for its 
priority is possible. At the same time the compatibility between liberal perfectionism and 
some form of pluralism is also possible, as an objective pluralist ethical theory could only 
be compatible with an objective value of autonomy. If the value of autonomy were not 
objective, then liberal perfectionism could not be based on objective pluralist premises.
5.4 Liberal Perfectionism, its Compatibility with Radical Pluralism and the Role o f the 
Value o f Autonomy in Raz’s Liberalism
In this part of my argument I examine the compatibility between liberal perfectionism 
and untamed value pluralism in greater detail. This leads my argument to the discussion 
of the role of autonomy in Raz’s system of ideas and the exact value status of autonomy.
First, I start by examining the arguments that Raz gives for his distinction 
between what he refers to as “weak” and “strong” pluralisms. Even though Raz commits 
himself to the truth of a strong pluralist ethical theory -  non-linear pluralism -  he then 
abandons it and bases his argument on a weak pluralist conception. I argue that there are 
two problems with respect to the above. First, the term “weak pluralism” is too broad and 
does not pay adequate attention to the different varieties of pluralism whose compatibility
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with different liberal theories I discussed in the first part of the thesis. As a consequence, 
Raz’s argument for the compatibility between liberal perfectionism and weak pluralism is 
too crude. Secondly, it is absurd for Raz to base a liberal doctrine on an ethical theory 
that he has implicitly rejected -  by arguing for the truth of an ethical theory that he does 
not use, i.e. strong ethical pluralism.
The solution to the second problem follows from my discussion in the first part of 
the thesis where I argue that Berlin’s discussion on value pluralism is not exhaustive of 
the issue and I contend the possibility of the existence of different pluralisms. My 
argument that strong ethical pluralism is not necessarily the true pluralist theory provides 
the necessary backdrop that allows Raz to advocate weak rather than strong ethical 
pluralism.
The solution to the first problem is also related to my argument in the first part of 
the thesis, which was a prelude to my discussion of Raz’s attempt to reconcile radical 
pluralism with liberal perfectionism, and which takes place in this stage of my argument 
in the thesis. Whereas it was in the first part of the thesis where I argued in favor of the 
specific liberal variations with which liberal perfectionism is compatible with, it is here 
where I expand on the actual reasons for the incompatibility between liberal 
perfectionism and radical pluralism (i.e. strong -  or non-linear pluralism in Raz). I argue 
that the two are incompatible for two main reasons. The first is the idea of Razian 
autonomy per se, while the second is due to the role that the said autonomy has in Raz’s 
liberalism. Actual fulfillment of the conditions of autonomy, Raz argues, will have to 
entail the filtering out of bad options from an individual’s or a group’s domain of choice. 
Irrespectively of whether this is a valid statement, its advocacy is at odds with a strong
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radical pluralist commitment. Although the radical pluralist does advocate moral 
objectivity and allows for the existence of morally repugnant options, because of the 
close relation between value pluralism and empiricism, a radical pluralist would feel 
uncomfortable with the demand for the aforementioned filtering of options from one’s 
domain of choice. This is even more the case in the context of modernity which makes 
the demarcation between bad and good options a very difficult and ambiguous endeavor. 
Overall, I argue that liberal perfectionism entails an Aristotelian view about the 
relationship between normative philosophical considerations and their embodiment in the 
political realm. Second, in terms of the place of autonomy within liberal perfectionism, 
Raz claims that the former should always be promoted and prioritized. A failure to do so 
would violate his revised version of the Harm Principle. I argue, however, that such a 
position is directly at odds with the radical pluralist approach which rejects the idea of 
value commensurability and, hence, the normative demand for the prioritization of 
autonomy.
The discussion of the nature of autonomy is such that it leads to a discussion on 
the theory of value which liberal perfectionism advocates. This discussion is vital in 
better understanding what is entailed in Razian autonomy, on what further grounds it is 
prioritized within liberal perfectionism and the latter’s compatibility with ethical 
pluralism.
5.5. Raz’s Theory o f  Value, Radicalism, Conservatism and Liberal Perfectionism
Raz, on the one hand, often appears to make an objective point about both the worth of 
autonomy as well as about its priority. On the other hand, he often indicates that the value
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of autonomy is contingent and its priority culturally specific. This fluctuation is the 
product of the fluctuation of all forms of pluralism -  different pluralisms to different 
extent — between objectivity and particularism. Raz tries to come to terms with this 
ambiguity by developing the theory of parochial values.
Parochial value theory holds that not all objective values can be mastered by 
everyone and an example of this is the value of autonomy. In my discussion of parochial 
value theory I identify as its main weakness the inability to give a precise account of the 
importance of contingent and particularistic considerations in the formation of parochial 
values. This weakness is reflected in the ambiguities that Raz’s liberal system of ideas 
exemplifies in terms of autonomy being a necessary part of the good life in modem 
conditions. The weakness in question is also reflected in the oscillation of liberal 
perfectionism between radicalism and conservatism. This is the result of the undeveloped 
and unsystematic co-existence of objectivity and particularism within parochial value 
theory and is due to the fact that the latter cannot fully resolve the ambiguities presented 
by the value pluralist premises on which liberal perfectionism is based. An advantage of 
this oscillation, nevertheless, is that it gives liberal perfectionism the ability to assert that 
failure to advance autonomy is not necessarily a moral failure in contexts in which 
autonomy is not valued whereas, at the same time, failure to promote it in contexts that 
recognize its value is condemnable.
Parochial value theory still poses a problem as it renders the liberal perfectionist 
theory somewhat equivocal in terms of its normative demands. After I examine the 
relationship between Raz’s theory of value and other theories, such as Popper’s, 
Oakeshott’s, Mill’s and Hayek’s, I argue that this ambiguity can only be accounted for by
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a commitment to an Oakeshottian conservative account of moral knowledge, a Kekesian 
approach to the plurality of the ethical universe as well as a simultaneous advocacy of the 
melioristic tendency of moral agents to converge on their beliefs regarding morally 
worthwhile forms of life.
Overall, the ambiguity of value pluralism and its oscillation between objectivity 
and particularism which I identified in the first part of the thesis trickles down into Raz’s 
liberal perfectionism and its prioritization of autonomy, which is based on value pluralist 
premises. Raz tries to solve this ambiguity by developing parochial value theory which 
claims that not all objective values can be mastered by everyone. I contend that despite its 
merits, an advocacy of parochial value theory in itself cannot assist liberal perfectionism 
in overcoming the ambiguity in question, which exemplifies itself as the liberal 
perfectionist oscillation between radicalism and conservatism.
My argument is that unless Raz’s perfectionist system of ideas incorporates 
elements of the conservative theories of Oakeshott and Kekes along with a more explicit 
commitment to the meliorism which I identify in Raz’s discussion of parochial value 
theory, its coherency is severely undermined. This argument is consistent with a 
reconciliatory view in terms of the relationship between liberal perfectionism and Kekes’ 
ethical pluralism or even lexical pluralism.
6. Conclusion
The subject matter of the thesis is prompted by Raz’s attempt to reconcile pluralism with 
liberal perfectionism and deals with the criticism that no liberal theory can be compatible 
with value pluralism. There have been many responses to this criticism. However, they
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all assume that there is a single uncontroversial conception of pluralism which applies to 
all liberalisms. I argue that, though important, Berlin’s discussion of value pluralism is by 
no means exhaustive.
In the first part of the thesis I am going to explore a plurality of pluralisms, from 
Berlin’s radical pluralism to various liberal pluralist theories. Without turning the thesis 
into a discussion of meta-ethics on the truth or falsity of value pluralism, I want to 
examine the variety of candidate theories of pluralism and their relation to liberalism as a 
prelude to examining Raz’ distinctive approach to pluralism and liberalism and their 
potential reconciliation.
38
2THE IDEA OF VALUE-PLURALISM
The aim of this chapter is to demarcate an area of value-pluralist discourse within which 
subsequent discussions about the variations of the value-pluralist doctrine and their 
relationship to different forms of liberalism in the thesis will take place. The aim is not to 
prove the truth of the value-pluralist claim but to indicate that objections to value- 
pluralism are not necessarily wrong but, instead, inconclusive. I will do this primarily by 
using conceptual tools of analysis and secondarily by using narrative tools which have to 
do with the history of ideas.
First, and foremost, I will investigate the value-pluralism of Isaiah Berlin. The 
conclusions and analysis that will take place will set the ground for the examination of 
other value pluralist variations and their compatibility with different liberalisms. This will 
be discussed in the third chapter and it will involve the examination of lexical pluralism, 
reasonable pluralism, non-linear pluralism and pluralism as reasonable disagreement.
The present chapter starts by briefly pointing out the four basic components which 
identify value pluralism in general: universality, plurality, incommensurability and 
incompatibility.
Then I investigate the similarities and the differences between Berlinian value- 
pluralism and moral relativism. The section acknowledges the close relationship between 
pluralism and moral relativism, but resists the claim that the former collapses into the 
latter because of value pluralism’s strong objectivist foundations.
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The chapter then goes on to compare Berlin’s pluralism with Kekes’ theory of 
primary and secondary values, and examines their similarities and differences.
Following this, I show that Berlinian value-pluralism cannot be equated with 
monism, or any of its more refined and weaker forms, since monism is incompatible with 
the plurality and incommensurability components of Berlinian value-pluralism.
Finally, after another brief comparative analysis between Berlin’s value-pluralism 
and Aristotelianism, I contrast radical pluralism with Dworkin’s position on the issue of 
value incommensurability and conflicts.
1. Components of Berlinian Value-Pluralism
Pluralistic intimations within ethics, political theory and even religion are not an entirely 
modem phenomenon. There have been pluralist allusions in the pagan polytheistic system 
in which different deities exist simultaneously and in rivalry with each other.17 In the 
field of political theory pluralist allusions have been present in the writings of Aristotle, 
Machiavelli, Vico and Herder, Montaigne, John Stuart Mill in On Liberty18 as well as 
David Hume and Oakeshott19. One could also identify pluralist allusions in the writings 
of Max Weber - especially in his Politics as a Vocation - where Weber 'invokes clashes 
of irreconcilable values, and indeed of irreconcilable moralities, in political life', even 
though he identifies ‘the sources of such clashes’ solely ‘in moral psychology, in
17 Nussbaum, M; ‘The Costs o f Tragedy: Some Moral Limits o f Cost-Benefit Analysis’ in Journal o f  
Legal Studies, 29 (June 2000), pp. 1005-1036
18 Look at Berlin, I.; "The Counter-Enlightenment" in The Proper Study of Mankind: an Anthology of 
Essays, edited by Hardy, H. (Pimlico: 1998), pp. 243-268 and Berlin, I.; "Herder and the Enlightenment" 
in ibid. pp. 359-435.
19 Kekes, J.; The Morality o f Pluralism (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1993), p. 12
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philosophical anthropology, or in conflict between different cultural forms'. Isaiah 
Berlin, who wrote extensively on the value-pluralist sentiments of thinkers such as 
Machiavelli and Vico and Herder, never fully explored the presence of pluralist traits in 
Weber’s writings. His references to Weber are few and sporadic. Berlin mentions Weber 
in his discussion of the differences between the historical and the scientific forms of 
inquiry21, in his discussion on historical knowledge22 and, furthermore, he shares Weber’s
O'Xreservations towards holistic Utopians. Despite the omission of any extensive reference 
to Weber’s value-pluralism in Berlin’s corpus, and despite Weber’s many differences 
with Berlin, ‘if there is any explicit anticipation of Berlinian value-pluralism to be found 
anywhere, it is in Weber's thought, where it supports an agonistic view of political life 
that has many points of contact with Berlin's'24 Nevertheless, it is still only since the 
writings of Isaiah Berlin that a number of philosophers explicitly identify themselves as 
value-pluralists.25
Berlin defines value-pluralism as the 'conception that there are many different 
ends that men may seek and still be fully rational'.26 That is, a claim to value-pluralism is 
not just a claim pointing to the obvious fact 'that different ways of life honour different 
goods and virtues' or, even more so, that 'what one life praises another life condemns'. 
Value-pluralism says that 'the good is independent of our perspectives on it, but it is not
20 Gray, J.; Berlin (Fontana Press: 1995), p. 58
21 Berlin, I.; "The Counter-Enlightenment" in The Proper Study of Mankind: an Anthology o f Essays. 
edited by Hardy, H. (Pimlico: 1998), p. 56
22 ibid., p. 77 and p. 89
23 ibid., p. 242
24 Gray, J.; Berlin (Fontana Press: 1995), p. 58
25 For a comprehensive list o f these thinkers and for a list of their major works look at Crowder, G.; 
Liberalism and Value-Pluralism (London and New York, Continuum: 2002), p. 17, n.7 and Kekes, J.; The 
Morality of Pluralism (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1993), p. 12, n. 6.
26 Berlin, I.; "The Pursuit o f the Ideal" in The Crooked Timber o f Humanity, edited by Hardy, H. 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1990), p. 11
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onthe same for all*. Value-pluralists, therefore, recognize the existence of several universal 
values that ’range from the satisfaction of survival needs, such as the need for food and 
shelter, to benefits required for any human life to count as a good life, such as friendship 
and intimacy, to social and political values such as justice, liberty and equality'.28
The co-existence of universalism and pluralism in the value-pluralist moral theory 
points to the inability to rationally commensurate between the range of these objectively 
valuable options. Some values or lifestyles are so radically different from one another 
that they cannot be subordinated to the same system of evaluation. One might credibly 
say for example that essay A is better than essay B because A makes a more rigorous and 
coherent argument than B. But it strikes one as unreasonable, irrational or meaningless to 
claim that a rigorously argued and coherent piece of essay writing is better or more 
worthwhile than a well-conducted and performed piece of music. Furthermore, some 
values are so radically different that not only is it senseless to weigh them using a 
singular system of evaluation, but it is also the case that some values are incompatible 
and cannot coexist within the same system of ideas. As Gray points out, 'neither 
theoretical nor practical reasoning' about such 'ultimate values' or radical lifestyles will 
resolve the conflict that their radical nature ensures.29 Security versus personal liberty and 
libertarian versus egalitarian convictions are two examples of such conflicting values. In 
the first case, measures to enhance and guarantee security from threats such as terrorist 
attacks or organised crime may invade or tamper with a citizen's sphere of personal 
freedom. In the second case the libertarian position, which makes a claim to the right to 
private property, comes into conflict with the egalitarian position that makes a claim to
27 Gray, J.; Two faces of Liberalism. (Polity Press: 2000), p.6
28 Crowder, G.; Liberalism and Value-Pluralism (London and New York, Continuum: 2002), p. 2
29 Gray, J.; Berlin (Fontana Press: 1995), p. 43
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equality. In the same manner, there are a number of lifestyles which are worthy of pursuit 
but which are irreconcilable with each other and ’the realization of one excludes the 
realisation of another'.30 Such incompatible lifestyles may be the lifestyles of a monastic 
religious life of solitude and a politician's highly active and socialised lifestyle.
Many moral goods are not only incompatible with each other, but are also 
'internally complex and inherently pluralistic'. Berlin indicates that this is the case with 
positive and negative liberty32 and one can say the same for the existence of 'rival 
equalities within the concept of equality, such as equality of opportunity and equality of 
income'.33
To conclude my argument so far, it can be said that pluralism as an explicit moral 
theory is a contemporary phenomenon even though aspects of it can be traced back to the 
writings of Vico, Herder, Machiavelli, Weber and others. One can also identify some 
general characteristics that most pluralists share; the recognition of the existence of some 
universal values, the recognition that those universal values are several in number, that 
they are incommensurable and the identification that amongst those incommensurable 
values there are some incompatible ones.
The above value-pluralist constituents are only general and approximate 
characteristics. Their purpose is only to demarcate an area of value-pluralist discourse 
within which my investigation of the different types of pluralism will take place. For that 
matter, there is a plethora of different value-pluralist doctrines whose pluralist allusions
30 Kekes, J.; The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1993), p.21
31 Gray, J.; Berlin (Fontana Press: 1995), p. 43
32 He does this in Berlin, I.; "Two Concepts of Liberty" in The Proper Study of Mankind: an Anthology o f 
Essays, edited by Hardy, H. (Pimlico: 1998), pp. 191-242 where he distinguishes between the notions of 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ liberty -  and at the end he actually seems to come down in favour o f the former as 
the correct understanding o f what ‘liberty’ is.
33 Gray, J.; Berlin (Fontana Press: 1995), p. 43
43
vary. These doctrines differ not only with each other; they often find themselves in 
difference with the rough value-pluralist traits that have been identified above. Berlinian 
value-pluralism shares these common characteristics to a greater extent than other 
variations of value-pluralism. The conclusions derived from a further inquiry into a 
number of objections to the Berlinian account of value-pluralism will also be of relevance 
to these other accounts of value-pluralism, which I examine in the next chapter.
Several distinctions will be of use in order to better grasp Berlinian value- 
pluralism. The latter is often misinterpreted or confused with moral relativism. 
Furthermore, an explicit distinction between Berlinian value-pluralism and monism, ’the 
idea of the world and of human society as a single intelligible structure’34 is useful as later 
expositions of other types of value-pluralism, such as lexical pluralism, will revolve to 
some extent around this issue.
2. Berlinian Value-Pluralism and Moral Relativism
First I discuss Berlin’s differentiation between value-pluralism and moral relativism
through the history of ideas. Then I acknowledge three reasons by virtue of which
pluralism is closer than other objectivist ethical doctrines to moral relativism. This is
embodied in Berlin’s view of human nature which is more pluralistic than the monistic
one which I also examine in the next section. Nevertheless, I stress that, far from initial
appearances, Berlinian value-pluralism is not merely Weltanschauungen by
demonstrating Berlin’s commitment to universal moral intelligibility and his rejection of
cognitive radical relativism. Then, I argue that Berlin’s moral empiricism is not a strong
34 Berlin, I.; "The Originality of Machiavelli" in The Proper Study of Mankind: an Anthology o f Essays. 
edited by Hardy, H. (Pimplico: 1998), pp. 312-313
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enough reason to claim that his value-pluralism collapses into ethical relativism. 
Furthermore, I examine Berlin’s recognition of some generic panhuman needs and values 
which exemplify the anti-relativistic traits of his pluralism. Finally, I claim that the 
possession of tools for the passing of moral judgment as well as the possibility of moral 
progress in Berlinian pluralism, place it more in the tradition of moral objectivism rather 
than that of moral relativism.
Berlin understands 'relativism' to be 'a doctrine according to which the judgment 
of a man or a group, since it is the expression or statement of a taste, or emotional attitude 
or outlook, is simply what it is, with no objective correlate which determines its truth or 
falsehood'.35 A common mistaken interpretation of Berlinian value pluralism is that it 
inevitably collapses into this kind of moral relativism.
Prima facie it should be conceded that there is more common ground between 
pluralism and relativism than between monism and relativism. Berlin himself, who 
otherwise traces the beginnings of an objectivist pluralist moral theory to Vico and 
Herder, acknowledges that:
because of their conception of the cultural autonomy of different societies (whether divided by 
space or time) and the incommensurability of their systems of values, Vico’s and Herder’s 
opposition to the central tenets of the French Enlightenment have commonly been described as a 
form of relativism.36
35 Berlin, I.; "Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought" in The Crooked Timber of  
Humanity, edited by Hardy, H. (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1990), p. 80
36 ibid., p. 76
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Such a relativistic description is given by Amaldo Momigliano who, in his 
response to Berlin's Vico and Herder31, claims that Berlin does not fully appreciate the 
force of relativism in the writings of Vico and Herder and the impossibility of reconciling
•> o
cultural pluralism and universal values. Berlin, as suggested earlier, does recognize the 
danger of this happening due to anthropological observations on the vast variety of 
different cultural practices and lifestyles. Nevertheless, at least from the narrative 
perspective of the history of ideas, he identifies the roots of relativism not in the anti- 
Enlightenment writings of Vico and Herder, which he still insists are permeated by a 
value-pluralist conviction but to
other and later sources: German romantic irrationalism, the metaphysics o f Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, the growth of schools o f social anthropology, the doctrines o f William Graham 
Summer and Edward Westermarck, above all from thinkers who were not necessarily relativists 
themselves - Marx, for example or Freud, whose analyses o f appearance or illusion and reality 
entailed belief in the objectivity of their own disciplines, without, perhaps, awareness o f at any
39rate some of their full implications.
In addition, value-pluralism can be said to be close to relativism in at least three 
more aspects. To start with, it is difficult for a Berlinian value-pluralist to come up with a 
list of explicit objective generic human goods -  since it would be expected that such a list 
could be demanded by value-pluralism’s proclaimed objectivity. Secondly, the difficulty 
to come up with a list of that sort is exemplified by the lack of clarity that is demonstrated
37 Berlin, I.; Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History o f Ideas (London, Hogarth Press: 1976)
38 Momigliano, A.; "On the Pioneer Trail" in The New York Review o f  Books, 11 November 1976, pp. BB­
SS
39 Berlin, I.; "Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought" in The Crooked Timber of 
Humanity, edited by Hardy, H. (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1990), pp. 78-9
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by the Berlinian value-pluralist theory in its demarcation between universal human goods 
on the one hand and culturally specific ideals on the other. Thirdly, a value-pluralist 
perspective such as Berlin’s holds that many of the different and often incompatible ends 
that human beings seek are fully rational. That means that for a Berlinian value-pluralist 
there might be a number of equally rational ways of settling conflicts between values 
when the conflicting values are all worthwhile, yet incommensurable and sometimes even 
incompatible. So for instance, Homeric bravery and Gandhian non-violence may both be 
worthwhile values but when they conflict there is no rule that would determine which 
quality should override the other. This pluralist view is much closer to moral relativism 
than most other objectivist ethical doctrines, which ascribe to a monistic ethical 
framework that always generates the same type of specific prescriptions in situations of 
value conflicts; for instance, a utilitarian should always act in a way that would maximize 
overall happiness.
Nevertheless, despite these preliminary similarities between value-pluralism and 
moral relativism, it is vital that pluralism is not to be confused ’with the existence of 
entire moral outlooks, conceptual frameworks or Weltanschauungen'40; nor is value- 
pluralism identical with the attitudes expressed through the accounts of anthropologists, 
emotivists or social relativists. Such views ’interpret our moral judgments to be 
components of comprehensive views of the world, so different from one another that they 
are mutually unintelligible’41 thus rendering us unable to reason about them. Pluralism 
says something very different; that, despite the variety of different values and 
perspectives, rational moral judgment is still a possibility. This is so because the fact that
40 ibid., p. 48
41
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‘the values o f one culture may be incompatible with those of the values o f another, or that they 
are in conflict within...a single human being at different times...does not entail relativism of 
value, only the notion of a plurality of values not structured hierarchically’.42
Partly because this plurality of values does not necessarily entail relativism, as 
‘ends, moral principles, are many; but not infinitely many: they must be within the human 
horizon’43, partly because ‘what makes men human is common to them, and acts as a 
bridge between them’44, and despite the fact these values cannot be ranked, Berlin can 
explain value-pluralism in terms of universal intelligibility. That is, he acknowledges the 
existence of contextual values but he denies that this inevitably leads to a radical 
cognitive relativism:
‘Members o f one culture can, by the force of imaginative insight, understand...the values, the 
ideals, the forms of life o f another culture or society, even those remote in time or space. They 
may find values unacceptable, but if  they open their minds sufficiently they can grasp how one 
might be a full human being, with whom one could communicate, and at the same time live in the 
light of values widely different from one’s own, but which nevertheless one can see to be values, 
ends of life, by the realization of which men could be fulfilled’.45
42 Berlin, I.; "Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-Century European Thought" in The Crooked Timber of  
Humanity, edited by Hardy, H. (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1990), p. 80
43 Berlin, I.; "The Pursuit o f the Ideal" in The Crooked Timber o f Humanity, edited by Hardy, H. 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1990), p. 11
44 ibid.
45 ibid., p. 10
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For Berlin, universal intelligibility is not only an essential feature of human 
beings; it is also a necessary condition for the workability of his value-pluralist doctrine. 
It was Davidson who noted that in order to disagree, we have to agree on a mass of other 
things.46 Similarly, if human beings could not agree on a basic framework of values or 
categories of value on the basis of which they would unravel their subsequent 
disagreements, then value pluralist conflicts would be no different than diverging 
perspectives about different world views.
It is important to stress, nevertheless, that whereas Berlin’s commitment to 
universal intelligibility is a characteristic that moves it closer to objectivity, it does not 
guarantee objectivity. For Berlin, moral agents could have intelligible views about their 
respective morality but fail to come up with an agreement regarding the objectivity of 
specific moral values. This disparity could be so radical that it could result in a pluralism 
which in practice often resembles relativism -  even though, in theory, it makes a case for 
its distinction from the latter.
Berlin’s rejection of conceptual relativism enables him to have a sense of moral 
progress which in turn facilitates comparisons between different societies and cultures. 
The rejection of conceptual relativism is a move away from relativism in the sense that 
human moralities exemplify common universal traits. What this means, for instance, is 
that all human beings have an idea of, let’s say, fairness, but that humans disagree on 
what the specific value substantiation of fairness is and how far is to be reconciled with 
other values. Thus, in Berlin’s theory, universal intelligibility gives us non-relativism in
46 Davidson, D., ‘The Very Idea of A Conceptual Scheme’ in his Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1984)
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the sense that Berlin’s theory recognises the existence of universal moral concepts but 
permits the existence of irresolvable value conflicts.
Berlin’s account of the rejection of conceptual relativism has both advantages as 
well as deep problems. As said previously, the anthropological non-relativism that 
Berlin’s theory entails enables it to make normative cross-cultural comparisons, moral 
judgments and demands; a very important feature of any moral theory with a claim to 
objectivity. Moreover, Berlin’s conceptual non-relativism allows for value conflicts and 
permits his radical value pluralism to make a claim to objectivity without necessarily 
having to advocate monism or other less pluralistic moral theories.
On the downside, an understanding of value-pluralism of the sort that Berlin 
presents is one which is applied and makes sense only with respect to a specific view of 
human nature. There are two dangers with this; the first, and the more serious one, is a 
methodological danger, while the second danger is one against which, I believe, Berlin 
has an adequate defence. A line of argument which is based on a specific conception of 
human nature shares all the weaknesses and the uncertainties with the ethical theories 
which are based on grand foundations; they are theories upon which there is rarely 
universal consensus. In addition to this critique, it might be claimed that applying value- 
pluralism to a universal account of human nature is a practice not very much unlike the 
intellectual endeavours of the Enlightenment; endeavours against which Berlin has 
repeatedly and forcefully argued against.47 Despite the appearances, nevertheless, there is 
no real contradiction between Berlin’s anti-Enlightenment discourse and his advocacy of 
a specific conception of human nature, for the latter is very different from the rationalist
47 He did this in his essays ‘The Counter-Enlightenment” and ‘The Apotheosis o f the Romantic Will”.
Both can be found in Berlin, I.; The Proper Study o f Mankind: an Anthology of Essays, edited by Hardy, 
H. (Pimlico: 1998), pp. 243-268 and 553-580 respectably.
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version of it, which was advocated by many of the theorists of the Enlightenment. 
Moreover, even though Berlin holds that not all values are human constructs and that 
some of them are rooted in human nature, he is never explicit about which of these values 
are good and which bad. This is a problem that will be encountered repeatedly not only in 
my elucidation of Berlinian pluralism but in other pluralist variations as well. Also, I 
have argued that Berlin’s advocacy of common universal moral concepts allows for 
cross-cultural normative comparisons. Nevertheless, as radical pluralism allows for the 
occurrence of value conflicts, comparisons within a cultural system, especially in light of 
the lack of any explicit list of morally worthwhile and repugnant options, could be very 
difficult indeed. As a consequence, Berlinian value pluralism would find itself in the 
peculiar position of being able to pass judgment on a cross-cultural basis, but not on an 
intra-cultural one. Even if this position were attainable on a theoretical level, its practical 
instantiation — and hence its application on the political realm — could be very 
problematic.
Moreover, Berlin’s value-pluralism and the idea of radical choice that it entails 
give his liberalism an existentialist element that differentiates it from most other 
liberalisms. According to Berlin, it is through choice that human beings are self-realized. 
The plural and self-creative nature of human beings finds reciprocation in his anti- 
naturalistic view of history which is shaped by the unpredictability and diversity of many 
self-transforming species. In this sense, Berlin’s conception of human nature is mainly a 
historicist and not a naturalist one in that it does not identify, at least explicitly, a 
dominant or unique view of human nature such that all other diversions are considered to 
be merely distorted aspects of that one and only true human nature. Instead, as Gray
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argues, Berlin’s view of human nature is more like the ‘anthropological premise, or pre­
supposition, of his value-pluralism inasmuch as it asserts as a primordial propensity of 
the human species the disposition to form for itself a plurality of diverse natures or...to 
invent for itself a variety of forms of life’.48
In addition, value-pluralism’s anti-relativistic nature is further exposed via its 
recognition of some panhuman generic needs and values -  as opposed to moral 
relativism, which makes ethics in some sense empirical. For an objectivist, it is a fact that 
even if people’s opinions change regarding values, their fundamental human needs do 
not. It is necessary that for one’s own or a group’s life to flourish, one needs to live free 
from the fear of constant and unjustified persecution, one should not be separated from 
loved friends and family, one should not live under extremely hostile conditions of 
hunger and utter poverty and so forth. It is partly considerations of this sort that in 
Berlin’s opinion urged Chaim Weizmann to ‘understand instinctively that people only 
develop freely in a country in which they are not perpetually uneasy about what other 
people think about them, how they look to others, does their behaviour attract 
unfavourable or perhaps too much attention -  are they accepted’.49
So, for Berlin nationality is not only the exemplification of very basic and 
fundamental considerations -  such as protection from hunger and prosecution -  but also, 
as Richard Wollheim notes, the exemplification of the view that ‘man has fundamental 
needs beyond those which arise out of the exigencies of life, and these include the need
48 Gray, J.; Berlin (Fontana Press: 1995), p. 75
49 Exchange between Berlin and the Iranian philosopher Ramin Jahanbegloo sited by Silvers, B. R.; 
‘Introduction to Nationalism and Israel’ in The Legacy o f Isaiah Berlin, edited by Dworkin, R., Lilia M. 
& Silvers B. R., (New York, New York Review o f Books: 2001), pp. 143-144
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for a community in which he can discover his identity’.50 The recognition of the existence 
of universal human needs is an indication of the close relationship between pluralism and 
objectivism. Where this objectivism deviates from the standard monistic objectivism of 
most objective ethical doctrines is that nationality is only one exemplification of a range 
of universal human values. It is a central claim of value-pluralists that in many instances 
these common human needs might conflict in a way that rational inquiry does not yield a 
single solution to the conflict. As I discuss in greater detail later, this is very different 
from the Aristotelian approach to such conflicts which holds that with the exercise of 
practical reason, a rational solution is achievable.
It will be useful to briefly examine the connection between pluralism and moral 
empiricism. Moral empiricism is often misunderstood to be a version of ethical 
relativism. Instead, it would be more accurate to claim that moral empiricism is a reason 
for, rather than a version of, for ethical relativism.51 The fact that moral empiricism does 
not necessarily entail moral relativism is indicated from the combination in value- 
pluralism of moral empiricism with an explicit recognition of universal human goods. 
These goods are derived from Berlin’s recognition of an inherently pluralistic human 
nature, common to all human beings. To the extent that value-pluralism is a moral 
empiricist but not an ethical relativistic doctrine, Berlin is on common grounds with 
Hume. Hume, nevertheless, does not have Berlin’s Herderian or Vicconian belief that 
there is a plurality of virtues. Furthermore, whereas Hume believes that the constancy of
50 Wollheim, R.; ’Berlin and Zionism’ in ibid., p. 164
51 This view is supported by the arguments in Mackie, J. L.; Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977) and Harman, G.; ‘Ethics and Observation’ in Ethical Theory 1: The 
Question of Objectivity edited by Rachels, J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 85-91.
53
human nature is exemplified in common universal moral practices which permeate time 
and culture, Berlin on the other hand believes that culture is inherently plural.
Having clarified that the inclusion of a moral empiricist element in value- 
pluralism is not a sufficient condition for value-pluralism to collapse into simple moral 
empiricism, I will now examine the relationship between value-pluralism and a moral 
relativist understanding of moral empiricism. My examination yields the conclusion that 
it is not so much the case that relativism is a totally distinct and different doctrine from 
Berlin’s value-pluralism, as it is the case that his value-pluralism entails relativism but is 
not exhausted by it.
Steven Lukes defines moral relativism as the claim that 'each culture is valid in its 
own terms, that its norms and principles are only applicable within' and 'that to
• • c lunderstand means not to criticize'.
The relativistic variation in focus is a more constructive statement than radical 
moral scepticism because it stresses the importance 'of caution on those who make, and 
above all apply, moral judgments, especially if they are powerful and do so in alien moral
52 In this, Hume’s account of human nature can be contrasted to the positivist one which Frazier presents in 
his anthropological study The Golden Bough (Frazier, J.; The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and 
Religion (London: Wordsworth, 1922, 1993). Frazier’s aim is to identify through the mystical and religious 
practices of different cultures common human traits according to which, as human beings progress they 
will abandon practices that are as cruel and morally repugnant as the rule that regulated the succession to 
the priesthood of Diana at Aricia. One would expect Berlin to resist such a claim because of his belief in a 
pluralist human nature that exemplifies itself through different cultural practices. But, it is questionable 
how far Berlin could go in this direction since, even though he is by no means a positivist, he allows -  as I 
will discuss later -  for the possibility o f the accumulation of moral knowledge in terms o f the practices that 
we can know are wrong. As a consequence, many cultural practices of the past, such as succession to the 
priesthood o f Diana at Aricia which Frazier describes, should now be considered morally obsolete. This 
position, however, could conflict with Berlin’s aversion to rationalism. On the other hand, all 
encompassing toleration of all cultural practices in the name o f plurality would push Berlin’s theory too far 
into the relativist direction. These are ambiguities which I will subsequently discuss in the chapter.
53 Lukes, S.; Liberals and Cannibals: The Implications of Diversity (London and New York, Verso: 2003), 
pp.7-8
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cultural contexts', a view proposed by Montaigne and espoused by Lukes.54 Berlin also 
notes something along those lines when he recognizes that the validity of some ideals and 
practices is culture-bound:
Each of these [ethical, social and aesthetic cultural] systems is objectively valid in its own day, in 
the course o f 'Nature’s long year' which brings all things to pass. All cultures are equal in the sight 
o f God, each in its time place.55
What is noticeable here with respect to the differences between value-pluralism and 
moral relativism is that ultimately, despite the apparent conclusive relativism of the 
above statement, its expressed theodicy, which is ascribed to Ranke, 'is a complacent 
version of Herder's theses, directed equally against those of Hegel and moral 
scepticism'.56 One should, nevertheless, also keep in mind that the above statement, being 
presented by an advocate of value-pluralism of the sort that Berlin is, ultimately 
constitutes a recognition of the intricate relationship between value-pluralism and moral 
relativism.
It is clear from the above that the difference between Berlin’s pluralism and moral 
relativism is not as straightforward as the difference between pluralism and simple moral 
empiricism. As a consequence, it might seem that Berlinian value pluralism inevitably 
collapses into moral relativism. This would be a wrong conclusion to draw.
For, if  understanding the system of values and practices of a culture entails 
accepting that these values and practices cannot be criticised because of their quality of
54 ibid., p. 8
55 Berlin, I.; "Herder and the Enlightenment" in The Proper Study of Mankind: an Anthology of Essays.
edited by Hardy, H. (Pimplico: 1998), p. 431
56 ibid.
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being part of a certain contextual cultural domain, then it is unavoidable that too much 
value is put on social convention. And if the value put on social convention is so great, 
then it has to be accepted that it was, for example, right -  or at least not condemnable -  
for Oscar Wilde to be put in jail effectively because he was a homosexual; since he was 
acting within a cultural context which judged homosexuals to be morally culpable. In a 
similar manner, a moral relativist would not be able to condemn a culture which in order 
to justify its practice of slavery, would make the spurious claim that "slaves don't suffer". 
A value-pluralist can impugn such a claim due to its commitment on the existence of a 
plurality of universal human goods. Even if slaves were educated, or somehow 
conditioned, to consider a truly miserable existence with a low life expectancy spent 
serving their masters as worthwhile; a value-pluralist could still consider their slavery as 
"unjust", "unworthy" or plainly "wrong".
Value-pluralism’s morally objective and uncompromising stance on some issues 
indicates its possession of moral tools for dealing with issues of false-consciousness; 
tools that the moral relativist lacks. So, despite the opposition of some of the most 
prominent value-pluralists against the grand philosophical project of the Enlightenment to 
ground moral reasoning on universal and rationally undisputed foundations, in this 
instance value-pluralism offers us something that can be seen as an anti-monistic 
Enlightenment project. This anti-monistic and anti-hierarchical Enlightenment project, 
being a direct derivative of value-pluralism, benefits from its pluralistic component and 
allows for the existence of several universally valuable lifestyles in the manner that other 
more monistic and hierarchical Enlightenment projects - such as Aristotle’s - do not. The
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importance of social convention and objectivity are persistent and recurrent themes in the 
study of liberalism and will be referred to and re-examined in due course.
In support of pluralism’s position as a version of moral realism rather than moral 
relativism, one can point to another fundamental conceptual difference per se between 
relativism and value-pluralism. By claiming that each value is contextually true or that 
each lifestyle and cultural practice is valid in each own terms, relativism tries to eliminate 
truth claims about the conflict that inevitably arises between different values or lifestyles. 
Berlin’s value-pluralism on the other hand does exactly the opposite; it tries to lay bare 
the fact that values and lifestyles often conflict in a manner that sometimes forces us to 
take radical choices that entail inescapable wrongs. Any equation between the two moral 
systems is conceptually untenable. It is to this radical character of Berlin’s pluralism that 
I refer in the thesis as “agonistic”.
Contrary to relativism, subjectivism claims that moral judgments are nothing 
more than the avowal of personal feeling and preference. And since, for subjectivism, 
preferences cannot be assessed in terms of truth or falsehood -  unless we are 
misinformed about our factual beliefs -  ‘subjectivism denies that moral knowledge is 
even a possibility’57, let alone the fact that there is such a thing as moral progress. 
Contrary to this position, value-pluralists have a set -  even if an unspecified one -  of 
moral values on which they base their moral judgments. Furthermore, it can be said that 
through the identification of ethical errors one gets a better understanding of the 
constitution and the dynamics of the ethical universe. Similarly, every time one makes a 
moral judgment which is based on a correct conception of the values involved, for 
instance the choice of altruism over unnecessary aggression, one can be said to have
57 Gray, J.; Two faces of Liberalism. (Polity Press: 2000), p. 60
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accumulated moral knowledge.58 This is another instance in which Berlin’s value- 
pluralism can be said to be closer to objectivism than to moral relativism.
To conclude, the distinction between value-pluralism and moral relativism has 
two dimensions. On the one hand, from the perspective of the history of ideas, value- 
pluralism and moral relativism are derived from different sources. Value-pluralism 
derives from the writings of Vico and Herder, relativism from the writings of German 
romantic irrationalism, from the development of schools of thought such as social 
anthropology and from certain other metaphysical doctrines. On the other hand, value- 
pluralism is an anti-relativist doctrine in that it makes an explicit recognition of universal 
human values. Nevertheless, it can still be said to be closer to moral relativism than other 
objectivist moral doctrines as, even though Berlin’s differentiation between value- 
pluralism and moral relativism may ultimately be correct, it is not as sharp and clear as 
Berlin might have hoped. This is mainly due to the fact that pluralism recognises a 
plurality of rational solutions to situations of conflicting values.
3. Berlinian Value-PIuralism and Primary and Secondary Values
Even though Berlin’s argument for the distinction between moral relativism and Berlin’s 
value pluralism is present, it is also often unclear and, ultimately, inconclusive -  as is the 
argument that value pluralism collapses into moral relativism. It might be thought that
58 It begs further inquiry whether this could also be said for one who, for instance, chooses unnecessary 
aggression over altruism, even though she acknowledges the moral culpability o f the latter and the moral 
worth o f the former. Philosophy has given a range of answers upon which there is, as yet, no consensus; 
Aristotle would call it weakness o f will, for Hume there is no connection between the fact o f the matter and 
the action that might result from it while for Kant, to the extent that such behaviour cannot be 
universalised, it is irrational and hence immoral.
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this problem could be surpassed if one held to a theory of values which distinguished 
between what Kekes calls "primary and secondary values".
If Kekes' theory were true, one would decide between two conflicting values with 
respect to which one has primacy over the other. So, if a specific lifestyle insults any one 
from a set of values that Kekes calls primary values, then the values encompassed by the 
lifestyle in question should be overridden by that value. Be that as it may, Kekes’ method 
for the resolution of value-conflicts will not hold if the theory of primary and secondary 
values is unsustainable.
According to Kekes, ‘it seems reasonable to suppose that some benefits and 
harms are, under normal circumstances, universally human’.59 We can call ‘the resulting 
values ‘primary values’” .60 Furthermore, ‘in addition to primary values’ there are values 
that ‘vary with persons, societies, traditions, and historical periods’ which can be called 
‘secondary values’.61 ‘Reasonable people will share primary values because their 
common humanity renders some things beneficial and other harmful. But, reasonable 
people will also recognize that there are vast differences that emerge above the level of
f*yvalues we are bound to hold in common. Secondary values reflect these differences’.
It seems to be the case that Kekes’ thesis is based on a specific conception of what 
constitutes universal human needs and that, moreover, it can be rejected on the grounds 
that reasonable people do not seem to agree on these universal human needs. Human 
nature 'is composed of universally human, culturally invariant, and historically constant
59 Kekes, J.; The Morality o f Pluralism (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press: 1993), p. 18
60 ibid.
61 ibid.
62 ibid., p. 19
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f*!Xcharacteristics'. These characteristics have to do with 'facts about the self, intimacy and 
social order'.64 Primary values are defined in response to the fulfilment of the needs of 
these universal human characteristics. Primary goods are the 'satisfactions' of the above 
needs 'by exercising the capacities included in the description of the facts of human 
nature'.65 Primary evils 'are the frustration of those needs whose satisfaction human 
nature requires'.66 For Kekes it is, indeed, the case that primary goods define ‘the 
minimum requirements of all conceptions of a good life' however such life is conceived 
‘because they are required for the satisfaction of needs that all human beings have due to 
our shared nature’.67
The thesis that there is a consensus on the nature of primary values - and in 
consequence on what constitutes the primary goods and the primary evils - amongst all 
reasonable people is a different type of argument. It is not the thesis from which Kekes 
derives his argument on primary and secondary values. This he does by deriving our 
basic and foremost moral obligations from a specific conception of what constitutes our 
human nature. The thesis that all reasonable people agree on these basic and foremost 
moral obligations is consequential to the previous one.
The latter consequential thesis is a thesis through which one can test the 
soundness of Kekes’ primary and secondary values distinction. If the nature of values is 
the one that Kekes argues that it is, then all reasonable people must perceive it as such 
and agree on it. If such a consensus is not found, then it is the case that either the moral
63 ibid., p. 39
64 ibid., p. 40
65 ibid., p. 41
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
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perceivers are not reasonable or, if these perceivers are indeed reasonable, it is the case 
that the theory is untrue.68
Now, it is a fact that human beings vehemently and often disagree on what 
constitutes a primary value and on whether a good is a primary or a secondary one. There 
are individuals as well as groups that value religion over survival and social order or 
tradition over intimacy. As there is no consensus, the question then is whether these 
people are unreasonable, in which case the implications of the lack of consensus are not 
devastating for the theory, or whether these people are, indeed, reasonable in which case 
the implications of this disagreement for Kekes' theory are more pressing.
Kekes does not provide a systematic account of what constitutes a reasonable
agent. One could nevertheless infer that for him a person can be called reasonable only
insofar as she agrees with his view on human nature and if she acts in a manner that
fulfils certain needs that arise from such a conception of human nature; needs which,
furthermore, must be ranked in a specific hierarchical manner. Any deviation from this
would render a person unreasonable. This is a very rigid approach. There are people that
theorise about human nature differently and identify different basic human traits from the
ones that Kekes identifies, let alone all those who do not recognize an inherent human
nature that is common to all human beings whatsoever. Different people have different
accounts of human nature which influence their moral judgements and moral behaviour.
68 The argument here is that in the case where there is a lack of consensus on the primary values it will be 
either the case that the perceivers are not reasonable - and/or maybe they do not perceive under normal 
conditions - or the argument is unsound. Of course, it might also be the case that both of the above 
conditions occur simultaneously; that is, both the perceivers are unreasonable and the argument is actually 
unsound. When this is the case, one cannot offer a definite disproof o f Kekes' argument. The argument will 
still be unsound, but there will be no way of showing that it is so. In a similar manner, a disproof of Kekes' 
argument - even though it might be actually unsound - will not be possible when the moral perceivers 
perceive under skewed conditions. For more on the relationship between moral judgement and the 
conditions of moral perception look at McDowell, J., ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’ in Ethical Theory 
1: The Question of Objectivity edited by Rachels, J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 210-226
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That is, their actions are consistent with the goals that they recognize to be valid and 
coherent within their own conception of our common human traits. In this sense of the 
term "reasonable", people with different views on human nature and thus, different goals 
and practices, can all act reasonably.
But, this kind of reasonable behaviour - which is equated with rational choice 
theory69 and which Raz calls ‘reasoning capacity’70 - cannot be what Kekes wants us to 
understand by the term “reasonable behaviour”. Kekes is not making an argument about 
what action is consistent or logical, given one’s recognition of any conception of human 
nature. Instead, he is making a moral argument according to which we should act in 
accordance with the common needs of this inherent nature of ours as this, and hence the 
needs and obligations that such a conception prescribes, is so defined by his theory of 
primary and secondary values. What then Kekes means by "reasonable" behaviour is 
"moral" behaviour. But, even in this case, it is not clear why, given the validity of the 
conception of human nature that Kekes proposes, one should act towards the ends that 
human nature prescribes. One can be subjected to such a moral demand only if there is a 
further metaphysical argument in place which specifically demands that one ought to 
promote the ends prescribed by human nature on, let us say for instance, deontological or 
utilitarian grounds. In Kekes’ exposition this argument is nowhere to be found. 
Nevertheless, even if it were to be found, it would have still been unclear why such a 
principle for action should be granted universal priority. Furthermore, even if one went a 
step further and allowed for the existence and universal applicability of such a
69 Allingham, M.; Choice Theory: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
70 Raz, J., Engaging Reason: On The Theory of Value and Action: (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. 69. For Raz’s argument against this account o f rationality see ibid. pp. 69-75.
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metaphysical directive, this directive would contradict Kekes’ anti-rationalist sentiments 
as these are expressed elsewhere.71
Moreover, for Kekes there are conflicts between secondary values that can be 
settled by, to use Larmore’s words, ‘those who think and converse in good faith and 
apply, as best as they can, the general capacities of reason that belong to every domain of
79inquiry'. There are also conflicts between primary and secondary values in which the 
former override the latter. But, Kekes does not give any indication of whether it could 
ever be the case that conflicts between primary values arise and, if they do, how these 
conflicts might be rationally resolved -  were a solution to be even possible. A Berlinian 
value-pluralist, for instance, would claim that irreconcilable conflicts occur within the 
realm of generic values, within the realm of secondary values and between the two 
realms.
In support of Kekes’ theory, one might suggest the defence that it is not so much 
the case that he thinks that conflicts between primary values do not occur, but more the 
case that this is just not the subject with which he concerns himself with. Kekes, this 
response may go, is interested in the conflict between primary and secondary values. The 
conflict within the primary domain, or even the secondary one for that matter, is actually 
an issue that he never rejects explicitly. However, even if this the case, the Berlinian 
pluralist claim in favour of the possibility for an irreconcilable conflict between what 
Kekes calls primary values is still very much relevant and makes the normative demands 
of Kekes’ ethical theory very problematic.
71 See section Value-Pluralism and Monism in the present chapter.
72 Larmore, C.; The Morals o f Modernity (Cambridge University Press: 1996), p. 168
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It is surprising then that contrary to one's expectations Berlin often expresses a 
conception of value which is very similar to Kekes’. This is because, in my opinion, 
Berlin also ends up arguing for the primacy of some values over others - thus making a 
distinction similar to Kekes’ primary and secondary values distinction.
It is Berlin's elaboration on the notion of negative freedom that points towards a 
prioritisation of values, despite the fact that his advocacy of value-pluralism would, as we 
have already seen, commit him to the view that values are incommensurable and, hence, 
impossible to rank. It is true that in his discussion on the value of negative liberty Berlin 
initially recognises that 'individual freedom is not everyone's primary need'73 and that 
'liberty is not the only goal for men’.74 There are a number of other goods and values 
distinct from that of negative liberty that one might have to consider advancing at the 
expense of negative liberty or vice versa:
'If I curtail or lose my freedom in order to lessen the shame of...inequality, and do not thereby 
materially increase the individual liberty of others, an absolute loss o f liberty occurs. This may be 
compensated for by a gain in justice or in happiness or in peace, but the loss remains, and it is a 
confusion of values to say that although my 'liberal', individual freedom may go by the board,
75some other kind of freedom - 'social' or 'economic' - is increased'.
In any case, one is often forced to come up with a maxim on the basis of which one is to 
resolve conflicts between ultimate values that involve an irreversible loss, even if that 
maxim has the form of a 'practical compromise’. Berlin pays tribute to the failed attempts
73 Berlin, I.; "Two Concepts of Liberty" in The Proper Study of Mankind: an Anthology of Essays, edited
by Hardy, H. (Pimplico: 1998), p. 196 
ibid., p. 197
75 ibid., pp. 197-198
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of thinkers such as John Locke, Adam Smith and, at times, Mill to harmonise conflicting 
human interests. The common trait that permeates all of the above attempts as well as the 
attempts of Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine, is the recognition that 
there is a 'portion of human existence' that 'must remain independent of the sphere of 
social control. To invade that preserve, however small, would be despotism'. It is a fact 
of life, nevertheless, that 'we can not remain absolutely free and must give up some of our 
liberty to preserve the rest'.77 The amount of liberty that we are prepared to give up in 
exchange for some other valuable goods varies and is different in different situations. 
But, 'total self-surrender is self-defeating'.78 There must be a minimum level of freedom 
which cannot be given up; that minimum level being the one that 'a man cannot give up 
without offending against the essence of his human nature'.79 This minimum level of
•  SOfreedom is designated by the value of negative liberty. Negative liberty, not unlike 
some other 'absolute stands', like belief in 'natural law' or 'the word of God' or 'in the 
permanent interests of man', is 'grounded so deeply in the actual nature of men' that it is
o  |
'an essential part of what we mean by being a normal human being'.
Berlin's thesis here is similar to Kekes' in three specific respects. First, Berlin 
makes an argument for the primacy of a value -  a very minimal and basic version of 
negative liberty -  over other values. Negative liberty for Berlin is intrinsically valuable, 
unlike Mill whose perfectionist standpoint values freedom mainly because it contributes 
to individuality, a position very much influenced by the German tradition of
76 ibid., p. 198
77 ibid.
78 ibid.
79 ibid.
80 Berlin does not try to mask the fact that the borders o f negative liberty are elusive. On the contrary he 
elaborates on this in an extensive and important note in ibid., p. 202.
81 ibid., pp. 235-236
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Romanticism. Second, the primacy of negative liberty over other values is derived from a 
specific conception of human nature. It is also noticeable that Berlin’s conception of 
human nature is not a rationalist one, according to the tradition of the Enlightenment, but 
a rather historicist one which is based, very much like Kekes’ conception, on the 
recognition of some panhuman generic goods. Berlin’s theorization on the issue is, 
nevertheless, rationalist not because of the fact that his historicist conception of human 
nature has negative liberty as a necessary ingredient, but because for Berlin negative 
liberty is intrinsically valuable and it is ultimately this that gives it primacy over other 
values in his liberalism. It should also be noted that a primacy of that sort is not only 
rationalist, but it also contradicts the non-hierarchical aspect of his value-pluralism. 
Third, it seems that the importance of negative liberty is so great and that it is embedded 
so deeply into what we consider to be a normal life, that everyone recognises it to be so. 
This is a very similar claim to Kekes’ argument that all reasonable people would agree on 
the nature and the composition of primary values.
In addition, one might be tempted to argue that Berlin’s view with regards to the 
possibility of bridgeable moral differences is similar to Kekes’ conception of secondary 
values. It is true that the two ideas are similar in that they refer to conflicts which can be 
effectively settled. They are still different, however, in that Berlin’s view of this 
settlement can be seen as a more amicable one in the sense that the conflicts in question 
can be resolved by resource to cognitive realism or mutual understanding. Kekes, on the 
other hand, makes no such claim. For him, secondary values represent a domain of values 
in which people are allowed to disagree on as they are not as important as the vital
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primary values and since they are conceived without exclusive reference to human nature 
and needs, but rather with appeal to people's backgrounds, experiences, culture etc.
Overall, it can be said that the commitment to a theory of value similar to the one 
embraced by Kekes is not an asset for Berlin's system of ideas, partly because the truth of 
Kekes’ theory was shown to be far from evident. Furthermore, considering other 
tendencies in Berlin's writings, such as his attempt to avoid an endorsement of anything 
more elaborate than a very minimal conception of the existence of a common human 
nature and his rejection of rationalism82 - even though his success on both of these 
attempts is dubious -  his support for a Kekesian theory of values would be incoherent. In 
order for Berlin to account for such a theory, he would have to hold to some idea of 
progress - which might in itself contradict other aspects of Berlin's system of ideas, such 
as his criticism of J.S. Mill's meliorism. It is true, nevertheless, that even though Berlin 
would argue against Mill’s strong sense of moral progress, he would still commit himself 
to the subtler view that moral progress does, indeed, occur in the sense that moral agents 
can come to understand what constitutes a moral wrongdoing. This modest sense of 
progress, however, is not expressed in as solid and definite grounds as it is in Kekes’ 
theory, which appeals to a very specific conception of human nature. Instead, Berlin’s 
modest sense of moral progress is rather based on the romantic belief that even though 
pan-human mutual understanding may not create an agreement on all forms of the good, 
it may eventually lead to a mutual recognition on the practices which are wrong. As a 
consequence, despite the elusive nature of Berlin’s ethical theory and its ambiguous 
relationship with monism and relativism, a sense of moral progress can still be identified 
in Berlin’s system of ideas. Even if Kekes’ view must ultimately appeal to the above
82 See ibid., pp. 212-216.
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condition in order to make its case for the pan-human applicability and recognition of 
primary values, it does aim to make a much stronger and more specific point in terms of 
moral knowledge since it gives a number of particular human needs the violation of 
which constitutes moral wrong.
In spite of his commitment to some form of moral progress and his conviction in 
’our ability to recognise virtually universal values', Berlin still holds that rationalist 
'efficiency and organisation should not be regarded as the ultimate goals in life'. 
Nevertheless, he still values reason as enabling means for ‘men and women to live better 
and happier lives' and to 'diminish the bruising conflicts between good ends'. Moreover, 
Berlin’s claim that 'reason is needed to sort out the conflicting claims of justice, mercy, 
privation and personal freedom' on the basis of the context in which they arise is an 
indication of his belief in social progress, albeit — due to value pluralism -  not to a 
strongly positivistic one.83 Kekes’ moral theory, on the contrary, is one which would 
indicate a much stronger and more explicit view of what constitutes social development. 
For Kekes, any social context which does not fulfil the moral demands set out by generic 
values is problematic whereas any establishment of practices which fulfil these demands 
is a step in the right direction.
4. Berlinian Value-Pluralism and Monism
The monistic idea that 'One is good, Many - diversity - is bad, since the truth is one, and 
only error is multiple’ is much older than the western tradition of the Enlightenment, 'and
83 All quotes are from Annan, N., "Foreword" to Berlin, I.; The Proper Study o f Mankind: an Anthology 
of Essays, edited by Hardy, H. (Pimplico: 1998), pp. xiii-xiv.
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£4deeply rooted in the Platonic Tradition’. Monists Tiold that the diverse goods human
Of
beings seek are forms of, or derive from, a single overarching good’. They share with 
value-pluralists a common objectivist approach to the moral universe, but lack the 
component of pluralism, which is central to value-pluralism. Furthermore, the moral 
universe of the monist is one in which all moral facts can be organised and co-exist 
harmoniously with (or within) an overarching universal monistic principle. As Lukes puts 
it, these moral facts ’can be subject to a complete and consistent ordering - or if they are 
’moral Utopians', monists may believe, as Marx and Engels did, that the incompatibility 
can be overcome by overcoming the conditions that generated it'. Value-pluralism on 
the other hand rejects the notion of the rational harmonious co-existence of different 
values and moral facts. 'Ends, moral principles, are many', albeit 'within a human 
horizon'; but are also irreconcilable, and between these irreconcilable moral principles
07
'we are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable loss' or as
00
Dworkin puts it: ‘an irredeemable moral stain’. On a political level, the momstic 'notion 
of a perfect civilisation in which the ideal human being realises his full potentialities' is 
for Berlin 'absurd' and 'not merely difficult to formulate, or impossible to realise in
84 Berlin, I.; "The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will: The Revolt against the Myth o f an Ideal World" in 
The Proper Study of Mankind: an Anthology of Essays, edited by Hardy, H. (Pimplico: 1998), p. 553. Also 
on this topic look at Popper, K.; The Open Society and its Enemies Vol I: The Spell o f Plato (London, 
Routledge [& Kegan Paul Ltd.]: 2003 [1945]) and Popper, K.; The Poverty of Historicism (London. 
Routledge [& Kegan Paul Ltd.]: 2002 [1957]), pp. 50-95 [chapter III].
85 Lukes, S.; Liberals and Cannibals: The Implications of Diversity (London and New York, Verso: 2003), 
p. 91
86 ibid.
87 Berlin, I.; "The Pursuit o f the Ideal" in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, edited by Hardy, H. 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1990), p. 11 and p. 13
88 Dworkin, R.; “Do Liberal Values Conflict?” in The Legacy o f Isaiah Berlin, edited by Dworkin, R., 
Lilia M. & Silvers B. R. (New York, New York Review of Books: 2001), p. 80.
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practice, but incoherent and unintelligible1.89 For Berlin, the notion that moral principles
Oftdo not constitute a ’perfect whole’ is a ’conceptual truth'.
Pluralists argue for the plurality and the incompatibility of moral values in the 
first instance from an empirical standpoint. We do, in fact find ourselves in situations 
where any of the available choices will entail not only an irreversible loss but, also, an 
inevitable and often irrevocable wrong. This loss is anticipated by value-pluralism since 
there are many distinct and different worthwhile values, only some of which can be 
feasibly chosen. As Berlin puts it:
’...in choosing one thing [we] lose another, irretrievably perhaps... If we choose justice, we may 
be forced to sacrifice mercy.. .If we choose equality we may be forced to sacrifice some degree of 
individual freedom. If we choose to fight for our lives, we may sacrifice many civilised values, 
much that we have laboured greatly to create. Nevertheless, the glory and dignity o f man consist 
in the fact that it is he who chooses’.91
The loss can be more excruciating when the dilemma is between radical choices but 
irreversible losses also occur when one is engaged in less agonising dilemmas. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the thesis that choice making entails losses is not 
necessarily a position embraced only by value-pluralists. A monist, as I will discuss 
shortly, might well recognize that a decision concerning one value might necessitate the 
loss of another value and that this loss might be tormenting. Nevertheless, this type of
89 Berlin, I.; Four Essays on Liberty (London and New York, Oxford University Press: 1969), p. Iv
90 Berlin, I.; "The Pursuit o f the Ideal" in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, edited by Hardy, H.
(Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1990), p. 13
91 Berlin, I.; "European Unity and its Vicissitudes" in The Crooked Timber of Humanity, edited by Hardy, 
H. (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1990), pp. 201-202
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monist could still hold to the position that, no matter how saddening, there is only one 
correct way of action since there must be one overriding value. So, the position that 
choice making entails loss is not a monopoly of the value-pluralist conviction nor is it 
necessarily derived from value-pluralist premises alone; it can, also, be compatible with 
some versions of monism.
What is peculiar to the value-pluralist position is the claim that our moral choices 
often involve not only an irreversible loss, but also an irreversible wrong. In William 
Styron’s novel Sophie's Choice, 'a Nazi forces Sophie, a Polish Mother in a concentration 
camp, to choose which one of her children will live and which one will die’.92 If she does 
not make a choice, both of them are condemned. If one approaches the moral dilemma 
from a utilitarian monistic perspective, given the circumstances and assuming Sophie’s 
attachment to each one of her two children is equal and that she was coerced in this 
position, there is one "correct" course of action which does, undoubtedly, involve a great 
loss and suffering but which does not involve moral wrong. This action will be the one 
that maximises utility -  or in this case minimises loss of it -  and would entail that Sophie 
makes a choice about which one of her children is to live and which is to die without 
recognising any wrong in that choice. A deontologist, on the contrary, would claim that 
wrong is committed since it is the case that a mother has to decide on the death of her 
child. If Sophie decided not to choose any one of her children, something which would 
result in the death of both, the wrongness of infanticide would be avoided - at least on an 
initial level, because ultimately she would still commit infanticide because, by not 
choosing anyone of the two, both of her children are condemned to death. If we assume
92 Gaus, G. F.; Contemporary Theories o f Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project 
(Sage Publications: 2003), p. 41
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that no such wrong is committed when Sophie does not choose between her children, 
then it is only natural to acknowledge that utilitarian concerns should come into 
consideration, for two lives will be lost instead of one.
A value-pluralist recognises the relevance of both the deontic and the utilitarian 
concerns in this moral dilemma which entails an inescapable and irreversible wrong. No 
matter how Sophie decides, apart from the loss and the emotional torment, at least one of 
the children, as well as Sophie, would be inescapably wronged. This value-pluralist 
conclusion is evidence of the elusive pessimism that often permeates Berlin's writings 
and which co-exists with his humane and optimistic celebration of the plurality of 
valuable lifestyles which human beings can choose to pursue.
It should be noted, however, that for the Berlinian value-pluralist there also exist 
choices which involve an irrevocable loss, but not necessarily an inescapable wrong. 
When one has to choose between a repugnant option and a valuable option, there is no 
wrong entailed in choosing the valuable one, despite the fact that in choosing the valuable 
option, one loses the repugnant one. It is important here to stress that for Berlin, human 
beings exercise their freedom appropriately not only between valuable options but also 
between repugnant ones and when in a dilemma, one is chosen while the other is lost. 
The fact that the lost option is not a valuable one is not a reason for Berlin to not consider 
it a loss. It is only a reason to not consider the loss of it to also entail the committal of 
wrong.
In another general counter-argument against monism, value-pluralists point to the 
inconclusiveness of the monist position since, so far, there has been no obvious 
agreement on what the monistic overarching moral principle is. For Berlin, 'we are faced
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with conflicting values; the dogma that they must somehow, somewhere be reconcilable
Q<* ^
is a mere pious hope; experience shows that it is false'. These reasons are more intuitive 
and empirical than deductive and do not constitute a proof of the plurality and 
incompatibility of moral principles.94 When put together, though, they are an indication 
of the possibility of the correctness of value-pluralism; or, in any case, at the very least 
they lay bare the possibility of the monist argument being void.95
A very elaborate account of the nature, similarities and differences of monism 
with value-pluralism is given by Kekes who distinguishes between three different types 
of monism.96 According to Kekes, what unites pluralists and monists is the acceptance of 
the fact that conflicts between values occur. What differentiates monists from pluralists is 
the monistic denial of the significance of such a conflict. The pluralists subscribe to a 
pluralist theory of values that interprets these conflicts as conflicts between ultimate 
values. For a value pluralist the empirical fact that conflicts between values occur is an 
affirmation of the truth of the value-pluralist doctrine. The monist explanation of the 
above conflict is very different from the pluralist one and it varies. An initial monistic 
response could be that appearances are deceiving and that the nature of these conflicts is 
contextual and not one between ultimate values. A second response could be that that the 
value conflicts that we experience in life are, indeed, conflicts between ultimate values; 
these values are, nevertheless, commensurable and a single value that outweighs all the 
others can be found. A third response tries to reconcile value-pluralism with monism by
93 Berlin, I.; "European Unity and its Vicissitudes" in The Crooked Timber o f Humanity, edited by Hardy, 
H. (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1990), p. 201
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empiricism cannot account for the objectivist component of value-pluralism.
95 For a more detailed account of this look at Crowder, G.; Liberalism and Value-Pluralism (London and 
New York, Continuum: 2002), pp. 64-73
96 Kekes, J.; The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1993), pp. 51-75
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focusing on the similarities of the two doctrines. Finally, a fourth response that is not 
monistic as such, but which is closer to monism than it is to pluralism, is the one 
advocated by Dworkin according to which if one redefines values appropriately one can 
do away with Berlin’s agonistic conflict.
The first explanation, which has been advocated from as early as Plato, has 
already been partly examined elsewhere in this chapter. According to monism, 
incompatibility is only apparent and is due to human beings’ irrationality. There is only 
one summum bonnum, nothing else should count as a value, or if it does, it is only 
secondary and instrumental for achieving the one intrinsic value which will be 
interpretable at a higher and more refined level of moral consciousness. A classic 
counter-argument to this view is the Kantian argument directed against all transcendental 
metaphysical theories. A value-pluralist would not accept the latter counter-argument to 
this - rather crude - form of monism because a dangerous consequence of such an 
acceptance would be to shake the moral universalism which pluralism advocates. If the 
pluralist does use the Kantian argument against this form of monism, the monist could 
resort to abandoning the metaphysical part of his claim and argue that we can’t find the 
summum bonnum because of our incapacity for adequate rational reasoning. But, argues 
Kekes, ’what reason is there for disturbing appearances in this case? Why should we 
doubt what millions of reasonable people conceive as being clashes between
0 7  •incommensurable and incompatible choices?' To this extent, these anti-rationalist 
arguments are similar to the ones proposed by Berlin and Oakeshott.
The second version of monism which is presented by Kekes and tries to offer an 
alternative explanation of the occurrence of moral conflicts is the one that recognizes the
97 ibid., p. 66
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existence of ultimate values on the one hand, but does not recognize their 
incommensurability on the other. In this view, ultimate values might clash but, because of 
a commitment to a metaphysical doctrine, one could come up with a specific ranking 
which gives priority to one value over all the others. This monistic view is similar to the 
kind of monism expressed earlier in that it is often grounded in a metaphysical conviction 
and, thus, is also subject to the same anti-rationalist critiques. Where it differs from the 
former view is that whereas the former considered all conflicts to be contextual, the latter 
accepts that ultimate values conflict; but from this conflict one single overriding value 
always emerges. Values might be ultimate, but some carry more weight than others. So, 
an extreme egalitarian might accept that equality and liberty are ultimate values, but 
when the two are in conflict we should always decide on the side of equality, no matter 
what the cost and loss in terms of liberty.
Kekes seems to believe that a monistic view of a similar kind can come about by
Q O
substituting for values ‘equivalent units of some medium'. He lists a number of 
problems why this view cannot be accepted — one of which is that because it is hard, if 
not impossible, to come up with a universal idea of what that medium might be, it is 
mistaken to rank values according to such a principle. If that medium is defined by 
something like Bentham's hedonistic utilitarianism, it will be opposed by systems of 
ideas, such as Mill's, which advocate quality differences between different experiences." 
This latter view, however, moves away from an objective medium of evaluation to a 
more subjective one. These criticisms are valid and they point to the problems that are 
entailed in substituting values for some other medium. Nevertheless, what Kekes misses
98 ibid., p. 67
99 See Mill, J. S.; Utilitarianism edited by Sher, G. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979)
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is that this is a methodology of ranking values that does not necessarily lead to a monistic 
outlook unless it is conjoined with a specific monistic metaphysical conviction of the sort 
that was examined earlier. This is because comparing values via some other universal 
medium give us different rankings between values when they are examined under 
different circumstances. This counter-argument would be embraced by Berlin’s value- 
pluralism and it relates to the significance and the role which he ascribes to human reason 
in aiding our moral judgments. Reason tries to assist us -  and not make a normative 
single prescriptive ruling -  in deciding whether we should choose ‘boots or Pushkin’, as 
Berlin puts it, according to the situation in which we find ourselves in. Furthermore, the 
substitution of values by some other medium will be accepted by lexical value-pluralists 
who recognize the existence of many values but, nevertheless, hold that some values will 
always override the others. This is a view which is closer to monism than Berlin’s 
pluralism but, at least at a first glance, it cannot be said to be a straightforward variation 
of monism. The issue becomes more complex when a lexical value-pluralist recognizes 
only a very limited number of overriding values. In such a situation, what should count as 
an adequate number of values above which one might be called a pluralist? In any case, it 
should be clear that the ranking of values according to some medium couldn’t give us a 
monistic conclusion by itself, as Kekes seems to assume. In order to derive a monistic 
theory of value from it, one would have to resort back to some sort of metaphysical 
doctrine which ranks values in a specific manner that gives superiority to a single 
overriding value. The other possibility would be to make an observation according to 
which the method of ranking values according to some medium would always show that 
a specific value always scores higher in the ranks than all others, independently of its
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application in time, place, context, and different cultures. To my knowledge, this has not 
been shown to be true of any value.
The third version of monism which Kekes refers to, the ’Canonical Principle for 
Ranking Values' tries to reconcile itself with value-pluralism by working on the 
similarities of the two doctrines rather than on the differences. Pluralists and monists 
disagree about the causes of conflicts. Nevertheless, they agree on the actual occurrence 
of conflicts and, more importantly, they agree about the importance of settling conflicts. 
The 'strong sense’ of this monism is one where values are ranked into higher and lower 
values. At first glance, this approach might seem compatible with pluralism, especially if 
one substitutes "higher values" for "worthwhile options" and "lower values" for 
"unworthwhile ones". Nevertheless, this 'strong sense' approach collapses into either one 
of the previous two versions of monism which I have already mentioned and found 
incompatible with value-pluralism -  some values will be ranked higher than others either 
because of some transcendental metaphysical principle or because they score higher in 
some ranking unitary medium. In the weak sense of monism, there is still the insistence 
'on the need for a ranking of different types of values, for unless it was available, there 
would be no principled way of resolving conflicts among values'.100 The weak 
interpretation, nevertheless, 'does not suppose that the ranking is, or must be, based 
exclusively on characteristics intrinsic to values’ like the strong sense does.101 Kekes thus 
concludes that the weak interpretation 'is consistent with the pluralistic view that the 
conflicting values are incompatible and incommensurable'.102
100 Kekes, J.; The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton, Princeton University Press: 1993), p. 75
101 ibid.
77
To the extent that the resolution of these conflicts should be principled, indeed, 
there might be common ground between this type of monism and value-pluralism. But, 
this is questionable. As William Galston notes, many of the contemporary conflicts in 
modem polities are not conflicts between good options and bad options. They are 
conflicts between equally worthwhile alternatives between which the value-pluralist does 
not necessarily find a principled -  to the extent that "principled” means "rational" -  way 
to resolve these conflicts. Many of the decisions taken depend on contingent 
circumstance or contextual co-ordinates.103 Furthermore, practical reasoning might 
demand that in different circumstances different frameworks of action might be necessary 
instead of any repeatable and principled plan of decision-making. Thus, if principled 
resolution of value-conflicts is not possible, then the ranking that it implies, even by this 
weaker version of the ’Canonical Monism’, is still contradictory to the 
incommensurability that is entailed in value-pluralism.
Another objection to value-pluralism with monist tendencies which is worth 
considering is the one advocated by Dworkin. Dworkin interrogates Berlin’s value- 
pluralism by making use of the paradigm instance of two -  only apparently and not in 
reality, in his view -  conflicting values: liberty and equality -  an example which Berlin 
first made use of in order to illustrate the conflicting character of values.104 In a nutshell, 
Dworkin does not refute the fact that in choosing liberty over justice irreversible loss 
occurs. He refutes the claim that the conflict is deep and radical. For Dworkin, the 
conflict between liberty and justice is contingent or merely contextual. It ceases to be a
103 See Galston, W. A., Liberal Pluralism: The Implications o f Value-Pluralism for Political Theory and 
Practice (Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press: 2002)
104 Dworkin, R., ‘Do Liberal Values Conflict?’ in Dworkin, R., Lilia. M & Silvers, R. B. [eds.], The
Legacy of Isaiah Berlin: (New York, New York Review Books: 2001), pp. 73-90
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conflict when it is understood that liberty is derived from justice. If the apparent conflict 
between the two was correctly resolved by getting the definitions of liberty and justice 
right, no one would be wronged.105
Bernard Williams’ reply is that if, in a given situation, some people think that they 
were wronged because they have different conceptions of, say, liberty and justice from 
the ones that prevailed and on the basis of which a decision which violates their liberty in 
favour of justice was made, then they would advocate a different solution to the issue. 
These people might not necessarily think that the political decision that was taken is 
unfair since they are a minority in a pluralist society, but they still ‘have a complaint 
about what came out of it: this is not a complaint of being wronged, but it certainly is not 
just a complaint to the effect that their interests have lost out’.106 Their conception of 
liberty has been violated for a conception of justice that they do not share. This makes 
them have ‘a complaint in liberty even though they do not think that they were 
wronged’.107
The extent to which Berlin would find himself in agreement with such a line of 
argument is an issue which exposes a deep tension in Berlin’s system of ideas. For 
Berlin, for good or bad, the correct understanding of liberty is an understanding on the 
grounds of negative liberty. If we accept Williams’ counter-argument to Dworkin, then 
value-pluralism would have to base its defence on the grounds that some people express a 
complaint about the violation of some values, as these are subjectively understood by
105 Williams, B., ‘Liberalism and Loss’ in Dworkin, R., Lilia. M & Silvers, R. B. [eds.], The Legacy of  
Isaiah Berlin: (New York, New York Review Books: 2001), pp. 91-103
106 ibid., p. 99
107 ibid.
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themselves or the group in which they belong. The acceptance of such a line of defence 
relativises pluralism in a manner that Berlin would be reluctant to accept.
For Berlin, ethical reality is not just an observation. If it were, value-pluralism 
would be identical with simple moral empiricism. The observation that there are many 
radically different lifestyles, cultural practices and values is an empirical one. Unless one 
is an extreme moral empiricist -  and value-pluralists are moral empiricists to some 
degree -  it does not logically follow from the empirical observation that one can infer an 
ontological truth; namely that all of these lifestyles, practices and values are worthwhile. 
Such a relativistic interpretation of value-pluralism rests on a discourse that identifies 
cultural relativism with scepticism regarding moral values. Value-pluralism is 
incompatible with such a radically sceptical conception of moral values. So, Berlin 
argues for one understanding of liberty despite the fact that different people seem to 
understand different things when they refer to it. As was noted elsewhere, this approach 
allows value-pluralists to deal with issues of false-consciousness and gives them the 
moral tools to make objective moral judgments. Value-pluralists would agree with 
Dworkin on this point, for it is the case for both of them that the ethical world cannot be 
known by mere observation. Since this is the case then, how could value-pluralism be 
different from monism?
Maybe the reason for this difference is a matter of degree. It might be simply the 
case that pluralism is more willing to allow for a greater range of conflicting values - 
after exhaustive interrogation has taken place - than Dworkin is. The difficulty that a 
pluralist finds in giving the exact number of these values is one of the reasons, as has 
already been noted above, for the intricate relationship between pluralism and moral
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relativism. Another reason for the difference between pluralism and the specific theory 
that Dworkin advocates is the different position that rationality holds in the two doctrines. 
A pluralist holds that there are not good enough reasons to put rationalism over the 
perception, held by the vast majority of people, that many worthy values are incompatible 
and conflicting. This is the empiricist side of relativism, which comes into tension with 
its more objectivist side that recognizes the actual existence of some universal values, 
though Berlin claims these are also in some sense empirically derived. On the other hand, 
Dworkin’s theory errs on the side of rationalism. The reason for this, Dworkin claims, is 
that value-pluralism is ‘too often cited as a kind of excuse for not confronting the most 
fundamental substantive issues’ since it is much more difficult ‘to do the hard work of 
actually trying to identify the right conceptions of the values in question’.108
This approach cannot always work, for it is undisputable that there are some cases 
in which values conflict -  such as the allocation of resources between scientific research 
and social justice. In this case it would be absurd to redefine scientific research in a 
restrictive way that would allow it to be carried out with the money that would be 
available in a just allocation. Dworkin would agree to the absurdity of this on the grounds 
that scientific research is a much easier term to define than liberty is and that its 
difference from social justice is much clearer than the difference between liberty and 
social justice. To this many post-modernist theorists and social constructivists, would 
vehemently disagree since for them neither science nor scientific research can been seen 
independently from social or sexual contingencies.109 This would lead Dworkin to adopt
108 Dworkin, R., ‘Discussion on Pluralism’ in ibid., p.124 and p.125
109 For instance look at Foucault, M.; The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology o f Medical Perception trans. 
by Sheringham Smith, A. M. (London: Tavistok Publications, 1973) and Fox Keller, E. & Longino, H.
E. [eds.]; Feminism and Science (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)
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an extreme rationalist position that would dictate how each and every value ought to be 
understood or to get consumed into virtually endless definitional endeavours. It should be 
clear by now that pluralism is distinct from both the above positions, the former of which 
is very close to monism while the latter could conceivably collapse into relativism.
To conclude, I found similarities between Berlinian value-pluralism and monism 
in that both are objectivist moral doctrines and in that they both accept -  with the 
exception of Dworkin’s monistic theory -  that conflicts between values occur. 
Furthermore, some moderate versions of monism recognize, as the pluralists also do, that 
losses often occur when choosing in situations of value-conflicts. Monists, nevertheless, 
do not share the value-pluralist view that in many instances, when choosing in situations 
of value-conflicts, the committal of an irreversible wrong is unavoidable. On top of this, 
Berlinian value-pluralism can be said to be different from at least four specific types of 
monism. It is different from a monism that explains value-conflicts in terms of human 
irrationality; it is different from a monism that substitutes for values equivalent units of 
some medium; and it is also different from the ‘Canonical Principle for Ranking Values’ 
because the latter contradicts the component of Berlinian value-pluralism which holds 
that values cannot be ranked. As I will discuss later on in the chapter, this latter type of 
monism could be compatible with the lexical variation of value-pluralism. Finally, value- 
pluralism does not accept the view that in a situation of value conflicts we can always 
redefine the conflicting values so that the conflict disappears.
Before I proceed to the next chapter, where I discuss the variations of Berlinian 
value pluralism and their compatibility with different liberalisms, a brief comparative 
analysis between Berlinian pluralism and intuitionism will further illuminate some of the
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issues that have arisen thus far. They will illuminate them, because such a comparison 
reveals not only the similarities between Berlinian pluralism and intuitionism, but also 
because it points towards some the common ground between Berlin’s pluralism and 
Aristotle’s system of ideas.
5. Berlinian Value-Pluralism and Moral Intuitionism
While Berlinian pluralism is closer to moral relativism than other objective monist moral 
theories, it does make strong moral claims about the wrongness of some moral 
judgements and practices. When pressed hard, it was very difficult for Berlinian 
pluralism to come up with an immaculate philosophical defence which at the same time 
paid adequate tribute to both its objectivist and pluralist aspirations.
In this sense, it can be said that Berlin’s value pluralism is similar to the 
intuitionism of Henry Sidwick, H.A. Prichard and especially W.D. Ross.110 Intuitionists 
like Prichard think that much of moral philosophy is too abstract to make any substantial 
and persuasive arguments for moral behaviour. Consequently, as Philip Stratton-Lake 
observes, they insist that ‘ordinary moral thought be taken more seriously than it often 
is’.111
One way to argue for such a case would be to use the Oakeshottian view that there 
is a lot of tacit and non-theorized moral knowledge in existing practices and traditions 
which is embodied in habits and common sense morality. This is a different process of
110 See Sidwick, H.; The Methods of Ethics. (London, Macmillan, 1907), Prichard, H .A .; Moral Writings 
edited by MacAdam, J., (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 2002) and Ross, W.D.; The Foundations o f Ethics. 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1939).
111 Stratton-Lake, P.; ‘Introduction’ in Stratton-Lake, P. [ed.J; Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations. 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press: 2002), p. 26
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perception of moral knowledge to the one that Brad Hooker calls ‘faculty intuitionism’. 
The latter is a ‘special [intuitionist] faculty capable of apprehending moral truths’ which, 
Hooker also notes, ‘few philosophers currently accept’.112 Even though Oakeshott never 
fully elaborates on the details of how this process actually operates, it is different from 
‘faculty intuitionism’ in the sense that it does not appeal to the epistemic capacity of 
moral agents to grasp meta-ethical truths as the latter does. Instead, it appeals to the 
epistemic capacity of humans to make use of and to often -  but not always -  explicitly 
perceive knowledge that is hidden and incorporated into tradition. Similarly, Hayek’s 
conservative theory is different from Oakeshott’s described above because, although it 
adopts views that might appear common in given societies, they are the product of a 
social evolutionary process. Hayek’s strong sense of rationalism is an aspect of his theory 
that would render it incompatible with intuitionism.
Ross’ intuitionism is different from all of the above theories. Berys Gaut refers to 
it as one which embodies pluralist ideals in the sense that it holds that ‘there is a plurality 
of first-order moral principles stating what one has moral reason to do; that these 
principles may conflict in theory application to particular cases; and that there is no 
higher-order moral principle which in each case of conflict ranks one first-order principle 
above another’.113 Ross’ appeal, however, to ‘what most men think’114 is not unqualified 
since he claims that moral common sense should go together with critical reflection. The 
latter is necessary in order to unmask faults and moral misperceptions.
112 Hooker, B.; ‘Intuitions and Moral Theorizing’, in Stratton-Lake, P. [ed.J; Ethical Intuitionism: Re- 
evaluations. (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 2002), p. 161
113 Gaut, B.; ‘Justifying Moral Pluralism’ in Stratton-Lake, P. [ed.J; Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations. 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press: 2002), p. 138
114 Ross, W.D.; The Right and the Good (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1930), p. 23
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It seems to me that this aspect of Ross’ theory is very similar to that of Berlin’s. 
Both have an aversion to over-theorizing and attempt to put the human agent and the 
immediacy of human experience before abstract moral contemplation. Both, at the same 
time, recognise the fallibility of human beings which is due as much to their inherent 
individual fallible nature as much as it is due to the, often misguiding, influence that 
human beings are subject to in the context of social, political and other structures. 
Consequently, irrespective of whether they are true or false, the two theories are also 
similar insofar as they both reject simple moral empiricism.
This approach ultimately begs the question of when does one know that the 
combination of moral reflection and common moral sense will yield truly right principles 
and concepts. I find Ross’ response to this issue, which is that right moral principles are 
self-evident, unsatisfactory. Berlin’s response to questions regarding the moral behaviour 
of agents operating under conditions of radical moral conflict is rather similar and, also, 
to some extent unsatisfactory since it is not very specific and fully developed.
Moreover, Berlin’s theory of pluralism and Ross’ intuitionism share some more 
similar problems. Ross’ theory is often criticised for having to ultimately appeal to 
another meta-ethical or higher order principle such as utility. If it does, then its appeal to 
self-evident moral knowledge is severely curbed.115 Similarly, Berlin’s theory might have 
to resort to some similar ultimate appeal; one may claim that the solution of Berlin’s 
dilemma between ‘boots or Pushkin’ is based on an ultimate appeal to a utilitarian 
calculus.
115 This argument is made by Gaut in Gaut, B.; ‘Justifying Moral Pluralism’ in Stratton-Lake, P. [ed.]; 
Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations. (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 2002), p. 143-145
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In addition, Ross’ appeal to self-evident moral principles and facts is counter­
intuitive since there is no convergence between individuals or groups about what 
comprises a self-evident moral truth. In some degree, Berlin’s account of radical conflict 
and untamed value pluralism does account for that. However, Berlin’s theory is subject to 
very much the same criticism, i.e. the observation of lack of convergence on universal 
human goods.
To conclude, irrespective of whether moral intuitionism and radical pluralism are 
true ethical theories, they share a number of characteristics and, as a consequence, 
problems.
6. Berlinian Value Pluralism and Aristotelian Theory
Pluralist sentiments found few echoes within the ancient Greek philosophical tradition. If 
some pluralist elements were to be found, however, one would probably find them in the 
works of Aristotle.
It was Aristotle who thought that the best lives that human beings could attain -  
which, should be noted, would always be second best to the purely philosophising lives 
of the Gods -  are the ones which contain many goods. One of the major differences 
between the two theories is that, whereas for Aristotle it is possible for all these goods to 
be combined both in general and within a single life, for Berlin any such combination -  
let alone a best combination -  is an impossibility. The view that all the different ideals 
and values that are honoured in different cultures can be fused into an all encompassing 
good or lifestyle is a view that has been maintained from Aristotle to the present but 
which for Berlin is a fiction. As he put it, ‘the notion of total human fulfilment is a formal
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contradiction, a metaphysical chimera...That we cannot have everything is a necessary, 
not a contingent, truth’.116
So, Alasdair McIntyre observes, it is the belief about the combinability of all the 
valuable goods that urges Aristotle to claim, like Dworkin later did, that ‘the apparent 
existence of a tragic dilemma must always rest upon one or more misconceptions or 
misunderstandings. The apparent and tragic conflict of right with right arises from the 
inadequacies of reason, not from the character of moral reality’.117 For Aristotle, rational 
deliberation cannot yield moral wrong whereas for Berlin there are instances in which 
rational deliberation entails an irreversible wrong.
Where Aristotle’s ethical system meets Berlin’s is that in both cases the individual 
realises herself -  or, in the case of Aristotle, himself -  in conjunction with their social 
environment, the polis. As in Aristotle’s system of ideas The Politics have to be seen in 
conjunction with his Nicomachean Ethics, in Berlin human beings self-realise themselves 
through choice-making and morally progress by discovering values which have 
developed, and can be understood, through historical traditions despite being objective. 
Moreover, Berlin develops his idea of universal intelligibility in a conception of common 
human needs -  and consequently a conception of human nature. Like Berlin, Aristotle 
also has a conception -  albeit a more specific, metaphysical and explicit one -  of what it 
is to be human. This is the starting point on which he bases his subsequent assertions on 
ethics and, ultimately, politics.
There are some stark differences between the two doctrines as well as some 
impressive similarities. The crucial question, nevertheless, is whether Aristotelian theory
116 Berlin, I . , " T w o  Concepts of Liberty" in The Proper Study of Mankind: an Anthology of Essays. 
edited by Hardy, H. (Pimplico: 1998), p. 238 and p. 240
117 MacIntyre, A.. Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. (London, Duckworth: 1988), p. 142
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can help resolve any of the deadlocks which pluralism presents us with. I believe that it 
can be of assistance in at least one of these deadlocks.
One of the main arguments that have been advanced against value-pluralism so 
far has been that it inevitably collapses into simple moral relativism, whether this is 
understood as moral empiricism, subjectivism or a general moral relativistic tendency. 
One of the main reasons for this has been the fact that pluralism appeared to be too 
elusive with respect to the course of action it prescribes in situations of conflicting 
values. If, as relativists argue, the conflict between two incompatible values can give rise 
to different solutions between different agents, different cultural domains and different 
times, then this is not a very different view from the moral relativist one. Although it 
should be clear by now that there are many aspects of the pluralist theory that 
differentiate it from its moral relativist counterparts, the issue yet remains; can value- 
pluralism give a more specific rule or prescription for action in the aforementioned 
situations? It is noticeable that this is another way of expressing the challenge that Ross’ 
intuitionism faces in terms of its commitment to self-evident moral knowledge -  because 
of its refusal to advocate a higher-order principle on the basis of which first-order 
conflicts could be decided. One possible way out for intuitionism would be the advocacy 
of an Aristotelian theory which, although it may not solve all the problems and 
ambiguities associated with intuitionism, does at least move the debate into more familiar 
ground.
The same is the case with Berlinian value pluralism. Despite the fact that it is 
different from Aristotle’s moral theory in that the latter believes that rational deliberation 
through practical reasoning will give rise to rational solutions to value conflicts -  an
8 8
assertion which Berlinian value pluralism rejects -  Aristotle’s theory still leaves some 
room for the Berlinian view on moral decision making. This is because rational 
deliberation through practical reasoning can come up with different normative demands 
for the same value conflict which occurs under different circumstances. So for instance, 
Aristotle could make claims in favour of the concept of liberty and against equality in 
some instances, but in favour of equality and against liberty in others. The pluralism that 
is embodied in the lack of a fixed outcome in value conflicts is the same both for 
Berlinian as well as for Aristotelian pluralism -  even though in Aristotle there is no 
wrong, but in Berlin’s case there is.
Moreover, as I have discussed in the chapter, the relationship between moral 
empiricism and objectivity is a major issue in Berlin’s theory. This also is very much so 
in Aristotle’s theory, not only in terms of individuals realising themselves in conjunction 
with their social environment but also in terms of the methodology that Aristotle uses in 
deriving moral objectivity. For Aristotle, the real, tangible world perceived through our 
sense data is the only means through which we can come to grasp objective moral facts. 
As a consequence, Aristotle’s objectivity is subject to critiques such that it fails strict 
objective criteria, very much in the same way that radical pluralism and moral 
intuitionism are subject to similar critiques because of their close connection to moral 
empiricism.
The above do not insulate the Berlinian project from the critiques that it faces. 
They do, however, make the point that, were Berlin’s theory to fail on the points in 
question, then so would Aristotle’s and Ross’. By discussing radical pluralism alongside 
Aristotelian and intuitionist theory, I did two things. Firstly, I highlighted some aspects of
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radical pluralism, which is a theory that will be central to my argument in this thesis. 
Consequently, a substantial acknowledgement of the characteristics, merits and 
weaknesses it involves is important. Secondly, even though I cannot prove, strictly 
speaking, that radical pluralism can rebut the challenges advanced against it, I argue that 
if these challenges apply to radical pluralism, they also apply to moral intuitionism and 
Aristotelianism. Thus, the arguments against some specific characteristics of Berlin’s 
theory will also face not only Berlinian, but also Aristotelian and intuitionist 
counterarguments.
7. Conclusion
What I attempted to illustrate in this chapter is not a proof of the truth of value-pluralism. 
In order to prove value-pluralism one would have to make a true ontological argument 
about the actual existence of objective values and a further epistemological argument of 
how moral agents become aware of them.118 Such a project would be too grand for the 
scope of the present essay. Instead, for the purposes of my argument, I take value- 
pluralism for granted and any further elaboration on the types of value-pluralism or 
liberalism will assume the general truth of value pluralism.
There were two main objectives in this chapter. The first was to examine some 
general pluralist traits so as to have a better idea of what is entailed in the liberal 
commitment to pluralism. The second was to present a basis on which I can discuss on 
the value pluralist variations that I will use for my argument in the thesis with respect to 
the compatibility between liberalism and pluralism.
118 This is an issue with which I will, to some extent, deal later on in the thesis when I examine Raz’s 
theory of parochial values.
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The latter I achieved by presenting Berlin’s view on value-pluralism. This 
exemplifies a very radical take on pluralism and its comparison with the more timid 
pluralist variations which I present in the next chapter will be illuminating.
In presenting Berlin’s view, I delineated an area of value pluralist discourse to 
which I will often refer in my conclusions in the course of the thesis. I have argued that 
value pluralist discourse aspires to create room both for concepts such as rationalism and 
false consciousness, as well as for moral empiricism and radical moral conflict.
As I have already mentioned, I did not aim to prove that value pluralism does this 
successfully. I only aimed to highlight the subtle claim that Berlinian pluralists make by 
differentiating it from the claims of theories such as simple moral relativism and monism. 
In doing so, I paid tribute both to the challenges that Berlinian value pluralism faces as 
well as to its assets and its similarities with moral intuitionism and Aristotle’s ethical 
theory. It is to the examination of alternative value pluralist positions and their 
compatibility with different liberalisms that I will now turn.
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3VARIATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM AND THEIR COMPATIBILITY WITH
DIFFERENT LIBERALISMS
Having expanded on Berlin’s view of value-pluralism and examined its relationship with 
relativism and monism I am now going to elaborate on some variations of this value- 
pluralist doctrine. After that, I will go on to investigate the compatibility between 
different liberalisms and these value pluralist variations.
1. Lexical Value-Pluralism
Lexical pluralism holds that there is a plurality of worthwhile values which can be 
lexically ranked. This account allows the prioritization of certain rules or kinds of 
considerations over others without necessarily having to concede ground to a monistic 
single overall Platonic principle of prioritizing values.
Traces of a hierarchical ordering within pluralism often appear in Mill’s 
Utilitarianism.119 Similarly to Berlin who finds only traces -  instead of a developed 
doctrine -  of value-pluralism in Vico and Herder, Mill also offers neither a systematic 
nor a full exploration of the possibilities of this lexical approach to ethical values. To Mill 
one can also add Aristotle who -  as has already been mentioned in the previous chapter -
119 Mill, JJS.; Utilitarianism in On Liberty and Other Essays edited by Gray, J. (Oxford University Press: 
1991, 1998)
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recognizes a variety of worthwhile goods which he then, rather more systematically than 
Mill, classifies in a strict lexical ordering.
A lexical understanding of value-pluralism is one that shares along with the 
Berlinian understanding of value pluralism the universalistic and the pluralistic 
components of the latter, as each of these has been identified in the previous chapter. It 
can also be said that the lexical approach to pluralism accepts to some extent the principle 
of incommensurability.120 Moreover, it is implicit in the elaboration of the lexical 
understanding of value-pluralism that it recognises - at least to some extent - the 
incompatibility of some worthwhile values, although the type of incompatibility it 
recognizes might vary from the type recognized by Berlin’s untamed value-pluralism.
I have already referred extensively to the idea of incompatibility as a significant 
trait of pluralist theory. Still, a number of ambiguities regarding the exact content of this 
term and thus its significance for the various types of pluralism that I am about to 
examine remain. Claiming that two or more values or lifestyles are incompatible may 
mean that the more you satisfy or pursue the one, the less you can do so with the other. 
So, with a given amount of spare time, every minute I spend taking an enjoyable walk in 
Hyde Park is a minute not spent having a drink by the Thames, which I would also enjoy. 
However, recognition of the bare fact that some of our choices entail some kind of an 
opportunity cost cannot by any means fully account for the incompatible nature of 
worthwhile values or lifestyles which is attributed to pluralists. Another sense of 
incompatibility is the one according to which one value or lifestyle fully excludes 
another. This is a stronger conception of incompatibility from the ‘opportunity cost’ one
120 Look at Rawls, J.; Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993,1996), pp. 310- 
324 and Cohen, J.; ‘For a Democratic Society’ in Freeman, S. [ed.], The Cambridge Companion to Rawls 
(Cambridge University Press: 2003), pp. 86-138 and especially 100-111.
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mentioned before and one that most pluralists would agree with. An example of this 
would be the incompatibility between the lifestyles of a monk and an indulgent rock star. 
There is, moreover, a third different sense of incompatibility. This even stronger sense 
expresses the conviction that it is not just the case that one objectively good moral value 
might exclude another but rather that there exist objectively good values that actively 
oppose or condemn other objectively good values. The much quoted values of liberty and 
equality are a straightforward example of this type of incompatibility which can be 
referred to as “agonistic”. It is implicit in Berlin’s account of value pluralism that it is this 
agonistic incommensurability that he finds the most interesting.121 The advocacy of such 
a strong sense of incompatibility is not a problem for Berlin; on the contrary, the 
argument in the thesis so far has been that this is exactly the point that Berlin wants to 
make with his unrestricted value-pluralism. Radical pluralism, which is the main theme 
that permeates his writings, is all about the fact of the existence of such a sense of 
incompatibility; this is exactly what Berlin is trying to push forward -  often with great 
cost to the internal consistency of his system of ideas. The endorsement, for instance, of 
such a strong sense of incompatibility is often at odds with some other aspects of his 
thought, such as his preference of negative over positive liberty. A more plausible 
approach on the issue could be that Berlin’s project might be much more about the
121 This is evident in many scattered instances throughout Berlin’s writings. One might say that the most 
indicative of his essays on this issue are ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ and especially ‘Herder and the 
Enlightenment’ (in Hardy, H. and Hansheer, R. [ed.] The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology o f  
Essays (London: Pimlico, 1998), pp. 191-242 and 359-437 respectively. In Two Concepts o f  Liberty there 
even are instances where Berlin seems to refer to the second type of incompatibility (as for example in ibid. 
p. 197 where he points out that freedom is a distinct value and should not be confused with economic and 
social values). However, his radical view on the incompatible nature of the plural universe is evident in the 
passages in Herder and the Enlightenment where he expresses his ‘belief not merely in the multiplicity, but 
in the incommensurability...in the incompatibility of equally valid ideals, together with the implied 
revolutionary corollary that the classical notions o f an ideal man and of an ideal society are intrinsically 
incoherent and meaningless’ (ibid. p. 368). This is also especially evident in his passages about the 
objective nature o f  pluralism (ibid. pp.424-426) and in belief that Herder’s notion of equal validity o f  
incommensurable cultures renders the concept of an ideal man incoherent (ibid. p.428).
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observation of the fact of the existence of radically incompatible values and lifestyles and 
less about its philosophical and strict analytical value.
Another counterargument against Berlin’s subscription to a deep-seated and far- 
reaching incompatibility is that the irredeemable moral stain that is entailed in the 
agonistically incompatible choices that we are often forced to make is too much to ask 
from moral agents. One response to this would be that the moral stain often appears to be 
inescapable -  after all, if there is one overriding essence to Berlin’s work it is the 
agonistic nature of the choices that we have to make in life and the moral cost that is 
entailed in making these choices.
The type of incompatibility and incommensurability which the lexical value 
pluralist endorses is of crucial importance since, as it is obvious from the above, it is 
going to have serious implications regarding the issue of whether a pluralist’s conception 
of the ethical universe is more on the universalistic or the particularistic side.
Lexical value pluralism claims that there is an absolute value which should be 
fulfilled or a minimum standard of some kind that should be satisfied before the 
fulfilment of other values can take effect. So, the type of incompatibility that is 
recognised by lexical value pluralism is not as strong as the type of incompatibility and 
incommensurability that is entailed in Berlin’s pluralism. In lexical pluralism some 
considerations have clear priority over others. Mill’s tendency towards lexical value
\*)*ypluralism can be seen in his distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Mill’s 
distinction is much debated as it has often been argued that it cannot hold in light of
122 Look at Mill, J.S.; Utilitarianism in On Liberty and Other Essays edited by Gray, J. (Oxford 
University Press: 1991,1998), ch.2, pp. 136-158
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Berlin’s pluralist view of the ethical universe.123 However, irrespective of whether Mill’s 
distinction is acceptable for Berlin, it can be said that -  when approached within the 
context of Mill’s own system of ideas -  the distinction is still indicative of his tendency 
to prioritize some values or activities over others.
Moreover, it can be said that lexical pluralism resembles the prioritizing of values 
which is evident in Kekes’ pluralism. For Kekes, some values are seen as primary and 
more important than other values which are secondary and of lesser importance. 
Examples of primary values are the fulfilment of basic needs of survival such as shelter, 
food etc., whereas examples of secondary values are things that are culturally and 
historically relevant. Similarly, Rawls’ recognition that liberty only has priority if a 
number of social conditions -  very similar to the ones exemplified in Kekes’ primary 
values -  are satisfied, implicitly acknowledges the primacy and the urgency of these 
conditions over liberty. Once these primary conditions are satisfied liberty has priority 
over all other considerations.124
123 Gray, J.; Two faces of Liberalism. (Polity Press: 2000), pp.34-69 and Gray, J.; ‘Postscript’ in his Mill 
On Liberty: A Defence. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1996)
124 It is difficult to make a similar argument for Mill’s account in Representative Government in which he 
advocates that the liberal political framework dictated from the practical application of the Principle of  
Liberty is applicable only to societies that have achieved a certain level o f progress (Mill, J.S.; 
Considerations on Representative Government in On Liberty and Other Essays edited by Gray, J. (Oxford 
University Press: 1991,1998), p. 258). One might observe that, like Rawls, Mill here sets a condition -  
even as ambiguous as that o f progress - that has to be fulfilled before the fact o f a plural moral universe 
starts to have significance for the actual political and legislative life o f a society. Mill’s view, however, that 
the Principle of Liberty as applied in the political sphere in the form o f a representative constitution can 
only take effect after the people of the community in focus have developed a ‘sufficient value’ and ‘an 
attachment’ to it, otherwise ‘they have next to no chance in retaining it’ (ibid.) cannot be seen as a 
subscription to a value-pluralist doctrine. This he does, as we have already mentioned, through the 
distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Mill’s view that the fulfillment of some —unspecified — 
material and more immanent conditions have an absolute priority over the promotion of liberty is not a 
recognition of the sort purported by Kekes and Rawls. It serves as an instrumental purpose, as a practical 
observation that if liberty is to prevail, some conditions have to be fulfilled beforehand, whereas it is 
implicit in Rawls’ -  and explicit in Kekes — that the fulfillment o f primary values has an higher moral 
significance and should always be given priority over other values.
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The point where the Berlinian and the lexical understandings of value-pluralism 
diverge is that the latter is committed to a different, softer type of incompatibility 
whereas the former is committed to a much stronger and more radical type of 
incommensurability. The Berlinian value-pluralist holds that because it is meaningless to 
commensurate between ultimate values or radically different lifestyles, conflicts that arise 
between and within the latter cannot be definitely resolved through rational means. 
Lexical value-pluralism, on the other hand, adopts a view according to which one may -  
indeed, one must -  rank some values higher than others. As a consequence, values ranked 
higher in the lexical order must be necessarily fulfilled before one starts considering the 
fulfilment of values further down in the list.
Since lexical value-pluralism does not commit itself to the type of incompatibility 
that the Berlinian pluralist does, it is plausible for the former to compare and lexically 
rank conflicting values and virtues by means of substituting them for equivalent units of 
some medium. It is difficult, nevertheless, to imagine a value-pluralist, even one that 
ascribes to a lexical order of ranking values, who would be willing to make use of such a 
medium of comparison. A more common method for ranking values hierarchically is by 
making use of theoretical, religious or meta-ethical rationalist claims; a method which 
has also been used by pluralists such as Aristotle.
I have already mentioned that Aristotle exemplifies some pluralist traits in the 
sense that he recognises that there is a plurality of goods that a human being must possess 
if he is to lead a good and successful life. Nevertheless, above all these equally worthy -  
and for Aristotle combinable -  virtues stands the virtue of philosophising, which is a 
divine characteristic that is unparalleled in worth by any other endeavour. Similarly,
97
many traditionalists and conservatives recognise the worth of free choice, modernisation 
etc., but only as second in priority to the value of religion, tradition and family relations.
This position resembles a monistic approach to a degree greater than a Berlinian 
value-pluralist would feel comfortable with. As it is the case that if a lexical value- 
pluralist claims that some values are always overriding values, she would have to either 
substitute for the values some other medium on the basis of which a comparison will take
19 5place or she would have to decide about the overriding values on rationalist grounds. 
This pluralist view is much closer to monism than Berlin’s pluralism, but it is important 
to stress that despite its monistic tendencies lexical value-pluralism is still different from 
the crude Platonic monism that explains value conflicts in terms of human irrationality. A 
lexical value-pluralist is still committed to the recognition of the inescapable committal 
of an irreversible wrong when choosing between two worthwhile conflicting values. 
Where it differs from the Berlinian value pluralism is that it holds that when the choice is 
between an overriding and an overridden value, there is a loss of value. A crude Platonic 
monist or a Benthamite utilitarian on the other hand would hold that no loss would be 
involved in choosing the one and only overriding value.
The monistic doctrine that most closely resembles lexical value-pluralism is ‘The 
Canonical Principle for Ranking Values’. I have already argued that the strong sense of 
this type of monism collapses into either Platonic monism or meta-ethical monism, while 
I have also presented both the reasons for which lexical value-pluralism could collapse
125 It should be noted here that it might arguably be the case that even if  there is a substitution o f the values 
with some other medium, the decision on which should be the overriding value or values is going to be a 
rationalist decision. This is because the reasons for deciding on the comparison or the medium that has 
been chosen in order to carry out the comparison presuppose a rationalistic methodology.
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into Platonic monism and the reasons that obstruct the assimilation of the two. Meta- 
ethical monism can be arrived at by either substituting for values equivalent units of some 
medium or by making the rationalist claim that some values carry more weight than 
others. It has been hinted that a value-pluralist usually feels ill at ease with the first 
approach of going about meta-ethical monism, while the second, which is also used for 
arriving at meta-ethical monistic conclusions, is in fact what the lexical pluralist is more 
likely to make use of in order to rank values. Despite the fact that I found the relationship 
between Berlinian pluralism and rationalism to be an ambiguous one, it can be said that 
overall it is one of hostility.127 Part of the reason for this is, amongst others, the Berlinian 
pluralist conviction that a rationalist approach to ethics and its political implications is at 
the root of all totalitarian or monistic doctrines. And, indeed, it appears that these 
Berlinian fears are vindicated with respect to the lexical pluralist doctrine when the latter 
is put under a more thorough scrutiny.
Pluralists like Kekes and Larmore accept that ranking values is reasonable only in 
some particular situations. This is because, at times, values ‘will inevitably conflict in 
concrete political and moral situations’ and in conflicts of this manner there cannot be a 
priori answers. So, ‘for instance, if freedom and equality conflict, then one consideration 
relevant to the resolution of their conflict is how much freedom and how much equality 
actually exist in the context in which the conflict arises’.128 Similarly, ‘if the human right 
to the protection of legitimately acquired property conflicts with Rawlsian justice, then it 
is crucial to know whether the conflict occurs in the context of mass starvation or in that 
of a socialist policy of redistribution in a context where there is no poverty and there is an
126 See my discussion in Chapter Two.
127 See my arguments in Chapter Two also.
128 Kekes, J.; The Morality o f Pluralism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 205
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adequately high standard of living’.129 However, this is a very weak type of hierarchy 
with which even a radical pluralist might agree.
On the contrary, a lexical understanding of value-pluralism would imply that the 
values earlier in the lexical ordering ‘have an absolute weight...with respect to later ones, 
and hold without exception\ 130 That means that ‘we can suppose that any principle in the 
order is to be maximised subject to the condition that the preceding principles are fully 
satisfied’.131
The first immediate problem to arise is that such a rigid hierarchical approach 
affects our sense of good judgment and moderation. For instance, if one always decided 
on the side of, let us say, liberty over equality even in a context of extreme social 
inequality and starvation, one could be reasonably said to have lost perspective on the 
situation and to be morally wrong in deciding in favour of liberty. However, this cannot 
be said of Rawls with respect to the specific example regarding liberty and equality. 
Although Rawls argues for the lexical priority of liberty over other values, under 
circumstances of social wretchedness or degradation liberty can give way to other 
welfarist considerations. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether in these cases of social 
degradation it is always the welfarist considerations that should take primacy or whether 
it is just the case that he allows for the primacy of welfarist considerations while he still 
leaves room for the possibility of the primacy of liberty.
The second problem with the lexical ranking of values is that when put under 
careful scrutiny its pluralistic component seems to be insufficient in preventing it from its 
eventual collapse into some form of monism. I have already mentioned that the strong
129 ibid. pp.205-6
130 Rawls, J.; A Theory o f Justice (Oxford University Press: 1971,1999), pp.38, Italic is mine.
131 ibid.
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presence of rationalism in lexical value-pluralism is a trait that could weaken its pluralist 
outlook. Furthermore, since it ranks values in a manner in which the -  even partial - 
fulfilment of values of lesser importance is always conditional upon the complete 
fulfilment of the most important values, it is hard to see how it can escape from 
collapsing into a monism even of the Platonic form. This is because the overriding 
perceived “worthiness” of the single value that is at the top of the lexical order must be 
pursued to its absolute realisation irrespective of the level of realisation of the other “less 
worthy” values.
To the extent that the type of pluralism in focus maintains that moral values 
should still be ranked but not in a lexical order, the argument is different yet, regrettably 
for lexical value-pluralists, it is still not insulated from moving away from pluralism and 
towards monism to a degree that places it closer to the latter than to the former. Such a 
variation of lexical value-pluralism could hold that there are a number of values which 
are incommensurable but nevertheless more “worthy” than others. The more weighty 
values are not lexically ranked with each other; instead they are incommensurable. Yet, 
when they conflict in practical political situations, it might be reasonable to rank them for 
the sake of practical convenience. So, a pluralist of this sort might hold that liberty and 
equality are rival but equally worthy values while, at the same time they are higher than, 
say, the value of tradition. Having said that, when a policy maker has to decide which 
value should be curtailed in the practical exemplification of this moral-political dilemma, 
she would have to take into account the specific contingencies of the situation; for 
instance whether there are people starving or whether they are affluent but with a rather 
limited level of freedom.
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This position does not offer a better alternative to the standard lexical order 
variation of value-pluralism as it does not solve any of the problems that lexical pluralism 
set out to solve nor does it avoid lexical value-pluralism’s uncomfortable similarity with 
monism. On the first point, as it accepts the incommensurability of a certain number of 
values, from the point of view of lexical pluralism it concedes too much ground to 
intuitionists. Indeed, once we know that some values carry more weight than others, we 
can then “reasonably” resolve conflicts between the higher incommensurable values 
through recourse to a form of practical reason. Nevertheless, as was noted in the second 
chapter, the political decisions that are contested are not the ones in which, for instance, 
equality is chosen over liberty in the context of mass starvation, but ones in which liberty 
is chosen over equality in a context of relative affluence and freedom. The above form of 
pluralism is of no aid in such situation since it falls prey to what lexical pluralists might 
call intuitionist disputes.
In the second case, it is questionable what should count as an adequate number of 
overriding values for one to be considered a pluralist and not a monist. This point might 
have to do more with the elusiveness of the concept of pluralism and its clear delineation 
but it still, nevertheless, points to the insufficient insulation that this version of pluralism 
offers against monism. For, is it pluralistic enough if lexical pluralism recognises, let us 
say, only two higher values the fulfilment of which has an absolute priority over the 
fulfilment of any of the other “lesser” values?
These weaknesses are also shared by the Berlinian version of value-pluralism. 
When expounding Berlin’s conception of value-pluralism, I identified a deep tension in 
his approach. On the one hand, Berlin spent a great deal of effort in explicitly arguing for
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the incommensurability of moral values whereas, on the other hand, it was implicit in his 
elaboration that he regarded negative liberty to be prior to any other principle or value 
whether this was liberty understood as positive liberty or equality. Recognising the 
danger of their view collapsing into a sort of rationalistic monism, both Berlin and the 
lexical value-pluralist concede that there is still room for the intuitionist approach. This 
may be, after all, what gives lexical pluralism its characteristic as a moral theory which 
respects both the plurality of values -  which is also a characteristic of intuitionism -  and 
their hierarchical nature.
2. Non-linearity as a Basis for Value-Pluralism
I have already shown that Berlinian value-pluralism tries to justify itself partly by 
referring to the idea of incommensurability. Berlin tried to show the validity of 
incommensurability by pointing out that our disputes over values are ‘rationally 
interminable’ and by exposing the agonistic nature of conflicts between clearly distinct 
values.
Another way of expressing incommensurability is through non-linear preference 
orderings. According to Raz, ‘A and B are incommensurable if it is neither true that one 
is better than the other nor true that they are of equal value’.132 For Raz, ‘the test of 
incommensurability is failure of transitivity. Two valuable options are incommensurable 
i f  (I) neither is better than the other, and (2) there is (or could be) another option which 
is better than one but is not better than the other.''133 So, if A is not better than B and a 
third value or good C is introduced such that C is better than A but not better than B, then
132 Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1986), p. 322
133 ibid., p. 325; Italic is in the original.
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it can be said that we have a failure of transitivity, which vindicates the idea of 
incommensurability and, hence, the truth of value-pluralism.
Glen Newey claims that such way of defining incommensurability and explaining 
value-pluralism rests on two contestable assumptions. Firstly, it must be the case that ‘the 
ordinal measures of value expressed by the preference-rankings above correspond to real 
measures of value’.134 Secondly, it must also be the case that ‘the non-transitivity (if such 
it be) of those measures is sufficient to establish that values which they are measures of 
are really distinct’.135 The effect of these two assumptions -  contestable in Newey’s view 
-  is that non-linearity is not an argument that guarantees pluralism since one can use it to 
derive monistic conclusions.
The second of the above assumptions which is disputed by Newey finds its main 
opponent in the writings of Dworkin whose objections have already been examined. It 
is true that the clearly distinct nature of conflicting values was not found to be self- 
evident. Yet, the opposite claim, according to which values are not really distinct, was 
found to be inconclusive since it rests on assumptions which many pluralists would not 
accept. Furthermore, the necessary outcome of the Dworkian position would be that 
moral conflicts and dilemmas can be resolved by redefining the terms of the moral 
conflict or dilemma. The practical instantiation of this theoretical approach, however, 
could affect one’s good judgment and moderation. So, it is true that the non-linearity of 
preferences cannot -  strictly speaking -  be a sufficient condition for establishing the
134 Newey, G., After Politics: The rejection of Politics in Contemporary Liberal Philosophy. (Basingstoke, 
New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 83
135 ibid.
136 For a discussion concerning the issue of the distinctiveness or otherwise o f values which is posed by 
Dworkin see my discussion in Chapter Two.
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really distinct nature of values. It could, nevertheless, still be considered a very strong 
indication of the above.137
With respect to the first assumption, which Raz implicitly makes use of, Newey 
holds that the monist can deny that the expressed preferences between the values or the 
goods in the non-linear matrix correspond to the real measures of these values or goods 
by saying that only partial -  i.e. inaccurate -  ordering of the values can take place since 
‘the epistemic resolution required for full linearity’138 is unattainable. If that were the 
case, then the monist could concede non-linearity for a set of rankings that can be ordered 
only partially and at the same time consistently hold to the claim that there is a single 
overriding value.
Two main points are clear from the above. Firstly, non-linear pluralism is a very 
open ended type of pluralism. It can insulate itself neither against monism nor against 
relativism, and as such it is open to various criticisms. Secondly, this ambiguity is
137 It is unclear whether the burden of proof for the distinct or otherwise nature of values should be put 
upon the Dworkinian position or its opponent. The argument for the burden of proof to be put on the former 
could be that the claim that moral values are distinct and conflict is an empirical observation. The argument 
for the burden of proof to be put on the other side o f the debate could be that it is an empirical observation 
that in fact, there is, indeed, some sort of convergence of values, albeit a limited one. Christian List calls 
this type of agreement ‘meta-agreement’ (List, C.; ‘Two Concepts of Agreement’ in The Good Society, 11, 
no.l, 2002). Meta-agreement is agreement about what exactly a disagreement between two groups or 
individuals really entails. It is a condition of divergence in opinion or judgment which occurs after intense 
deliberation between the disagreeing parties. The fact that this is the best convergence that has been 
reached in many controversial topics (List, C.; ‘The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason’ in Ethics,
116, no.2,2006) is a strong indication o f the Berlinian point which advocates the existence of incompatible, 
distinct values on the one hand and cognitive realism on the other. The former is embodied in the lack of 
convergence of opinion and the latter in the fact that, after deliberation has occurred, there is an 
understanding between agents of what is at stake. This, however, is by no means a conclusive argument 
since the Dworkinian point according to which a decision is possible after a level o f even more intense and 
further improved conditions of deliberation cannot be theoretically dismissed. For the time being, however, 
the evidence suggests that deliberation does not destroy pluralism, it only brings about a shared way o f  
conceptualizing issues, a point which appears to me to be very similar to the one Berlin makes. For more on 
this issue see Dryzek, J. S. & List, C.; ‘Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A 
Reconciliation’ in British Journal o f  Political Science, 33 and Fishkin, J., List, C., Luskin, R. &
McLean, I.; ‘Can Deliberation Induce Greater Preference Structuration?’, paper presented at the Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2000).
138 ibid.
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reminiscent of the ambiguity that Berlinian value pluralism exemplifies in terms of its 
own relationship with monism and moral relativism.
The acknowledgement of the first statement is very important in the sense that it 
delineates and puts into perspective the claims and arguments of my position on the 
relationship between different liberalisms and different pluralisms in the thesis. However, 
for the purposes of the present work, the truth of the doctrine of non-linear value- 
pluralism -  as well as of all the value-pluralisms that I identify and examine - will be 
taken as given when I explore the relationship between these various forms of pluralism 
with different liberal theories.
The second statement above is very important for the structure and presentation of 
my contention in the thesis. The similarity between Berlinian and non-linear pluralism is 
further reinforced by their likeness in their approach to the possibility of the rational 
interminability of conflicts. Overall, it is safe to conclude that the Berlinian and the non­
linear pluralist theories embody similar traits and, consequently, the merits and 
weaknesses of the one, also apply to the other. Finally, my conclusions with respect to 
Berlinian pluralism and its relationship with the various theoretical aspects that I examine 
in the thesis hold for non-linear pluralism and vice-versa.
3. Value-Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement: Reasonable Pluralism
After having examined non-linear pluralism and its relationship to Berlinian pluralism I 
now turn to the examination of reasonable pluralism.
Larmore correctly points out that value-pluralism -  and for that matter any type of 
value-pluralist theory -  is effectively a ‘statement about the nature of value’, and in this
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110sense a sort of ‘response to religious and metaphysical disenchantment’. In the context 
of modernity the former attribute of pluralism, i.e. its essence about the nature of value, 
has given way to its latter characteristic, i.e. its essence as a response to metaphysical 
disillusionment. In modem times, according to Larmore, ‘pluralism is not a conception 
we happen to believe correct, but rather a conception about which reasonable people 
disagree’.140
Which agents should count as reasonable is an issue no less controversial than 
what -  if any -  is the correct quintessence of value-pluralism. The issue was partly 
touched upon in the discussion about Kekes in the previous chapter, where I explored the 
extent to which it is correct to claim that reasonable people are defined in terms of their 
endorsement of a certain set of moral values which is derived from a specific conception 
of human nature.141 Furthermore, I also questioned the idea that in order for an agent to 
be considered reasonable she has to conform to a rationalistic and monistic account of 
reasonableness.
Larmore’s approach is slightly different. In his view reasonable people are ‘those 
who think and converse in good faith and apply, as best as they can, the general 
capacities of reason that belong to every domain o f enquiry’.142 Raz would be very 
sympathetic towards this view, especially since he is an advocate of the idea that the 
ability to reason is a pan-human quality.143 Raz recognizes that skeptical arguments ‘can 
be advanced against any of the principles of reason’ but he also holds that ‘such
139 Larmore, C.; The Morals of Modernity. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1996), p. 168
140 ibid. p. 168
141 See Chapter Two.
142 Larmore, C.; The Morals of Modernity. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1996), p.168; italic 
is mine.
143 In Raz, J., Engaging Reason: On The Theory of Value and Action: (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp.65-89
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principles are historical products in the same way that languages and other systems of 
concepts are’ and that ‘they can be replaced by others which are, hopefully, free of 
paradox’.144 It is in this context that Larmore answers Thomas Nagel’s point that there is 
still a deadlock in the disagreement between reasonable people when they eventually 
reach a confrontation between incompatible points of view.145 Larmore claims that this is 
due to the completely different backgrounds of belief that the agents have and that 
‘generally we have good reason to believe more than what reasonable agreement with 
others can secure’.146 This response, on the one hand, is in line with Raz’s claim that 
there ‘cannot be skeptical arguments against reason itself147; on the other hand, it goes 
much further than the view that sees reasonable disagreement as a form of modus vivendi 
for resolving conflicts. On an initial level, this latter aspect of Larmore’s reasonable 
disagreement insulates it against the skepticism that haunts both reasonable disagreement 
- mistakenly understood as modus vivendi -  as well as many other versions of pluralism.
For Larmore, reasonable people will disagree not because of prejudice and bias 
but because of the moral facts of the matter. That is, reasonable people will disagree, for 
instance, on whether to give priority to liberty or equality because these two values truly 
clash; and not because of a misconception or confusion about the values on behalf of the 
reasonable agents. In this sense Larmore accepts the basic framework of Berlinian value- 
pluralism and in this his account shares the merits as well as the weaknesses of the latter. 
Furthermore, if Larmore were to retract this objectivist stance from his elaboration on 
reasonable disagreement, then the latter ceases to be a statement about the nature of the
144 ibid. p. 89
145 My discussion of the idea o f ‘meta-agreement’ in List’s work (n. 19) above is relevant here.
146 Larmore, C.; The Morals of Modernity. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 1996), p. 170
147 Raz, J., Engaging Reason: On The Theory o f Value and Action: (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp.65-89
ethical domain. If reasonable disagreement is seen only as modus vivendi, it only has the 
instrumental character of one amongst many methods of conflict resolution. If this were 
the case, then reasonable disagreement as modus vivendi could be consistent even with 
relativism, an ethical theory which has similarities, but which is ultimately distinct from 
any pluralist theory.
In any case, for Larmore, the best explanation regarding the reasons for which 
reasonable people disagree is given by Rawls as, in Larmore’s view, when he refers to 
pluralism he actually refers to the idea of reasonable disagreement.
In Political Liberalism Rawls refers to ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism’ which he 
distinguishes from ‘the fact of pluralism’.148 Rawls would agree with Galston that the fact 
of pluralism within a democratic society ‘is not surprising’ not only because ‘there are 
always many unreasonable views’ but also -  indeed especially - because ‘there are many 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines affirmed by reasonable people’.149 This may at first 
look surprising ‘as we like to see reason as leading to the truth and to think of the truth as 
one’150 but, this is exactly the point of reasonable pluralism. Reasonable disagreement, is 
the long-run outcome of the work of the human condition under democratic and free 
institutions.151 In this sense, Rawls makes the move from the fact of pluralism (which for 
Berlin as we have seen was an essential part of his pluralist argument) to reasonable 
pluralism by exposing a belief on the growing capacity of human beings to develop their 
reason.
148 Rawls, J.; Political Liberalism: (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993,1996), p. 63
149 ibid. p. 64
150 ibid.
151 This is obvious in ibid. pp. xviii-xxxvi.
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The relationship between reasonableness and rationality is a recurring -  albeit not 
a central -  theme in this thesis. For the Rawls of Political Liberalism the distinction
between the reasonable and the rational -  he claims that the reasonable comes before the
1 •rational -  is a basic feature in Kant. Like Kant, Berlin, Oakeshott and others -  albeit
for different reasons -  Rawls also rejects rationalism, which he defines as the idea that ‘if 
the reasonable can be derived from the rational, that is, if  some definite principles of 
justice can be derived from the preferences, or decisions, or agreements of merely 
rational agents in suitably specified circumstances, then the reasonable is at last put on a 
firm basis’.153 Instead, for Rawls, the idea of rationality is complementary to the idea of 
reasonableness.
This is an attractive position at first sight but after more careful scrutiny it appears 
to be inconclusive and to some extent contradictory with Rawls’ remarks elsewhere in 
Political Liberalism. So, for instance, Rawls’ elaboration on reasonable pluralism is 
linked with a meliorist view of the progress of human society; or, in any case, one can 
start to talk in terms of reasonable pluralism once a certain level of improvement has 
been established. Meliorist beliefs have -  at least to some extent -  the stain of 
rationalism.154 Furthermore, I find the claim in favour of the complementary nature 
between reasonableness and rationalism to be inconclusive. Indeed, it seems that in order 
for human beings to develop their reason and promote the chances of reasonable 
pluralism, they would have to exercise their rational capacities within a free modem
152 In ibid. p. 25n and in pp. 48-49/1 and p. 5In.
153 ibid. pp. 51-52
154 See my discussion on Mill’s liberalism, in the context of my examination o f its compatibility with 
pluralism, in the next section of this chapter.
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democracy.155 This latter condition could be considered rationalistic, as a value pluralist 
like Raz would hold that despite the fact that the capacity of reason is pan-human156 the 
best -  but far from unique -  way to exercise it is not necessarily -  or even primarily -  
within the context of modem liberal democratic institutions.157
Rawls finds the argument about the inconclusive nature of any proof regarding the 
complementary claim between reasonableness and rationality to be a forceful one. 
Indeed, the best way to face it is ‘to show that the serious attempts (Gauthier’s is an 
example) to derive the reasonable from the rational do not succeed, and so far as they
I CO
appear to do so, they rely at some point on conditions expressing the reasonable itself. 
However, I do not believe that this latter point is as obvious as Rawls presents it.
Rawls’ view is that a reasonable person is one who recognizes and accepts ‘that 
(because of the “burdens of judgment”159) other reasonable persons inevitably will affirm 
comprehensive doctrines different from their own’.160 However, for a start, the 
affirmation of any such comprehensive doctrine does not constitute a definite case of the 
objective worth of that doctrine -  after all Rawls does not claim such a thing. On the 
contrary, it is either a view that describes reasonable disagreement as modus vivendi or a 
view that adopts a cmde moral empiricist position according to which consensus on an 
issue is the indication that the matter in focus is objectively worthy (or unworthy -  
depending on the kind of consensus). This approach has already been dealt with
155 In ibid. pp. 54-56
156 In Raz, J., Engaging Reason: On The Theory of Value and Action: (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), Ch. 4
157 Raz, J.; Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press: 1995)
158 Rawls, J.; Political Liberalism: (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993,1996), p. 53
159 In ibid. pp. 54-58
160 Freeman, S., ‘Introduction: John Rawls -  An Overview’ in Freeman, S. fed.], The Cambridge 
Companion to Rawls: (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 32
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elsewhere and the argument was that value-pluralism is linked with moral empiricism but 
also that it is clearly distinct from an extreme version of it.
Moreover, Rawls’ Political Liberalism does not exclude the possibility that for 
some people pluralist aspirations are not a priority. Even more so, one could be an 
advocate of lexical pluralism without at the same time endorsing pluralism, since the 
latter might be supervened by other non-pluralist principles. To make a normative case 
which describes such approaches as unreasonable would be too rationalistic. Such a 
description is more acceptable when it is based on non-normative criteria.
In any case, for the purposes of this thesis an acknowledgement of the issues
involved is sufficient, and I will proceed with no further elaboration on the issue apart
from mentioning that another good reason for Rawls to distinguish reasonableness from
rationality is that the former is public in the way that the latter is not.161 It is noteworthy
that in A Theory o f Justice the distinction between rationality and reasonableness is still
there ‘but it’s never made explicit and in certain passages it seems to be implicitly
denied’162 especially when he seems to base his argument of justice as fairness on the
1Original Position which was presented ‘in the terminology of rational decision theory’.
It is only in Political Liberalism that the distinction between reasonable and rational 
becomes explicit.164
ibid. pp.53-54
162 Dreben, B., ‘On Rawls and Political Liberalism’ in Freeman, S. [ed.], The Cambridge Companion to 
Rawls: (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 321
163 ibid. p. 322
164 This explicitness in Political Liberalism cannot only be seen as a clarification in order to substantiate the 
contents o f A Theory o f  Justice further. It is furthermore, a rapprochement of Rawls’ stance regarding the 
apparent rationalistic tendency of his work in A Theory o f  Justice.
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4. Different Pluralisms for Different Liberalisms
4.1. Mill's Liberalism
Mill’s main argument in On Liberty is that no utilitarian principle can curtail liberty 
because the overall utility derived from the sum of utility maximizing actions does not 
always give maximum utility. Mill bases this on two main reasons: his conviction of 
fallibilism and in his belief in a Herderian romantic view of human nature and its 
fulfillment in terms of each individual’s unique self-realization.165 As a result of 
fallibilism this unique self-realization can only realistically come via an individual’s 
experimentation and engagement with lifestyles and activities that one considers as most 
appropriate to one’s talents and desires. Again, because of fallibility, the choice of 
experiments in living should be freely carried out by the individual. However, Mill 
believes that some of the choices that individuals make are more worthwhile than others. 
The introduction of the distinction between the higher and lower pleasures disengages 
Mill’s liberalism from classical utilitarianism. So, The suggestions that Mill’s moral 
intuitions were at variance with the implications of his moral theory and that only 
seriously compromising the one or the other could have brought the two into balance’ 
may be untrue. Mill is not a direct utilitarian along the lines by which utilitarianism was 
developed by Bentham but an advocate of indirect utilitarianism; a specific sort of
165 Evident in Mill, J.S.; On Liberty in Gray, J. [ed.J; John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Other Essays. 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1998), pp. 1-128. Many works on Mill argue on a similar thread, even 
though the focus in terms of the most prevalent aspects o f his theory varies. Most notably look at Gray, J.; 
Mill on Liberty: A Defence. 2nd Ed.. (London, Routledge: 1996), Cowling, M.; Mill and Liberalism 2nd Ed. 
(Cambridge, 1990) and Skorupski, J.; John Stuart Mill. (London, 1990).
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utilitarian moral theory that he has altered and tailored to the needs of his liberal 
project.166
Mill’s Harm Principle contends that the liberty to choose one’s own lifestyle can 
be restricted only when it is harmful to others. The question of what actually constitutes 
harm and how this is incorporated into a commonly accepted utilitarian calculus is one 
that poses an important obstacle for Mill’s overall project. A number of solutions to these 
two questions have been proposed but none of them seem to be adequate in overcoming 
the impediment altogether.167
The above are two of the most commonly advanced criticisms against Mill’s 
theory of Liberalism but they are by no means exhaustive since there exist a number of 
other criticisms advanced against Mill’s liberal endeavor with a variable level of success. 
An attempt to list and analyze them here would be futile because this is an issue that has 
been covered more than adequately by existing treatises on Mill’s theory. Thus, a further 
elaboration on this subject is beyond the scope of the present work apart from the 
instances where it relates to the main subject matter of my argument in the present 
chapter. What is within scope is the discussion regarding the compatibility between the 
liberal and the pluralistic aspects of Mill’s system of ideas. This is so because it is by far 
the most important objection not only to Mill but to other liberal thinkers as well and 
because it is exactly this objection that I attempt, not to refute but, instead to complement 
in a way that will offer liberalism a way out from the apparent deadlock that it has found 
itself in due to the force of this objection.
166 This is one of the arguments made by John Gray in Gray, J.; Mill on Liberty: A Defence. 2nd Ed.. 
(London, Routledge: 1996)
167 For instance, look at Feinberg’s attempt to define harm as a compromise of one’s interests in Feinberg, 
J.; The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 1: Harm to Others. (Oxford, New York, Oxford University 
Press: 1984)
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The pluralist objection to liberalism, finds one of its most enthusiastic proponents 
in the writings of John Gray: ‘The absence in Mill’s writings of any compelling account 
of how conflicts between ingredients of human well-being that are incompatible, whether 
in one person’s life or in any given society, are to be resolved, prises open his ethical 
theory, undoes his revision of utilitarianism and amounts to a tacit admission of the truth 
of incommensurabilities among the elements or ingredients of human happiness’. Gray
notes that ‘this is the conclusion reached by Isaiah Berlin as the result of his magisterial 
restatement of the traditional criticism of Millian liberalism’.169 This is an extremely 
important criticism but not because this is the only credible reason for which Mill’s 
liberalism fails -  even if it is the most forceful. It might be sufficient to deem Mill’s 
liberalism as unsuccessful in light of a number of other more traditional criticisms, such 
as -  amongst others -  the issue of what constitutes harm. Gray’s objection against Mill’s 
liberalism is very important as its applicability and relevance transcends Mill’s 
liberalism, which is based on utilitarian grounds, and encompasses other liberal theories 
which are grounded on autonomy and individuality and avoid most or all the other 
traditional critiques of Mill’s liberalism170 - such as Rawls’ or Raz’s liberalisms.
The objection raised by Gray regarding the tension between Mill’s liberal and 
pluralist convictions is related to the traditional objections in the sense that, because of 
his higher and lower pleasures distinction Mill is a hierarchical perfectionist and, partly 
as a consequence, cannot be a radical pluralist. The distinction between higher and lower 
pleasures seems to be a deep seated personal conviction of Mill’s that was most probably 
derived from his reaction to the intensively Benthamite educational and cultural
168 Gray, J.; Mill on Liberty: A Defence. 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 146
169 ibid.
170 For a list o f those critiques look at ibid., p. 147
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upbringing imposed on him by his father and from his personal experiences in
171overcoming his melancholic and manic depressive stretches of his life. As a 
consequence, ‘Mill’s conception of happiness implies that individuals who have 
experienced the higher pleasures that go with being autonomous and developing their 
individuality will not trade these off for any lower pleasure: they will always prefer 
activities in which their generic and individual human powers of autonomy and 
individuality are exercised over ones in which they are not’.172
Such a conviction is difficult to square with a radical pluralist conception of the 
moral universe. However, Mill’s romantic views on human progress and meliorism may 
not be as blatantly incompatible with radical value pluralism as they might initially 
appear. Berlin allows for the existence of moral progress, for even if after a certain point 
no moral progress can occur because we might have stumbled upon values that are basic 
and incompatible, we can say that human moral cognition advances in terms of the moral 
knowledge that we acquire regarding what constitutes a repugnant moral condition. It is 
impossible to come up with a rational answer to the question of which one of two 
incommensurable actions or lifestyles is better; yet, what we can know is what actions are 
wrong or which lifestyles are repugnant.
So, I would disagree with the claim -  if such it is - that the existence in Mill’s 
system of ideas of a theory of progress of moral knowledge as such makes it de facto 
incompatible with Berlin’s untamed value pluralism. What makes Mill’s system of ideals 
incompatible with radical value pluralism is not the subscription to a theory of progress 
but his subscription to the specific theory of progress which is advanced in On Liberty.
171 Look in Mill, J.S.; Autobiography: edited with an introduction and notes by Jack Stillinger (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1971), especially Chapters four and five.
172 Gray, J.; Mill on Liberty: A Defence. 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 143
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Mill’s view is that some options are definitely bad, some are not harmful, indeed they 
might even be good, but there are some options which are definitely much better from all 
those that belong to any one of the previous two categories. So lower pleasures are better 
than repugnant ones, and higher pleasures are better than lower ones.
Despite the fact that Mill considers himself to be in some sense a pluralist, he is 
not an advocate of radical value pluralism. To this extent, if one is to judge the 
consistency of his liberal doctrine one would have to do it on the grounds of the pluralism 
that Mill really advocates. This, obviously, does not necessarily mean that this is the 
pluralist variation that fits best his liberal doctrine; Mill’s system of ideas might be valid 
on different pluralist grounds from the ones that Mill had envisaged as most suitable for 
it. In Mill’s case however, it actually looks as if the pluralist variation which Mill 
advocates, best serves his liberal doctrine in terms of consistency -  but not necessarily 
truth.
Mill’s preference for lexical value pluralism is evident from two points in his 
system of ideas. First, he confers lexical priority to ‘pleasures and forms of life adopted 
under conditions of autonomous choice’173 when he revises Bentham’s classical 
utilitarianism for the purposes of his liberal theory. This priority which is instantiated in 
Mill’s theory of higher and lower pleasures states ‘that any amount of a higher pleasure, 
no matter how small, is worth more than any amount of a lower pleasure, however large, 
[and] cannot be squared with any utilitarian calculus’.174 Furthermore, as it has been 
mentioned earlier, one of Mill’s central theses is that higher pleasures are granted ‘an 
infinite weight, or lexical priority, as against the lower pleasures, that makes comparative
173 Gray, J. in his ‘Introduction’ to Mill, J.S.: On Liberty and Other Essays edited by Gray, J. (Oxford 
University Press: 1991,1998), p. xv
174 Gray, J.; Mill on Liberty: A Defence. 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 141
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judgments of different bundles of higher and lower pleasures impossible except in 
limiting and marginal cases’. Second, as was discussed previously, Mill’s preference 
for lexical pluralism is evident in terms of his positivism.
In light of the above, it can be reasonably concluded that the pluralist variation 
that Mill had in mind when he contemplated morality was the lexical one and that his 
liberalism is consistent with his assumptions about morality and human nature.
If one, nevertheless, still supported -  rather implausibly -  the idea that the above 
indications of Mill’s commitment to hierarchical pluralism were of minor importance and 
that what Mill had in mind was in fact a pluralist conviction of the sort that is espoused 
by Berlin, then the case for the abandonment of such a belief for the necessary adoption 
of a lexical pluralist view of the moral universe - if his liberal theory is to be consistent -  
still remains. What would not remain is the view that Mill was a consistent philosopher.
Furthermore, Mill’s meliorism could result in conclusions which can be 
accounted for by Kekes’ moral theory. Like Mill, who argues for the moral improvement 
of mankind in the sense that the latter will come to realize what is of moral value, Kekes 
also holds that his primary values are uncontested since they are recognized as important 
and there is consensus on their truth by rational moral agents. This position is one which 
is deeply at odds with Berlinian value pluralism.
The application of a reasonable pluralist position in Mill’s liberalism would not be 
the best way to go about the issue mainly because of Mill’s hierarchy of values. Whether 
an experienced and well informed judge’s take on this hierarchy is evidential or criterial 
is contested.176 Whichever it is, nevertheless, this hierarchy is one which does not stem
175 ibid.
176 See ibid., pp. 130-158
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from the grounds of reasonableness. On the contrary, the lexical priority between higher 
and lower pleasures is determined by resort to criteria which might not be shared or 
recognized by reasonable people. If one were to equate the conception of reasonableness 
with the capacity to identify objective value hierarchies in the Millian sense, then it 
appears to me that this would make the understanding of reasonableness in question too 
comprehensive and rationalistic.
To conclude, it seems that Mill’s liberalism is incompatible with radical value 
pluralism. Mill is foremost a liberal and only secondarily a pluralist and if one were to be 
the kind of liberal described by Mill, then one would have to abandon belief in radical 
value pluralism. Lexical pluralism is the pluralist variation that allows for consistency 
and works best with Mill’s system of ideas. This does not make Mill’s liberal argument 
necessarily true, since it might give way under the weight of more traditionalist critiques 
or since it is not proven that lexical pluralism is a true doctrine; it does, however, make it 
consistent. Reasonable pluralism is an interesting alternative that, nevertheless, is not 
adequately tailored to be the basis of Millian liberalism in the way that a pluralist 
hierarchical theory of the moral universe is. Finally, Kekes’ pluralism could also be 
compatible with Mill’s liberalism since it can account for the latter’s meliorism.
4.2. Rawls ’ Liberalism in A Theory o f Justice
In a nutshell, what I understand Rawls’ project to be is this: Whereas in Political 
Liberalism there is a limit to the applicability of justice as fairness, in A Theory o f Justice 
Rawls argues that justice as fairness has both a universal applicability and a primary role 
in the organization of society. He claims that there are some basic liberties which have
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priority over other utilitarian or other considerations and which are necessary both for a 
range of conceptions of the good and for the development and implementation of the two 
moral forces that define the conception of the person, i.e. the capacity for a sense of 
moral justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. The priority of basic liberties 
is compromised only when this is for the benefit of the worse-off members of a society or 
a group and stems from an agreement derived amongst self-interested and rational 
individuals who act under the “veil of ignorance”. However, in order for the Principles of 
Justice to be applicable and for the argument from the original position to work, the 
preconditions of a well-ordered society and stability must be fulfilled.
One of the most potent critiques of Rawls’ argument in A Theory o f Justice is that 
it does not account for incommensurability. This criticism, however, is not adequately put 
if this is the only form it takes since, as I discussed before, the concept of 
incommensurability can have different meanings, thus giving birth to dissimilar 
conceptions of value-pluralism. Yet, the above criticism does offer a general line of 
argument; what remains is to specify the manner in which it unravels.
Rawls claims that lifestyles can be pursued harmoniously with, and under the 
auspices of, justice as fairness. This is evident in Rawls’ belief that There must be an 
agreed scheme of conduct in which the excellences and enjoyments of each are 
complementary to the good of all’.177 Furthermore, when he makes his communitarian 
argument and pays tribute to the complimentary nature of the intrinsically valuable and 
distinct ways of life that are pursued by different people as members of a well-ordered 
society, he makes an assumption regarding the compatible nature of all the possible
177 Rawls, J.; A Theory o f Justice (Oxford University Press: 1971,1999), p. 461
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alternative ways of life that the citizens of the society in question might choose.178 This is 
clear, for instance, in Rawls’ claim that ‘the members of a well ordered society have the 
common aim of cooperating together to realize their own and another’s nature in ways 
allowed by the principles of justice’.179
Here it looks as if Rawls does not appreciate the full force of the concept of 
incompatibility as this is expressed by Berlinian value pluralism. Had he done so, his 
theory would have to account for the possibility that some intrinsically valuable ways of 
life are not only mutually exclusive, but agonistic in the sense that they actively oppose 
and run contrary to other worthwhile ways of life. A radical value pluralist would not 
necessarily disagree with the claim that some lifestyles and choices complement each 
other or that some valuable practices depend on the existence of some other valuable 
practices. She would not even disagree with the belief in universal intelligibility. These 
beliefs, however, would still allow for the possibility in which some conflicts are 
irreconcilable and impossible to resolve in a comprehensive rational manner. Such 
conflicts, for example, are the ones which result from the clashes of the basic liberties 
which are identified in Rawls’ work by H.L.A. Hart.180
Specifically, the first and second statements of Rawls’ two principles of justice -  
and the lexical priority of the first over the second -  concede their limitation (only) when 
‘social circumstances do not allow the effective establishment of...[the] basic rights’ that
178 In ibid. pp. 456-464 (§79: The Idea of Social Unity). Specifically, Rawls writes (in p. 458) that ‘we need 
one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the successes and 
enjoyments of others are necessary for and complementary to our own good’. Also, (in p. 459): ‘When men 
are secure in the enjoyment of their exercise of others, especially when their several excellences have an 
agreed place in a form of life the aims o f which all accept’.
179 Ibid. p. 462
180 See Hart, H.L.A.; Rawls on Liberty and its Priority in Daniels, N. [ed.]; Reading Rawls: Critical 
Studies on Rawls’ ‘A Theory o f Justice’ (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press: 1975)
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the two principles of liberty try to safeguard.181 However, ‘once the required social 
conditions and the level of satisfaction of needs and material wants is attained, as they are 
in a well-ordered society under favourable circumstances, the higher-order interests [that
1R9are promoted by the two principles of liberty] are regulative from then on’. 
Furthermore, these higher order interests cannot be compromised for the sake of other 
conflicting considerations of absolute or relative economic notions.183 The basic liberties 
that are projected in the two principles of liberty, once the social conditions for their 
effective application are fulfilled, can only be further curtailed for the sake of the more 
effective promotion of these basic liberties themselves (e.g. restriction to speak as we 
please184) or if they ‘violate some natural duty or some obligation’.185 H.L.A. Hart 
correctly points out that Rawls is never explicit on which these basic liberties are. 
Furthermore, he finds Rawls’ claim ‘that liberty may be restricted to prevent violation of 
any such natural duties or obligations’ to be ‘an unexplained departure from the strict line 
so often emphasized in the case of basic liberties, that liberty my be restricted only for the 
sake of liberty’.186 It is partly in response to such objections like the ones above that 
Rawls had to revise some of these views in his Political Liberalism. It is not certain that 
an advocacy of lexical pluralism will solve these problems for Rawls. What is certain, 
however, is that an application of lexical pluralism as deep into Rawls’ theory as the 
basic liberties of his Principles of Justice is more accommodating than radical value 
pluralism.
181 Rawls, J.; A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press: 1971,1999), p. 132
182 ibid. p. 476
183 ibid. pp. 477-8
184 ibid. pp. 176-180
185 ibid. p. 291
186 Hart, H.L.A.; Rawls on Liberty and its Priority in Daniels, N. [ed.]; Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on 
Rawls’ CA Theory o f Justice’ (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press: 1975), p. 238
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Rawls’ argument about the way that human beings try to express their nature is 
derived from the agreement of the original position; a methodology so rationalistic that, 
given the radical value pluralist hostility towards rationalism, would find most, if not all, 
radical pluralists opposed to it.187 It is for these two reasons -  lack of appreciation of 
radical conflicts and moral rationalism -  that Rawls’ liberal project in A Theory o f Justice 
is incompatible with untamed value pluralism.
Rawls’ liberal theory in A Theory o f Justice, on the other hand, would be 
consistent with the convictions of lexical value pluralism. The latter is pluralistic enough, 
on the one hand, to accept the diversity of worthwhile ways of life and values but, on the 
other hand, it can still recognize the existence of one or more prioritized values over 
inferior ones. This is compatible both with the priority that Rawls gives to the Principle 
of Liberty through his argument of justice as fairness, as well as with the priority he gives 
to the fulfillment of some basic needs before the Principle of Liberty starts to apply. It is 
important to stress, however, that in this situation lexical pluralism will have to apply not 
only between the Principles of Justice and other principles and values, but also between 
the different basic liberties themselves.
Nevertheless, the case remains that even lexical value pluralism cannot 
completely settle with the claim that in a well-ordered society which is run according to 
the principles of justice as fairness different human beings can pursue different ways of 
life and adopt distinct values that compliment and never contradict each other. What, 
however, an endorsement of lexical value pluralism can do is accommodate the claim of 
the harmonious co-existence of this diversity by attributing certain types of priority to
187 As a matter of fact it is these issues Rawls will revise in Political Liberalism, after acknowledging the 
force of critiques like the one that was just presented.
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specific values or lifestyles. When this is done, the conflicts will remain but given the 
framework of justice as fairness, these conflicts will be resolvable and manageable. Of 
course, like in the case of Mill’s liberalism, this pluralist outlook is not as pluralist as the 
Berlinian one, but again, this is a price that has to be paid for consistency.
Lexical pluralism is still not fully consistent with Rawls’ liberalism since it does 
not share Rawls’ certainty of a harmonious co-existence of the variable lifestyles and 
values under the principles of justice as fairness in a well-ordered society; it just allows 
for a more rational settling of the occurring value conflicts. Moreover, it is questionable 
whether an application of lexical value pluralism as deep into Rawls’ theory as the 
relationship between basic liberties can guarantee the validity of justice as fairness. This 
is because there is an implicit recognition in the application of lexical pluralism in Rawls’ 
liberalism of the fact that some of the basic liberties might not be guaranteed under 
justice as fairness -  since some lower in the hierarchy might have to be trumped for the 
benefit of those which are ranked higher.
Even so, basic liberties cannot be guaranteed by reasonable pluralism as 
effectively as they can -  even to the limited extent that they are -  by lexical pluralism. 
This is because the latter is structured in a manner that, given the hierarchical conclusions 
of a specific theoretical framework such as Rawls’ in A Theory o f Justice, can carry out 
the prioritized values -  in this case basic liberties -  both in time and social context. In 
reasonable pluralism, on the other hand, reasonableness plays a central role in terms of 
defining political values which are dictated by public reason. This conception of 
reasonableness is particularistic enough so as to be able to safeguard the primacy of a 
value neither in time nor in social context. Hence, while it does not exclude the
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possibility that basic liberties might be values which will emerge from public reason and 
deliberation if the context in which reasonable pluralism prevails is liberal democratic, it 
cannot prescribe a course of action when basic liberties conflict with each other or other 
equally reasonable alternatives. For, even though liberalism might be a reasonable theory 
at one moment in time and in a particular social context, reasonable pluralism would 
allow for the emergence of other reasonable views -  both chronologically as well as 
spatially -  which are different from the liberal one. This is something that is not allowed 
by the system of ideas in A Theory o f Justice.
An ethical doctrine along the lines of Kekes’ might be more appropriate for the 
kind of liberalism in focus since it assumes the priority of some values -  which in this 
case could be Rawls’ basic liberties -  over others in such a manner that the overridden 
values are still objectively valuable but secondary, and there is consensus on the 
overriding values which also do not contradict each other. However, there are still 
reservations with respect to the truth of this theory since, Kekes’ implicit claim that there 
is no conflict between primary values -  i.e. Rawls’ basic liberties in this case -  can be 
contested. If the qualification of this observation is met, however, it is safe to assert that 
Rawls’ liberal theory in A Theory o f Justice is consistent with an ethical theory that 
exemplifies the structures of Kekes’ one.
To conclude, I have presented an argument in favor of the claim that untamed 
value-pluralism is incompatible with Rawls’ liberalism in A Theory o f Justice. A 
pluralism that I have found to be a well suited pluralist variation to Rawls’ project, even 
though it is not in as harmonious accord with it as it is with Mill’s liberalism, is lexical 
pluralism. Reasonable pluralism is a pluralist variation that is incompatible with the
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argument for the universality of freedom in A Theory o f Justice. Finally, there seems to 
be some common ground between Kekes’ theory and the liberalism in focus; even 
though, as with lexical pluralism, there are serious reservations which have to be met 
before the Kekesian pluralist theory is applied in Rawls’ liberalism.
4.3. Rawls ’ liberalism in Political Liberalism
The liberal theory of Political Liberalism is different from the one in A Theory o f  Justice 
in many respects, not least because Political Liberalism was partly a reformation of the 
liberal theory in A Theory o f Justice in response to the critiques advanced against the 
latter. In A Theory o f  Justice, the agreement on a mode of interaction and decision 
making along the lines of the principles of justice as fairness, which results in the priority 
of liberalism, is based on the rationalistic argument of the original position. In Political 
Liberalism, the working agreement between the members of a society is a matter of the 
contingencies and the specifics of society -  so that justice and the priority of liberalism 
do not depend upon rational choice but on the workings of the democratic society in 
which they exist and should be safeguarded.188 This is a substantial departure from the 
position in A Theory o f Justice where ‘common sense precepts are at the wrong level of 
generality... [so that] in order to find suitable first principles one must step behind 
them’.189 In A Theory o f Justice the conflicts that arise after justice as fairness has been 
established must occur from unequal distributive shares since there is agreement among
188 This is reminiscent of what Gray identifies in Raz’s The Morality o f  Freedom as functional and cultural 
reasons for the priority, in Raz’s case, of the value of autonomy in western liberal societies. I elaborate 
more on this in Chapters Four, Five and Six.
189 Rawls, J.; A Theory o f Justice (Oxford University Press: 1971,1999), p. 271
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different comprehensive doctrines.190 In Political Liberalism this agreement does not 
exist amongst all world views but only among reasonable religious, moral and 
philosophical outlooks. Furthermore, as long as they meet some basic criteria of justice, 
comprehensive doctrines in Political Liberalism have a place only in people’s private 
sphere whereas ‘in the public arena citizens were expected to invoke political values, 
which in Rawls’ understanding of politics, are completely disconnected from 
comprehensive doctrines’.191 In this context, Roberto Alejandro has good reason for 
considering the distinction presented in Political Liberalism as a conflict between the 
private and the public realms. While at first glance this might seem plausible and 
compatible with Rawls’ anti-perfectionist aspirations, it will nevertheless become 
apparent that this cannot always work for it is extremely difficult -  if not impossible in 
some instances -  to distinguish or isolate the private sphere from the public. Rawls is apt 
to remove certain issues of contestability that arise from the fact of pluralism in order for 
society to gain in terms of stability and workability. It is because of this that he aspires to 
abandon his comprehensive liberal doctrine in A Theory o f Justice for the sake of a 
political one in Political Liberalism. However, although the state should not impose 
specific conceptions of the good on its citizens, Rawls claims that the citizens have to be 
‘fully co-operative members of society’.193 The extent to which this is possible without 
the citizen having to actively advocate the values of the society in which they live seems 
to me unclear. As a consequence the political requirement for co-operation from 
members of society becomes a comprehensive demand for the advocacy of certain
190 Look at Alejandro, R.; The Limits of Rawlsian Justice (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), pp.l 15-124
191 ibid. p. 123
192 ibid. pp. 124-127
193 ibid., p. 128
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(liberal) principles. Even if one only has to allow for the set of the political conceptions 
of justice in a modem liberal society, one would have to be educated to do so. The 
boundary between “being educated” to acknowledge some values and “being 
indoctrinated” into accepting certain values or world views is a very thin one, especially 
in philosophical terms.
A radical pluralist can argue against Rawls’ assertions in Political Liberalism in 
two different ways. On the one hand, she can argue against the universal application of 
Rawls’ liberalism on political grounds and, on the other, she can argue against its 
primacy in the specific context of the modem liberal democracy itself. Both seem to be 
very compelling criticisms.
Regarding the former of the above two criticisms, its claim is that it is wrong to 
make a universal claim out of a political one. To be fair to Rawls, though, he does not try 
to make a universal point since his theory is intended to argue for the primacy of 
liberalism in the already modem liberal context. This is a big departure from the 
implications of his argument in A Theory o f Justice in which, to a great extent because of 
the comprehensive and rationalistic character of his argument, the primacy of liberty 
through justice as fairness was categorical and, hence, had a universal application.
Nonetheless, even if one allows for the above, two issues still loom large. One is 
the extent to which it is legitimate for any liberal claim to be other than universal. 
Between a liberalism which aspires to be universal and a liberalism which aspires to be 
culturally specific, it is the former that is of more interest at least to the political theorist; 
a culturally specific argument for the priority of liberalism would be as normatively 
compelling as an argument for the culturally specific application of the priority of non-
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liberal principles. However, since the attempts to justify such liberalism have so far been 
futile, the demonstration of a liberal theory which can both successfully argue for the 
priority of liberalism and keep its commitment to “the fact of reasonable pluralism” even 
only within the context of western liberal society is of some value.
The second and most important issue has to do with the compatibility of Rawls’ 
liberalism in Political Liberalism with his recognition of the “fact of pluralism”. To begin 
with, the radical understanding of “the fact of pluralism” is a universal moral claim and 
cannot be confined to its application solely with regard to a culture specific context. 
Thus, it cannot be argued that it does not apply to the specific circumstances of Rawls’ 
Political Liberalism since, despite the fact that Rawls tries -  often unsuccessfully -  to 
avoid ethical and perfectionist claims, his theory would still have to meet up with the 
radical pluralist requirements. Indeed, it was partly for the purpose of meeting these 
requirements that Rawls reformulates his liberalism from what it was in A Theory o f  
Justice into what it is in Political Liberalism. Unfortunately, however, any compatibility 
between radical pluralism and liberalism still remains a chimera. From an observational 
stance, this incompatibility is especially obvious within the context of late modem liberal 
society.
Even if one were to assume a society which is homogeneous in terms of its moral 
beliefs, there would still be irresolvable conflicts. Such conflicts can be exemplified by 
the debate on abortion or by the debate regarding the trade-off between civil liberty and 
safety, liberty and equality or between the basic liberties that H.L.A. Hart identifies in 
Rawls. So, assuming radical pluralism, the liberal society which Rawls presents us with 
cannot avoid conflicts the rational solution of which is an objective that remains
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unfulfilled. It is also important to mention that to the extent to which Rawls’ liberalism 
does not avoid making a perfectionist claim, it is as incompatible with untamed value 
pluralism as Mill’s or the liberalism in A Theory o f Justice.
So, despite Rawls’ explicit efforts in reformulating his liberal doctrine in order to 
tackle the problem of harmony and stability in modem liberal societies -  which is posed 
by “the fact of pluralism” -  he fails to present a convincing case with respect to the 
compatibility of this reformulated liberal doctrine and pluralism understood in its raw and 
unrestricted radical variety.
In addition, whether the liberal doctrine of Political Liberalism is compatible with 
a hierarchical understanding of value-pluralism depends on whether the doctrine can 
avoid the charge of perfectionism. It is not my aim in this thesis to present a definite 
critique of Rawls theory or to take a definite stance on some of the critiques that are 
advanced either in favor of his theory or against it. This topic is vast, much covered and 
certainly beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, in light of my discussion above regarding 
the political or comprehensive nature of Rawls’ Political Liberalism, it will suffice to say 
that i f  Rawls’ doctrine is a comprehensive one, it is compatible with lexical value 
pluralism very much in the way that Mill’s liberalism or the liberalism in A Theory o f  
Justice were rather compatible with a hierarchical understanding of pluralism. Again, the 
price to pay for internal consistency would be a withdrawal from the more radical 
conception of value pluralism.
Now, i f  the elaboration in Political Liberalism succeeds in avoiding a slide to a 
comprehensive or a perfectionist stance, then one might at first claim that by “the fact of 
pluralism” Rawls ought to refer to something else other than lexical value pluralism.
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After all, when I discussed the compatibility between lexical value pluralism and Mill’s 
liberalism or the liberalism in A Theory o f Justice I argued that it is their comprehensive 
nature that fits rather well (more so in the former than in the latter) with lexical value 
pluralism. However, this does not necessarily mean that in order for a liberalism to 
advocate a hierarchical conception of the plurality of moral values, the liberalism in 
question has to be a comprehensive one. Rawls’ exposition explicitly states that whatever 
the private conceptions of the good are, these will be left outside the public domain. The 
decision on the primacy of liberalism is political and morality has no say in this. Then, 
the theory in Political Liberalism is compatible with lexical pluralism in very much the 
same way that it would be compatible with monism or ethical relativism or any other 
moral doctrine per se. What is important for Rawls here is the social contingency which 
will give rise to the political imperative for the promotion of a liberal order.
To conclude the topic of the compatibility between lexical pluralism and the 
liberalism in Political Liberalism, it can be said that if the latter is unsuccessful in its aim 
in being a political doctrine and ends up sliding into rationalism, the two are compatible. 
To some extent, the same holds even for the case where the liberalism in focus remains a 
political doctrine. In this latter case, however, the significance of the compatibility is not 
critical since such a political liberal doctrine can also be compatible with other moral 
outlooks.
In the case in which Political Liberalism is a non-comprehensive doctrine, the 
application of reasonable pluralism would render the latter nothing more than mere 
modus vivendi, a pragmatic treatise on how to best achieve stability in a democratic 
society without any normative moral weight. Even in this situation, however, reasonable
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pluralism is still compatible with Rawls’ liberalism. As I have discussed already, there is 
good reason to doubt the success of the reasonable pluralist doctrine in carrying some of 
its claims on the nature of morality all the way; questions of who decides what is 
reasonable and what role intuitionism plays in this are never adequately answered. As far 
as compatibility is concerned, however, reasonable pluralism is compatible with the non- 
comprehensive understanding of the theory in Political Liberalism. This is because, even 
if the whole project is one which aims for stability and the avoidance of conflict, to the 
extent that it safeguards against the violation or the establishment of repugnant values 
and it allows the flourishing of the diverse pursuing of conceptions of the good, then it 
does not at least go against the main reasonable pluralist thrust.
To the extent that the framework of principles developed in Political Liberalism 
has also a functional reason in that it aims to educate the democratic citizen in 
acknowledging the worth of values -  such as freedom -  which are important in terms of 
the effective and smooth running of a diverse and pluralistic society,194 then reasonable 
pluralism is well suited for Political Liberalism.
Moreover, it can be said that there are similarities between Rawls’ liberal project 
in Political Liberalism and Kekes’ pluralism. This is because like Rawls, who believes 
that reasonable individuals will interact in a manner which will lead to, and ultimately 
encompass, a plurality of objectively worthwhile values, Kekes thinks that all sensible 
moral agents will understand the universal applicability and priority of the values which 
he groups in the primary domain. There are many issues with regard to the validity of the 
epistemic {how can agents understand the universal applicability of these goals) and the
194 In this sense, Rawls’ project in Political Liberalism is comprehensive since it is based on a specific 
conception o f the good which the citizens have to acknowledge in order to behave in a way that will give 
rise to rights that will help them realize this good.
132
ontological (whether human nature is such that allows for such claims) grounds of both 
views. Also, the problem to which I have referred to elsewhere in the thesis with respect 
to the possibility of conflict between what Kekes considers primary values is relevant. 
This is, after all, the radical pluralist objection to Rawls’ Political Liberalism.
Of course, if Rawls’ liberalism is understood as non-comprehensive, an ethical 
theory like Kekes’ with very strong normative implications will be inappropriate. A 
purely political conception of liberalism would be unable to make the normative claims 
which the theory of primary and secondary values demands.
Overall, it can be said that the compatibility of Rawls’ project in Political 
Liberalism with variations of value pluralism depends to some extent on how one 
understands the project itself. When I examined its compatibility with lexical pluralism, 
the argument partly depended on whether the project could sustain its political nature or 
whether it collapsed into a comprehensive one. In the latter case I found it to be 
compatible with a hierarchical version of pluralism whereas in the former the 
compatibility was not as straight forward. Furthermore, Rawls’ project in Political 
Liberalism appears to be compatible with an understanding of pluralism according to 
reasonableness. Moreover, an application of Kekesian theory in Rawls’ project in 
Political Liberalism might not necessarily make the latter true. Nevertheless, in sharing 
and reflecting some of the weaknesses of Rawls’s project, Kekes’ theory offers a pluralist 
framework which compliments a number of aspects of Political Liberalism in the case in 
which the latter is deemed to be comprehensive. Finally, I found the liberalism in 
question to be incompatible with unrestricted value pluralism.
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4.4. Raz’s Liberalism
4.4.1. Raz’s Liberalism and Lexical Value Pluralism
If Raz’s conception of autonomy is considered to be objectively valuable it can be 
granted priority within Raz’s liberal perfectionism if the latter endorses lexical pluralism, 
since lexical pluralism allows for such ranking of values. Despite the fact, however, that 
lexical pluralism allows for the prioritisation of autonomy, it does not guarantee it.
Values can be compared and ranked against each other by the use, as I have 
argued, of either some common means against which conflicting values are measured or 
on deontological grounds. One would expect that Raz’s Aristotelian type of liberalism 
would prioritize autonomy on the grounds that it is universally valuable and that it is a 
necessary part of the good life for humans. However, this cannot be the case since the 
arguments for the promotion of autonomy in modem liberal societies are functional195 
and as such Raz cannot make a universally applicable normative case for the priority of 
autonomy. If, however, a normative case for the priority of autonomy can be made not on 
the grounds of universality but on the grounds of its intrinsic value, then it might be 
possible to prioritise autonomy in the context of lexical pluralism.196 Furthermore, Raz 
claims elsewhere that there are worthwhile lifestyles that do not require autonomy as a 
necessary ingredient.197 I would go even further to suggest that there are worthwhile 
lifestyles such that not only do they not require autonomy to be one of their ingredients, 
but which actually preclude the Razian conception of autonomy. Such lifestyles are those 
devoted to the pursuance and the fulfillment of values that are recognized by traditions
195 See Chapters Four and Five.
196 For the argument that Raz makes a normative demand for the promotion of autonomy on grounds other 
than its universality, look at Chapters Four and Five.
197 He makes this assertion in Raz, J.; Ethics in the public Domain: Essays in the Morality o f Law and 
Politics (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1995), p. 124, n.30.1 also discuss this issue in Chapter Six.
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which are threatened by Raz’s view of autonomy and which can exist as enclaves even 
within modem liberal democracies. If one allows for the existence of such lifestyles, then 
the promotion of autonomy on deontological grounds seems absurd -  or, at least, 
unsecured. Given the above, if autonomy is to be the privileged value in such cases, it 
will have to be justified by means other than a deontological approach, since a 
normatively binding deontological approach in favour of the priority of autonomy in such 
circumstances is hard to produce. This leaves the weighting method as the only 
alternative. The details of this method, however, would be very difficult to pinpoint, since 
I cannot think of any philosophically valid medium one could use for the measurement of 
values like autonomy. If one, for example, uses as a medium for such measurement the 
worth that a good or a value has to one’s life, then the basis of the discussion moves away 
from the realm of classical moral objectivity and towards the realm of historically 
contingent values. This is a direction that a moral objectivist, such as Raz, would wish to 
avoid.
4.4.2. Raz’s Liberalism and Kekes ’ Pluralism
Now I will turn to the relationship between Raz’s liberal perfectionism and Kekes’ 
pluralist theory of primary and secondary values.
If Raz claimed that autonomy ought to be a necessary ingredient for anyone’s life 
because our human nature is such that the undertaking of experiments in life can be truly 
valued only when it is done so freely, then his liberal perfectionism would indeed be 
compatible with Kekes’ pluralism. However, as I discuss later in the thesis, the functional 
argument does not appear to make an argument for autonomy being a necessary
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ingredient of the good life. Likewise, the cultural argument is in favour of the 
prioritisation of autonomy not because of some normative demand per se, but because an 
agent who operates in a modem liberal context is accustomed to valuing freedom. 
Moreover, since Raz holds that there are worthwhile lifestyles that do not require 
autonomy as a necessary ingredient, it would be impossible for Raz’s liberalism to 
advocate an ethical outlook which holds that the status of autonomy as a primary value 
has to stem from a common human nature which would hold for everyone irrespectively 
of an agent’s background or historical and social context. On top of these reasons, the 
extent to which Kekes’ theory of primary and secondary values can make meaningful 
ethical claims is questionable. This is due to the fact that the convergence of opinion on 
primary values to which Kekes appeals is not verified by the actual patterns of observable 
moral behaviour. Consequently, since the epistemic test of convergence is not met, it can 
be concluded that the objective nature of the primary values is severely undermined. A 
claim to the contrary would involve a commitment to the rationalist position that moral 
agents who do not recognise the objectivity of primary values have misconceptions about 
the issue. Such a position, however, would jeopardise the role that the convergence of 
opinion has within Kekes’ system of ideas since it would not be an active test that 
determines which value is a primary one, but a test on the rationality of the human agent. 
All these challenges must be fully appreciated when the compatibility between liberal 
perfectionism and the theory of primary and secondary values is examined.
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4.4.3. Raz’s Liberalism and Reasonable Pluralism
Before I proceed, it is noteworthy to mention that when I discussed reasonable pluralism 
I found that both Rawls’ and Larmore’s accounts of it, no matter what their differences 
were, flirted with both subjectivist and objectivist traits. The question of what is the exact 
and actual moral status of the aforementioned pluralist theories was left unanswered. The 
reason for this is that this is a thesis which does, on the one hand, deal with some of the 
more specific questions of the pluralist outlooks that are presented while, on the other 
hand, these questions do not constitute its main preoccupation. A full analysis and 
thorough presentation of these issues would require a much larger project which is 
beyond the scope of the present work. As such, in light of the ambiguous nature of the 
reasonable pluralist theory, in this section I will examine the compatibility between 
reasonable pluralism and liberal perfectionism by making further assumptions about the 
exact nature of reasonable pluralism.
If reasonable pluralism is to be deemed an objective moral doctrine, then it can be 
compatible with liberal perfectionism but can help little with the obstacles that the latter 
faces. The reason for this is the reasonable pluralist assumption that rational people will 
respect different views and values since they will acknowledge the impossibility of 
reaching an agreement on which are the most important fundamental values. As a 
consequence, the state should be as neutral facilitator of conditions that allow reasonable 
disagreement as possible. Such a view, however, is not compatible with liberal 
perfectionism for three reasons.
First, liberal perfectionism does not advocate neutrality. It is the responsibility of 
the state to promote the worthwhile options in life and to filter out repugnant ones. For
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Raz, being neutral in terms of the promotion of morality in the public domain is 
disrespectful towards others since we all are moral agents and, as a consequence, 
ignoring issues of morality is anything but respectful. Whether perfectionism is actually 
the right (or wrong) thing to do is not significant for the argument I am making here. 
What is important is that the idea of neutrality which is entailed in reasonable pluralism is 
not consistent with Raz’s liberal doctrine which focuses on autonomy. Second, 
reasonable pluralism holds that it will be possible for different values and convictions to 
coexist in the context of an environment of non-political neutrality; however, the 
dilemmas of modernity have shown that this is a chimera. The issue of abortion is, for 
example, an issue in which one agent’s appreciation of the value of life conflicts with 
another agent’s or group’s advocacy for the right to choose. Situations such as the one 
above point towards the, often inescapable, inclusion of comprehensive conflicts in the 
political and social sphere; conflicts which, furthermore, appear to be irreconcilable with 
each other. The irreconcilable nature of these conflicts exemplifies the ‘fact of pluralism’, 
as Rawls puts it. Third, the context of modernity is again applicable here since the 
behaviour and level of toleration that might have been considered to be within the 
boundaries of reasonableness have been redefined to the extent that even invoking them 
might have become meaningless.
If reasonable pluralism is approached as mere modus vivendi, then the 
prioritization of autonomy in Raz’s theory would be possible but only on non-normative 
terms. This might not be too much of a problem, nevertheless, since the two central 
arguments, which are identified by Gray, for the promotion of autonomy in Raz’s liberal 
theory -  the functional and cultural arguments -  are only instrumental. If, however, Raz
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was pressed to describe autonomy as either an objective or a subjective value, he would 
be inclined to go for the former, as his elucidation on the nature of parochial values -  
which I will discuss later in the thesis -  indicates.
Raz would describe autonomy as an objective value not least because of his 
implicit appreciation of internal autonomy. Moreover, it seems to be Raz’s view that 
while autonomy is not a universal value, it is an intrinsically valuable component in some 
lives in certain historical/cultural contexts. One might say that for Raz autonomy could be 
a parochial value.198 Whereas for Plato and Aristotle the intrinsic is also universal, Raz’s 
theory of parochial values allows for the distinction between the two. As a consequence, 
as I have already mentioned in section 4.4.1, the promotion of autonomy might not 
happen on universal normative grounds, but instead on intrinsically normative ones. The 
merits, weaknesses and the truth of parochial value theory will be discussed in greater 
detail in the subsequent chapters. For the purposes of the argument at hand, it is only 
sufficient to demonstrate that Raz’s claim for the promotion of autonomy is not made 
from the subjectivist point of view.
Furthermore, if Raz’s promotion of autonomy were based on purely subjective 
grounds, it would mean that his theory would be a political perfectionist one. In such a 
case, it could under no circumstances make an argument for the adoption of a non-neutral 
stance regarding the promotion of certain values in response to objective moral concerns 
about what constitutes the good life and with the intention to respect agents qua their 
being moral agents. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that reasonable pluralism 
cannot be used by liberal perfectionism.
198 See my discussion in Chapters Five and Six.
139
Overall, in this section of the chapter I have argued that liberal perfectionism is 
not compatible with reasonable pluralism on two counts. If reasonable pluralism is 
approached as a comprehensive ethical theory, it is not compatible with liberal 
perfectionism because it cannot accommodate the non-neutral stance of political 
liberalism with regards to non-political values. The two are also not compatible because 
reasonable pluralism cannot withstand the criticism from modernity. If reasonable 
pluralism is not a comprehensive ethical theory then the priority of autonomy can be 
safeguarded but in a manner that does not make a strong enough normative case for its 
promotion.
5. Conclusion
In the previous chapter I discussed in detail the idea of Berlinian radical value pluralism 
and examined its strengths as well as its ambiguities and weaknesses. In this chapter I 
delineated and discussed some more timid variations of the Berlinian value pluralist 
theory and examined their compatibility with different liberal theories.
I started this chapter by discussing pluralist alternatives to Berlin’s radical 
pluralism. In doing so I highlighted the characteristics that make each one special and 
different from the other.
Whether these pluralist variations are true or false, no matter how important an 
issue it is, is not at the centre of my argument.
There is, however, the issue of how pluralist these variations of radical value 
pluralism really are. There are a number of reasons that give rise to this reservation. One
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of them is the ambiguous relationship between most of these variations of pluralism with 
monism and relativism.
However, even Berlin’s paradigmatic radical value pluralism has a highly 
ambiguous relationship with both monism and moral relativism. As such, the presence of 
this ambiguity can under no circumstances be considered to be a characteristic particular 
only to the more timid pluralist variations that I have presented. Moreover, it is not so 
much the case that the radical characteristics which are attributed to pluralism are 
misconceived by the pluralist variations that I discuss; it is more the case that their 
purpose is to present a more limited alternative to these radical characteristics. To the 
extent that Berlinian value pluralism has not been proven wrong, an excursion into more 
limited pluralist ethical theories is legitimate. In addition, it is true that lexical pluralism 
and Kekes’ theory of primary and secondary values are much closer to pluralism than 
other monistic moral theories. Where the line lies between a pluralist and a non-pluralist 
theory can be a hotly contested topic. I see no reason, however, for dismissing a moral 
theory as non-pluralist when it clearly embodies pluralist tendencies and characteristics. 
If these characteristics are less potent than the attributes of another pluralist theory, then 
the theory in question is less pluralist than the other, rather than not pluralist at all.
In terms of the compatibility between different liberalisms with different 
pluralisms, I have argued that Mill’s liberalism is incompatible with radical pluralism as 
well as reasonable pluralism. However, lexical value pluralism appears to be consistent 
with many of the ideas that Mill’s theory exemplifies. Rawls’ liberalism in A Theory o f  
Justice, like Mill’s liberalism, is also incompatible with unrestricted value pluralism as 
well as with reasonable pluralism. Lexical pluralism is the pluralist variation best suited
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to it; although many issues with respect to the validity of the liberalism in question persist 
even after the application of lexical pluralism in its system of ideas. I have found Rawls’ 
liberal theory in Political Liberalism to also be incompatible with Berlin’s radical view of 
value pluralism. If Rawls’ project is considered to be a comprehensive one, I argued that 
it can be compatible with lexical pluralism. If the liberalism in question is after all a 
political doctrine, this compatibility does not hold. If Rawls’ project in Political 
Liberalism is examined in terms of the reasonable take on value pluralism then the two 
are compatible. Finally, I found that Raz’s liberal perfectionism is incompatible with 
radical pluralism and reasonable pluralism whereas its compatibility with lexical 
pluralism is possible but must be qualified -  lexical pluralism may allow but does not 
safeguard the priority of autonomy.
Furthermore, as was also the case with Kekes’ pluralism and the other liberal 
theories which I discussed in this chapter, there seem to be some points of congruence 
between liberal perfectionism and Kekes’ moral theory of primary and secondary values. 
So, in Rawls’ case in A Theory o f Justice, it can be said that if the basic liberties are 
considered to be primary values, Rawls’ liberalism is compatible with the Kekes’ 
pluralism. Moreover, Rawls’ liberalism in Political Liberalism could also be compatible 
with Kekes’ pluralism, since both Rawls and Kekes argue in favor of a consensus in 
terms of which values are recognized as true -  by reasonable individuals in Rawls’ case 
and by rational individuals in Kekes’. Furthermore, Mill’s liberalism would also be 
sympathetic to Kekes’ ethical approach as the meliorism in Mill’s liberalism is similar to 
Kekes’ idea that there will be congruence towards the recognition that the objective
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moral values -  which are part of the Kekesian primary domain of values -  will in fact 
come to be recognized as such by rational individuals.
These compatibilities are an important observation because they are a precursor to 
the significance that the Kekesian theory will have for my more detailed discussion of 
Raz’s liberalism in the subsequent chapters. Moreover, the discussion so far in terms of 
the potential reconciliation between liberal perfectionism and some form of pluralism 
needs further elaboration since I argued that the compatibility between liberal 
perfectionism and Kekes’ pluralism or lexical pluralism needs to be qualified. During my 
discussion, I will also examine Raz’s view of autonomy and his theory of value as these 
pertain to, though go beyond, the consideration of his value pluralism and liberalism.
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4RAZ’S LIBERALISM: THE ARGUMENTS AND THE PROBLEMS
The purpose of this chapter is to present my understanding of some aspects of Raz’s 
liberal theory and to identify the problems and challenges that it faces, which I will then 
discuss in the remaining chapters of the thesis.
In the first part I will present Raz's endorsement of liberal perfectionism in the 
form of three negative arguments which are directed against the 'neutralist' liberal critique 
of perfectionism. Furthermore, I will develop some of the basic notions and foundations -  
such as an objective theory of value -  on which Raz constructs his overall argument for 
an autonomy-based conception of liberalism. Some aspects of Raz’s arguments will be 
found to be problematic or unpersuasive since they point towards, what I make out to be, 
an illiberal take on perfectionism that contradicts Raz's object of defence, i.e. liberalism, 
and his overall liberal convictions. Thus, the ground for a further investigation of the 
more specific aspects of Raz’s theory will be set so that any recommendations for 
improvement that will follow will have a reference point.
The second part will be dedicated to the investigation of the relationship between 
autonomy and pluralism in Raz's argument. I do this so as to present my take on the 
context in which one of the most forceful arguments against Raz’s liberalism is advanced. 
This argument, which has been the focus of my thesis so far, doubts the consistency of 
the central role of autonomy in Raz’s system of ideas, which is committed to value 
pluralism. Furthermore, in this section I will also challenge Raz’s arguments for the
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centrality of autonomy in his conception of perfectionism. For the time being, however, 
this will be of secondary importance since the main purpose of this chapter is to identify 
possible points of contention and to lay the ground for the discussion in the subsequent 
chapters of the thesis.
In the third part of this chapter I will present Raz’s revised harm principle, which 
is a key aspect of his liberal theory.
The fourth part will investigate Raz’s conception of the autonomous agent, which 
is as closely related to his view of perfectionism as it is to his view on the relationship 
between autonomy and pluralism.
1. Perfectionism and Neutrality
Raz is a liberal perfectionist. He explicitly argues against both the exclusion of the 
promotion of ideals199 and the neutrality between the ideals promoted by the state.200 That 
is, ’Raz argues that it is legitimate for the state to seek to promote the well-being of 
citizens in a way that includes it in the business of judging the value of particular ways of 
life’.201 Raz develops his argument for perfectionism first by advancing a number of 
negative arguments against anti-perfectionism.
199 In Raz, J., The Morality o f Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1986), pp. 134 - 162
200 ibid. pp. 110-133
201 Mulhall, S. and Swift, A.; Liberals and Communitarians T2nd ed.l. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1992), p. 310
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7.7. Perfectionism and the Overruling o f Ideals
Raz’s first argument against anti-perfectionism is that perfectionism does not necessarily 
overrule some ideals in favour of others. The main argument used by anti-perfectionists 
for the exclusion of ideals is that 'foisting one's conception of the good on people offends 
their dignity and does not treat them with respect'.202 Raz has a two-fold response to the 
above anti-perfectionist claim which appears in different parts in The Morality o f  
Freedom.
His first, immediate reaction to the above anti-perfectionist argument is that, on 
the contrary, showing respect for persons entails treating one ‘in accordance with sound 
moral principles’ whereas ‘one would be showing disrespect to another if one ignored 
moral considerations in treating him’.
This response, however, can make sense only alongside a commitment to an 
objective ethical reality. The existence of such a commitment is evident in Raz’s theory 
of well-being. When comparing the goals and lifestyles of a gambler and a farmer, Raz 
holds that ‘A person who spends all his time gambling has, other things being equal, a 
less successful life, even if he is a successful gambler, than a livestock farmer busily 
minding his farm. Their self-interest may be equally served by their activities, but their 
well-being is not’.204 Even though ‘the reason is that they engage in what they do because 
they believe it to be a valuable, worthwhile activity’, they can be mistaken regarding the
202 Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 157
203 ibid. p. 157
204 ibid. p.298
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valuation that they put on the lifestyle they have chosen to follow. This is because ‘to the
^ A C
extent that their valuation is mistaken it affects the success of their life’.
The fact that the value attached to an ideal can be a mistaken judgement which 
misrepresents the true value of that ideal is a clear statement of a persuasion in an 
objective theory of value. This is important not only because Raz’s objectivism is at the 
core of his system of ideas, but also because it indicates a clear-cut intention to stand up 
against the simple ethical relativist conception of morality which, as I have mentioned in 
the second and third chapters of the thesis, is often advanced against value pluralists. 
Furthermore, if one takes into account Raz’s further conviction that one ought not to take 
ideals, systems of belief and cultures at their own estimation,206 one can recognise why 
Raz sees the importance of ideals as dependant on their actual truth value and not as 
dependent on one’s belief in that truth value. As Raz puts it regarding one’s obligation to 
obey the directives of the state, ’the fact that the state considers anything to be valuable or
90 7valueless is no reason for anything. Only its being valuable or valueless is a reason’. 
Nevertheless, there is no procedure that is generally acceptable for establishing what is
205 ibid. p.299. Raz’s comparison between the value entailed in the lifestyles of a farmer and a gambler and 
his argument that the former is more valuable than the latter, is one that can be criticised in a number of 
ways. For instance, to what extent can a successful stock broker be considered a successful gambler?
Maybe an argument can be made according to which the activities of the stock broker in town do not 
amount to anything socially valuable. Such a claim, however, can also be advanced against the value of the 
activities o f a farmer since many of his techniques (fertilization, operation under conditions protected from 
competition etc.) are harmful to developing countries. These concerns have in common their pre­
occupation with issues that are primarily tangible, thus leading the argument on which lifestyle is more 
worthwhile than the other to issues that do not directly relate to immediate ethical concerns -  even though 
ultimately the argument might have to refer to ethical concerns (i.e. harming people in developing countries 
is wrong). These concerns, albeit being imperative for an overall view on the issue, are not going to pre­
occupy me any further in the thesis. My discussion on whether and how comparisons such as the ones in 
focus are possible, as well as the extension o f this discussion into value theory issues (in Chapters Five and 
Six) are going to be solely of a theoretical ethical nature.
206 Apart from the example above which can be found in The Morality o f  Freedom this is also evident in 
Raz, J., 'Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective' in his Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press: 1994), pp. 170 - 191, and especially pp. 182 -183.
207 Raz, J., The Morality o f Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 412, emphasis in original.
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truly valuable. As a consequence, this is a point which I will revisit and discuss in depth 
over the remainder of the thesis.
What this entails for perfectionists, in any case, is that they ‘do not have to 
argue that it is justifiable for the beliefs of some to overrule the beliefs of others; for the 
perfectionist ideals may enter politics not because people believe in them but because 
they are valid'.208 That is, Raz holds that directives for the promotion, or the 
safeguarding, of valuable ideals within a state do not necessarily need the consensus of 
the subjects of the state in order for these directives to be considered legitimate.209 The 
claim that directives are valuable qua their objective value and not because of inter­
subjectivist grounds is a claim that leaves many issues unanswered. It makes a clear 
ontological statement with regards to values, but it does not make an epistemological 
statement with regards to the acquisition of knowledge about the values in question. As a 
consequence, the question of who decides what is true and on what explicit grounds, is a 
pressing and serious matter which I discuss mainly in Chapters Five and Six. For the time 
being my purpose is not to resolve, but to identity the aspects of Raz’s theory that are 
problematic and to lay the ground for tackling them later in the thesis. Thus, for now it 
suffices to acknowledge the problem and to point out that Raz’s perfectionist liberal 
theory is very different from Rawls’ liberal theory in Political Liberalism where the 
consensus of the citizenry is at the core of the effective running of society and where the
208MuIhaII, S. and Swift, A.; Liberals and Communitarians r2nd ed.l. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1992), p. 314
209 Overall it can be said that for Raz, in order for a relatively just political authority to claim effective 
legitimacy over its subjects it will be desirable but not necessary for it to enjoy their consent since: 'consent 
represents merely one end o f the spectrum in the myriad o f processes and actions that lead...to the attitude 
of trust in one's government' [Raz, 'Government by Consent1 in Raz, J.; Ethics in the Public Domain 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 369].
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promotion of values -  at least at face value, for it is questionable to what extent Rawls 
avoids perfectionism in his theory -  must not be part of the public domain.
But, even if Raz is correct in arguing that the anti-perfectionist argument with 
regards to the overruling of ideas does not necessarily negate perfectionism, it still 
remains to be seen how it might be incorporated in political practice. One could make an 
even stronger case and claim, with some credit, that what really ought to matter most in 
our evaluation of the anti-perfectionist argument, which is that perfectionism necessarily 
overrules one's ideals for another's, is not so much its validity but its practicality; this is 
essentially Rawls’ point in Political Liberalism. To be fair, Raz does set a number of 
criteria that a government has to fulfil for its action to be legitimate. However, it is rather 
the ability of governments to perform in the manner that Raz expects them to perform 
that is questionable.
Because of such complications, a very brief investigation into Raz's account of the 
delineation of the morally legitimate bounds of the government authority, and hence the 
promotion of valuable ideas by the authorities, will be helpful for two reasons. First, 
Raz’s argument regarding one’s obligation to obey the directives of the state is meant to 
support his claim that a perfectionist doctrine does not necessarily involve anti-liberal 
implications; second, it is a basis which is closely related to Raz's autonomy-based 
doctrine of freedom and many of its features will be relevant in my forthcoming 
investigations.
1^ A
In the first part of The Morality o f Freedom and elsewhere , Raz attempts to 
develop a set of criteria that have to be fulfilled if obedience to the authority of a state’s
210 For a brief encapsulation and some further explorations o f Raz's arguments on the topic look at Raz, J., 
The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition' in Raz, J.; Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford:
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directives is to be morally obligatory. In a nutshell, Raz argues that there is no blind
obligation to obey the directives of the state qua their quality of being authoritative
directives. An 'agreement...to accept authority is binding...only if conditions rather like
« 11 •those of the normal justification thesis obtain’. According to the normal justification 
thesis ‘a person has authority over another person ... [when] the alleged subject is likely 
better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative 
directives) if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding 
and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him 
directly'.212
Raz’s normal justification thesis essentially claims that government action is 
limited by two main conditions. First, authorities 'should act only where their intervention 
is likely to lead to greater conformity with those reasons that it is likely that subjects will 
not conform to if they do not intervene. Second, they should not intervene where it is 
more important that their subjects should decide for themselves than that they should get 
the right results'.213 In order for government action to be legitimate, both of these 
conditions must be fulfilled.
For Raz, the normal justification thesis does not express the immense power of 
authorities and the entailed subsequent duty to obey the laws they construct. It rather 
reflects their limited role since such authorities are not there to set laws, which will 
reinforce new and independent considerations for their subjects. Government directives
Clarendon Press, 1994) pp. 341 - 354; Raz, J., 'Government by Consent' in ibid., pp. 355 - 369; and Raz,
J., 'Authority, Law and Morality' in ibid., pp. 210 - 237. For a more detailed formulation of Raz’s view on 
the issue look at Raz, J., The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
211 Raz, J., 'Authority, Law and Morality' in Raz, J.; Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994), p. 214, emphasis mine.
212 Raz, J., The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 53
213 Raz, J., Tacing Up: A Reply' in Southern California Law Review, (1989) vol. 62, p. 1231.
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and promotions of goals and ideals are there to 'mediate between ultimate reasons and the 
people to whom they apply*.214 When the rule of government deviates considerably from 
representing the reasons that apply to its subjects, one does not have a moral obligation to 
obey its command. So, the Ciceronian tendency, which echoes the rationalistic and 
monistic convictions of Platonism that the state should come before all, finds no quarter 
in Raz’s pluralist and Aristotelian account.
Raz's account is very thorough and sophisticated and for the time being my 
limited presentation surely does not do it lull justice. However, even if one assumes the 
soundness of Raz's theoretical argument on the matter, the anti-perfectionist claims still 
carry some weight since an anti-perfectionist, like the late Rawls, will feel uneasy about 
the fact that governments often misjudge what is valuable and what not -  this was Mill’s 
point even though he ended up arguing for a perfectionist liberal doctrine. Raz himself 
acknowledges this by writing that 'if it is likely that the government will not 
judge...matters correctly then it has no authority to judge them at all'215 Furthermore, he 
does recognise that his theory on the bounds of authority 'does not disguise the 
dangers...of fallibility of judgement, and uncertainty of purpose' that is often inherent in 
governmental practices.216 As a consequence, perfectionists argue that governmental 
intervention should be limited not because we cannot know which ideals are valid, but 
because we cannot expect governments to act on those that are'.217 Raz agrees that this 
argument 'justifies restricting the right of governments to govern' because of a concern
214 Raz, J.; ’Authority, Law and Morality’ in Raz, J.; Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994), p. 215
215 Raz, J.; The Morality o f Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 412
2,6 ibid., p. 427
217 Mulhall, S. and Swift, A.; Liberals and Communitarians f2nd ed.l. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1992), p. 316
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for 'individual freedom and autonomy'. As a consequence, 'a considered view of the 
defects of government...will lead to much greater freedom from governmental action' 
than a firm commitment to the promotion of valid ideals that idealism requires.219 It is 
because of all this that, when pressed, Raz ends up acknowledging the seriousness of 
‘what more neutralist theorists have always taken as one of the most important starting 
points of liberal political thought’ which is ‘that in the imperfect world that we inhabit, 
the dangers of perfectionist politics are so widespread that liberalism should try to resist 
the conceptual and political attractiveness of perfectionism'.
There are two concerns with respect to the above. On the one hand, it can be 
argued that Raz's argument could collapse into the anti-perfectionism that it tries to resist. 
On the other hand, if it does not wish to make concessions with respect to its expected 
role in government, it must be prepared to take on the cost of the serious externalities that 
perfectionism could entail in terms of the manner in which a government might promote 
values and conceptions of the good life without the consent of its subjects.221 Depending 
on the nature of these externalities, they could range from being undesirable to being 
dangerous and coercive since one's personal freedom can be greatly restricted due to 
governmental interference.
To summarise, in this section I discussed Raz’s first argument against anti­
perfectionism and I concluded that the argument is not as convincing as Raz deems it to 
be. The reason for this is the claim that perfectionism is acceptable when the values
218 Raz, J.; The Morality o f Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 428
219 Brink, B.; The Tragedy o f Liberalism: an Alternative Defense of a Liberal Tradition. (Albany, NY, The 
University o f New York Press: 2000), p. 72
220 ibid.
221 The idea of consent is another one the ambiguity o f which I have to acknowledge but, nevertheless, 
resist from developing further.
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promoted are objectively worthwhile. Such an assertion, however, is far from 
unambiguous since, as Brian Barry puts it, ‘no conception of the good can be justifiably 
held with a degree of certainty that warrants its imposition on those who reject it’.222 
Given the above, it might be the case that political scepticism, defined by Buffachi as the 
claim that ‘no degree of certainty at the epistemological level can justify its imposition on 
those who reject this conception of the good’ is more persuasive than perfectionism. 
These concerns inevitably refer the discussion of Raz’s perfectionist argument to his 
theory of value with which I will deal extensively later in the thesis.
For the time being it suffices to say that, apart from theoretical concerns regarding 
the objective nature of values and how one could grasp them, concerns about the practical 
workings of politics give the late Rawls and other liberal theorists good reasons for 
preferring scepticism about intervention and promotion of values rather than 
perfectionism.
1.2. Perfectionism and Coercive Imposition
Raz's second negative argument against anti-perfectionism is that perfectionism, and the 
discriminatory promotion of values that it involves, does not entail coercive imposition. 
The anti-perfectionist position that Raz attacks with this argument is two-dimensional. 
Anti-perfectionists argue firstly that perfectionist policies must inevitably be directed by 
some groups against others and secondly that perfectionism must be coercive.
The latter argument claims that the coercive nature of perfectionism is 
unavoidable since people will always believe in different ideals. Whether valid or invalid,
222 Barry, B.; Justice and Impartiality. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 169
223 Bufacchi, V.; ‘Political Scepticism: A Reply to the Critics’ in Politics, issue 23 (2), 2003, pp. 137-140.
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one's beliefs play a very important role in the choice of lifestyle(s) one might wish to 
pursue.224 Thus, the active promotion of some ideals and the discouragement of others 
will have to involve coercion. Raz finds these concerns 'real and important'.225 
Nevertheless, they have to ultimately be rejected since it is not the case that all 
perfectionist action is a coercive imposition of a particular type of lifestyle. Thus, 
perfectionist actions ‘could be encouraging and facilitating action of the desired kind, or 
discouraging undesired modes of behaviour’.226 Instances of such behaviour are 
‘conferring honours on creative and performing artists, giving grants or loans to people 
who start community centres, [and] taxing one kind of leisure activity, e.g., hunting, more 
heavily than others.’227 Raz’s view is that political actions like the ones described above, 
and which are undertaken for the pursuit of conceptions of the good, fall ‘far short of the 
threatening popular image of imprisoning people who follow their religion, express their 
views in public, grow long hair, or consume harmless drugs'.228 There are a number of 
issues at stake with respect to the above argument.
Firstly, the promotion of an ideal via indirect means, such as taxation or subsidy, 
alters the costs and/or benefits of a particular action. As Steven Mulhall and Adam Swift 
point out, 'the obvious way to think about the concept of coercion is in terms of the 
deliberate attaching of a sanction or penalty to a particular action: "if you do not cut your
224 It would be a mistake to indicate that people choose to pursue only one way o f life. Even if many forms 
of life are incompatible with each other (e.g. a life o f religious contemplation and a life of an active 
political figure), it's a fact of life that people often choose to pursue many different lifestyles. That is, not 
only do they experiment with different lifestyles over a long period o f time, say one's lifetime, but they also 
choose to pursue different -  and on occasion incompatible - lifestyles at the same time.
225 Raz, J.; The Morality o f Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 162
226 ibid., p. 161
227 ibid.
228 ibid.
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hair, we will send you to prison” would be a paradigm example of a coercive threat*. 
When one says instead that 'if you do not stop hunting, the state will tax you heavily', to 
use Mulhall and Swift's example, it is not the nature of the coercion or the threat that 
changes but the magnitude of it. Of course, 'the penalty of non-compliance is greater in 
the first case than in the second, but it is not obvious that this is a difference of quality 
rather than quantity, that it warrants calling the one coercion and the other not'.230
What one has to also consider, is that at the end of the day, taxation or subsidies 
are ultimately raised by coercive means. As a last resort, the penalty attached to non­
payment of taxation is imprisonment so, 'when the state decides to tax some activities and 
subsidise others' it is 'using its coercive power to enforce its judgements about the relative 
merits of different activities'.231 It has to be appreciated however, that the coercive means 
employed for the enforcing of taxation may not be the only -  or, indeed, the major -  
problem. This is because for many liberals it is the reason for the coercive imposition of 
taxation to which they object and not the coercive imposition in itself. This, however, is a 
point which refers back to the issue of the legitimacy of the perfectionist overruling of 
ideas in a liberal pluralist context.
But, even if it is granted that taxation is a non-coercive sanction, it still goes 
against the anti-perfectionists' convictions. It deliberately alters the costs and benefits of a 
situation, thus tampering with one's decisions and course of action, which amounts to 
nothing less than disrespect for one's autonomy. State subsidies for the arts, for example, 
while not coercive, do influence one's decision of whether she might be involved in the
229 Mulhall, S. and Swift, A.; Liberals and Communitarians f2nd ed.l. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1992), p. 321
230 ibid.
231 ibid., p. 322
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arts or not. If a life with art is valuable, why are not people allowed to make that choice 
for themselves? Because, according to Raz, art is a valuable option, and as such, the state 
ought to actively promote it. Two concerns arise here. The first has to do with the ability 
of the governmental judgement to identify which ideals are valuable in order to promote 
them. This concern does not have to do with the ability of governments to come up with 
arrangements that may improve their judgement and ability to identify objective values 
with a greater proximity than they would otherwise. Governments could delegate to 
experts -  as they, indeed, do -  for scientific projects, public policy issues etc. so that their 
policy implementation is more informed. Furthermore, it could be argued that this is not a 
process that occurs only with the purpose of fulfilling a goal which has already been 
decided to be a worthwhile one. There are many instances, this argument would go, in 
which experts actually determine to a great extent the values which will direct the 
formulation of a certain policy initiative. Even in these cases, however, there is no 
guarantee that the delegation process will yield values which should be promoted. 
Moreover, if one is a Berlinian radical pluralist, there could be many conflicting true 
values at any one given point in time so that any decision by any government or authority 
cannot make an adequate claim for the promotion of one value instead of the other -  the 
debate on abortion and the choice between the right to life and the right to choice comes 
to mind as an instance of this situation. Finally, the concern that governmental judgement 
is often inadequate in identifying valid ideals for promotion exemplifies the reasonable 
worry that many liberals express towards extended authority and imposition of values. As 
I have mentioned in the previous section of the chapter, apart from the political concerns 
about the manner in which governments actually do make perfectionist claims, there are a
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number of ontological and epistemic concerns that relate to this issue and which I am 
going to discuss in subsequent chapters.
The second concern has to do with the suggestion that even if taxation and 
subsidies are not downright coercive, they are certainly manipulative. Raz concedes that 
if taxation and subsidies are indeed manipulative, then they would distort autonomy. On 
the one hand it is true that 'manipulation, unlike coercion does not interfere with a 
person's options'232 -  and hence does not distort autonomy in this sense -  but, on the other 
hand 'it perverts the way that a person reaches decisions, forms preferences or adopts 
goals’.233 In this sense ‘it too is an invasion of autonomy whose severity exceeds the 
importance of the distortion it causes'.234
On top of that, Raz gives a further argument as to why it is not necessarily the 
case that the promotion of values is a coercive action which is aimed by one group at 
another. According to Raz, there are practical or functional reasons that one might have 
to take into consideration when considering perfectionist political action. Raz holds that 
political action ‘may be taken in support of social institutions which enjoy unanimous 
support in the community’.235 Perfectionist action in favour of such institutions may bring 
legal and administrative arrangements into line with them, facilitate their use by members 
of the community who wish to do so, and encourage the transmission of belief in their 
value to future generations’. An instance of the above is, according to Raz, ‘the
232 Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 377
233 ibid, p. 378
234 ibid.
235 ibid., p.161
236 ibid.
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significance of the legal recognition of monogamous marriage and prohibition of 
polygamy1.237
It seems to me that this argument is either outright wrong from the start or, at the 
very least, that it is not applicable in modem societies. It is very hard to find values or 
social institutions that enjoy the society's 'unanimous support' to which Raz refers to 
above. This observation is not only limited in modem multicultural societies since one 
can, with some credibility, argue that this has been the case for most societies in most 
time periods and in most places. It is especially, though, in contemporary societies that 
the 'several ways of life that may be found' in them 'are animated by different conceptions 
of the good life, which may overlap enough to make compromise possible, but which 
have too little in common’ 238 Moreover, as Raz is a value pluralist, he will have to accept 
that many of these different lifestyles are very likely to be incompatible with each other. 
In this case, the assumption of homogeneity is misguided. Moreover, Raz correctly 
argues, one could even envisage extreme cases where the possibility that perfectionist
'y 'lQ
action could 'backfire by arousing...resistance leading to civil strife'. It seems that 
perfectionist measures require a large measure of social consensus. When this consensus 
is absent, as in modem multicultural societies, the call is usually for 'freedom of 
government, so that the freedom of individuals will not be restricted'.240 This view, which 
is expressed by Bert Van Den Brink, is also shared by Raz and it does not necessarily fit 
his overall system of ideas in an unproblematic manner.
238 Gray, J.; Two faces of Liberalism. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000) pp. 18-9
239 Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 429
240 Brink, B.; The Tragedy of Liberalism: an Alternative Defence of a Liberal Tradition. (Albany, NY, The 
University of New York Press: 2000), p. 73
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Despite the fact that the analysis so far been rather critical of Raz's arguments 
against anti-perfectionism, it has to be acknowledged that Raz's analysis touches on 
problems that the anti-perfectionist approach chooses to ignore. Specifically, Raz is 
correct in pointing out that 'perfectionism is the natural condition'.241 And, indeed, there 
are promotions of valuable ideals that even the most vigorous anti-perfectionists would 
not dare to oppose; ideals such as an affordable and efficient health system and the 
prohibition of the commercial transactions of children. But, since this is the case, the 
issue here is again the extent to which Raz gives a qualitatively different account of 
liberalism from the one that is proposed by the anti-perfectionists. It seems to me that the 
difference between the two accounts is one of degree.
To conclude this section, I have established that Raz’s argument that 
perfectionism does not necessitate coercive imposition is not fully convincing. This is 
because it appears to me that Raz effectively links the argument that perfectionism does 
not necessarily entail coercion with the claim that this is so because perfectionism should 
only apply to values that are true and on which there is unanimous agreement. Firstly, a 
radical value pluralist would be opposed to this proposition, since for her there are 
situations in life in which unanimous agreement on objectively worthwhile values is 
impossible. I will tackle this problem when I discuss the general issue of the 
compatibility between Raz’s liberal perfectionism with his ethical pluralism in the next 
two chapters. Secondly, the idea of coercion in Raz is not fully developed and, although I 
am not going to deal with this well-worn and complex issue in the thesis, it has to be 
acknowledged as a point of vagueness in Raz’s theory.
241 Raz, J., Tacing Up: A Reply' in Southern California Law Review, 62 (1989), p. 1232
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Furthermore, Raz’s reference to the unanimous support with respect to which 
values are to be promoted by a perfectionist liberal regime, poses two very important 
challenges. Firstly, Raz has to establish the existence of such values and the ability of 
ethical agents to grasp them. I have highlighted the importance of this issue previously in 
the context of Raz’s argument which holds that perfectionism does not necessarily 
overrule the ideals of one for the ideals of another. Secondly, and just as importantly, the 
unanimous support to which Raz so often refers as a condition for the promotion of 
values is nowhere to be found. This is especially the case in the context of modernity 
which has accentuated and exposed differences and lack of unanimity in most aspects of 
public life. This is another challenge to Raz’s system of ideas to which I will refer 
extensively later on in the thesis.
1.3. Perfectionism and Pluralism
Raz’s third negative argument for perfectionism asserts that permitting governments to 
act on reasons that arise from moral values does not assume ’a rigid moral outlook’ which 
allows only for ’one morally approved style of life’.242 Raz’s reasoning for this argument 
overlaps with the positive articulation of the concept of autonomy that lies at the heart of 
his liberalism.
The centrality of autonomy in Raz’s liberal theory cannot be justified regarding its 
value in terms of some abstract universal right nor because people just desire to be 
autonomous. Regarding the former, this cannot be the case since Raz’s liberal theory is 
not rights-based; regarding the latter, it cannot be so since -  partly because of Raz’s
242 Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 166
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theory of well-being -  Raz's liberalism is not want-regarding in content. One can, on 
the contrary, better understand the role of autonomy in Raz’s liberal theory when 
considering it alongside Raz’s objective theory of value. For Raz, goals and lifestyles are 
worthwhile only to the extent that they fulfil objective moral qualifications. Thus, an 
'autonomous life is only valuable if it is spent in the pursuit of acceptable and valuable' 
goals.244
It is useful to first investigate what this view does not imply. It does not imply, 
Raz argues, that a good life consists of a single set of options. This view arises from his 
notion of non-linear value pluralism.245
The merits as well as the shortcomings of non-linear value pluralism were 
examined elsewhere in the thesis,246 so nothing more will be said of the issue for the time 
being. It suffices to use Raz’s commitment to non-linear value pluralism in order to 
explain the consistency between his hostility towards anti-perfectionism and his 
endorsement of liberalism.247
243 For a detailed exposition of Raz's arguments on the issue look at Ibid. Chapters Seven and Ten, pp. 165 
-192 and 245 -263 respectively. The term ‘want-regarding’ is a term introduced by Brian Barry in Barry, 
B.; Political Argument. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965).
244 Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 417
245 ibid., pp. 321 - 366
246 See Chapter Three.
247 For instance, those who believe in incommensurability think that one cannot compare, say, money with 
friends. Would one choose one million dollars or a best friend? Such a dilemma is incommensurable and 
involves a tragic choice [Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 335 -  
340]. But consider the case where one would have to choose between one dollar and a best friend. With no 
doubt, the vast majority of people would prefer a best friend. So, it might well be the case that it's not that 
one cannot choose between one million dollars and a friend but that the choice is just much harder than 
choosing between a dollar and a friend. The difference between the two examples is not a difference in the 
kind o f the dilemma; it is a difference in the degree or the intensity o f the dilemma. For a general account 
of value-pluralism look at Chang, R. [ed.J; Incommensurability. Incomparabilitv and Practical Reason. 
(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1997). Also, very informative is the discussion by John 
Skorupski in Skorupski, J, 'Value-Pluralism' in Archard, D. Philosophy and Pluralism. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 87-100.
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My aim in this part of the chapter was to present some of Raz’s arguments, so as 
to establish the existence of a number of characteristics in these arguments, and to 
identify problems which I go on to discuss in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. As a 
consequence, I identified the presence of moral objectivism in Raz’s system of ideas 
which, nevertheless, is not particularly developed in The Morality o f Freedom. 
Furthermore, I concluded that Raz’s three anti-perfectionist arguments are not wholly 
compelling. Finally, I identified the presence of three problems in Raz’s system of ideas 
which I will go on to examine in detail in the rest of the thesis. The first of these 
problems deals with the general issue of the compatibility between Raz’s perfectionism 
and his commitment to a value pluralism. The second problem refers to aspects of Raz’s 
theory of value, namely the manner in which Raz could argue for the exact nature of the 
objectivity of moral values. The third problem refers to the validity of Raz’s belief in the 
unanimous agreement on these moral values, which his advocacy of perfectionism 
demands. I should note, however, that although these three problems can be seen as 
distinct ones they do, in fact, sometimes overlap. As this is the case, when I examine each 
of them I sometimes have to also draw on some aspects of the others.
2. Autonomy-based Perfectionism and Value-Pluralism
During my discussion of Raz’s first anti-perfectionist argument in the previous section, I 
paid tribute to his attempt to indicate the presence of an objective theory of value in his 
system of ideas. This is important since I will refer to the success of his attempt to 
commit liberal perfectionism to moral objectivity when I examine the compatibility
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between Raz’s liberal system of ideas and his theory of parochial values.248 With regards 
to the same argument, I have also identified practical problems that have to do with one’s 
obligation towards authoritative political directives. I have argued that the necessary 
consequences of Raz’s approach are such that they would make many liberals feel 
uncomfortable. Another aspect with which some liberals might feel uncomfortable is the 
strong rationalism that is present in Raz’s approach to politics and morality. In Chapter 
Six of the thesis, I will argue that this rationalistic tendency of Raz is at odds with a more 
conservative, but equally plausible, interpretation of his liberal theory.
With regards to Raz’s second anti-perfectionist argument I disputed his view that 
the overruling of some ideals and the promotion of others by ‘soft’ means can be 
considered prima facie uncoercive. There were two reasons for this. The first is 
comprised by the familiar critiques against taxation that were advanced by social 
positivists like Hayek. The second is that the promotion of values disadvantages the 
priorities of one group over those of another. Certainly, Raz’s refutation of this is more 
convincing for homogeneous than heterogeneous societies. The former however, are 
increasingly hard to find in modem pluralist -  especially western democratic -  societies 
and cultures. This problem can be seen as an extension of the general challenge faced by 
Raz’s perfectionist liberalism; that is, the extent to which it can be considered internally 
coherent in light of the compatibility between its pluralistic instantiation and its aspiration 
for an objective moral theory.
Raz’s third argument against anti-perfectionism tried to argue for the 
compatibility between perfectionism and pluralism and in this sense it was a further
248 Raz uses the terms parochial values and parochial concepts interchangeably indicating that there is no 
difference between the two. For the benefit o f narrative and to avoid confusion I will be using the term 
parochial values only.
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elaboration on the issues that had arisen from his second anti-perfectionist argument. The 
argument is that since objectivism is compatible with value pluralism, and since 
perfectionism is an extension of moral objectivism, then perfectionism is compatible with 
value pluralism. Even though the premise that objectivism is compatible with value 
pluralism has been dealt with extensively in the second and third chapters of the thesis, 
more will inevitably be said on this issue as my discussion progresses.
As autonomy is at the centre of Raz’s liberalism, it is only natural that I lay bare 
both my interpretation of Raz’s conception of autonomy as well as my understanding of 
its more specific role in his overall system of ideas. Thus, first I will examine why 
autonomy is important for Raz and then I will elaborate on Raz’s conception of the 
autonomous agent. Finally, I demonstrate the problem of the compatibility between an 
autonomy-based liberalism and pluralism.
2.1. The Importance o f Autonomy
The most obvious explanation for why Raz ascribes so much importance to autonomy is 
that as he works within the liberal tradition, personal freedom and autonomy are very 
dear to him as they are dear to many liberals.
The other reason for the central place that autonomy has in Raz's liberalism has to 
do with the implicit recognition that the sum of one's utility-maximising acts is not 
actually utility-maximising. Very much like J. S. Mill before him, Raz acknowledges the 
existence of features of the good life such that it is part of living well that humans do not 
maximise utility directly. There are barriers to the monistic pursuit of utility which are 
not due to considerations of rights, but to the recognition of the existence of needs such
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as the need for special relationships. As a matter of fact, Raz often goes as far as to say 
that not only is it not the case that human beings do not maximise utility directly, but that 
there are practices with regards to which any discussion of maximising utility is absurd 
and meaningless.249
This case is accurately presented in Raz’s theory of well-being.250 In a nutshell, he 
argues that personal well-being is not solely agent-relative or merely want-regarding, as 
he sees well-being as inseparable from morality. This is another instance of his 
commitment to an objective theory of value that puts into perspective his first condition 
of well-being according to which, a person’s well-being can be promoted only (at least in 
modem contexts) with goals that have been accepted and chosen by this person, with the 
exception of biological needs. Moreover, there are three other conditions of personal 
well-being. The goals that people adopt should be chosen because they are believed to be 
independently valuable while the success of the goals that are undertaken is another 
important determinant of well-being. Finally, and most importantly for the issue of the 
centrality of autonomy in Raz’s theory, one can have comprehensive goals which one 
could pursue successfully only if the said goals are ‘based on existing social forms, i.e. on 
forms of behaviour which are in fact widely practiced in society’.
This latter condition has various implications for Raz’s system of ideas; not all of 
them accommodating the consistency between the different aspects of this system. 
Firstly, one might comprehend the condition of well-being in terms of the pragmatic 
claim that it is just inconceivable that one might try to pursue goals that are very different 
from the ones that are available in a given society. This pragmatism can lead to two
249 Raz, J.; Value. Respect and Attachment. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2001)
250 Raz, J.; The Morality o f Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 288 - 320
251 Ibid., p. 308
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further directions that can be problematic for Raz’s theory. The first is that of 
conservatism, which will be dealt with more extensively in Chapter Six. For now it 
suffices to acknowledge its presence as a potential direction that Raz’s theory on well­
being can lead us towards. This conservatism is deeply entangled with the strong 
contextualism which is also present in this aspect of Raz’s theory of well-being. In this 
sense it is a very different conservatism from Kekes’ that was presented in the second 
chapter of the thesis and was based on a very particular normative prioritisation of needs 
which was in turn based on a very specific conception of human nature.252
This is problematic for Raz since contextualism and social conservatism, which is 
reminiscent of Oakeshott’s liberal conservatism, would not be expected to be part of a 
system of ideas that is as outspoken about its moral objectivist underpinnings as Raz’s is, 
and which is also strongly liberal. Moreover, as an interpretative moral theory -  along the 
lines of the Oakeshottian tacit theory of knowledge, or even the intuitionist approach to 
moral knowledge -  can be used to back up Raz’s liberal project, the extent to which an 
objective theory of value is vital for Raz’s system of ideas becomes unclear. As a 
consequence of the above, it is uncertain on what grounds and how Raz might suggest 
that perfectionist political and social action ought to be undertaken with regards to the 
theoretical framework of his revised version of Mill’s harm principle.253
With regards to moral knowledge, Raz’s position has similarities to that of 
Aristotle. They both have a claim to moral objectivity and they are both pluralistic -  
Aristotle’s moral theory less radically so than Raz’s (irrespectively of whether the 
fulfilment of the latter’s pluralist aspirations is successful). In addition, Raz recognises
252 See Chapter Two.
253 Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 412-424
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that his account of well-being is an Aristotelian one in that it ‘consists in successful 
pursuit of worthwhile activities in a life free from repression of important aspects of one’s 
personality’.254 For Aristotle, however, the role of the state would be to enable the 
individual to realise his or her potential to achieve his or her individual good, an 
achievement impossible unless it is carried out within the context of the state. In order for 
this to be the case ’the polis...[must have] priority over the household and over any
*ycc
individual among us’. Raz, on the other hand, would find the image of a state 'playing 
big brother [and] forcing people to do what it considers good for them against their will' 
extremely undesirable and damaging.256 Some involvement nevertheless, as was evident 
from his three arguments against anti-perfectionism as well as from his revised version of 
the harm principle, is not only desirable but necessary. The problem, however, of the 
tension between the interpretative and the rationalistic elements in Raz’s moral theory, 
which can be exemplified in terms of its impact on social and political action, is still 
prevalent.
Raz places his sense of deep value pluralism (justified on grounds of non- 
linearity) alongside his moral objectivity and the functional and the cultural arguments 
for the priority of autonomy. The ascription to such a radically pluralistic view can be 
considered as an acknowledgement of the fact that autonomy is not a necessary 
ingredient in good human lives; one can lead a flourishing life without it. Raz’s
254 Raz, J., 'Facing Up: A Reply' in Southern California Law Review, 62 (1989), p. 1227
255 Aristotle; Politics in Ackrill, J. L. [ed.]; A New Aristotle Reader. (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), 1253al,pp. 19-20.
256 It is worthwhile to note that this view of Raz's contradicts the aspect of his theory of authority that holds 
that in order for a relatively just political authority to claim effective legitimacy over its subjects, it does not 
necessarily have to enjoy their consent. It would follow that the promotion o f  ideals - i.e. the manipulation, 
hence the coercion, o f subjects to pursue some goals and not others (section 1 .II above) -  that go against 
the will o f the subjects o f an authoritative regime should not be a reason for an authority not to act, since 
what matters is the promotion o f ideals qua validity and not qua belief or desire.
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recognition of this fact appears in various scattered remarks in his writings257 and is 
consistent with his functional and cultural arguments which contextualise the importance 
of autonomous lifestyles. As he puts it:
'...there can be non-repressive societies, and ones which enable people to spend their lives in 
worthwhile pursuits, even though their pursuits and the options open to them are not subject to 
individual choice. Careers may be determined by custom, marriages arranged by parents...I do 
not see that the absence of choice diminishes the value of human relations or the display of 
technical skills...scholarship, creativity or imaginativeness, which can be all encompassed in 
such lives'.258
What Raz effectively claims here is that that there are worthwhile lifestyles which do not 
require autonomy as a necessary ingredient.
It would be a mistake to infer from the above that autonomy for Raz is a 
subjective value which does not affect the well-being of the person except instrumentally. 
Even though Raz does not hold that autonomy is a universal value, he seems to hold that 
it could be intrinsically valuable for agents in certain historical and cultural contexts. 
Such an approach could account for the objective worth, and as a consequence, the 
normative -  even in a weak sense -  prioritisation of autonomy. The extent to which one 
can make sense of Raz’s theory of value will be examined in the next two chapters of the 
thesis. For the time being, it suffices to present Raz’s view on the issue of the priority of 
autonomy and to outline the points of contention.
257 Raz, J.; ‘Multiculturalism a Liberal Perspective’ and ‘Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic 
Abstinence’ in Raz, J.; Ethics in the Public Domain. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 170-191 and 60-69 
respectively as well as in Raz, J., Tacing Up: A Reply’ in Southern California Law Review, 62 (1989).
258 Raz, J., Tacing Up: A Reply' in Southern California Law Review, 62 (1989), p. 1227
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This leads my discussion to Raz’s assertion in The Morality o f Freedom that in 
modem societies pursuing an autonomous lifestyle is necessary. Gray identifies two 
arguments used by Raz, but not explicitly named as such by him, to substantiate this 
claim.259
The first, according to Gray, ’is a functional argument - the argument that skills of 
autonomous choice are functionally indispensable to personal well-being in a society 
marked by mobility in occupations and abode, innovation in technology and forms of 
work, and more or less incessant change in beliefs and mores’.260 This is evident in Raz’s 
claim that autonomy 'is an ideal particularly suited to the conditions of the industrial age 
and its aftermath with their fast changing technologies and free movement of labour. 
They call for an ability to cope with changing technological, economic and social 
conditions, for an ability to adjust...to come to terms with new scientific and moral 
views’.261
The second argument that Gray identifies in Raz 'is a cultural argument - the 
argument that autonomous choice is indispensable to the well-being of persons whose 
cultural tradition has inculcated a particular self-conception'.262
The two arguments, Gray argues, do not appear independently from each other; 
on the contrary it is very often the case that they overlap in that 'Raz argues that even the 
well-being of those who lack the understanding of themselves as autonomous agents 
requires the skills of autonomy, if they live in a society in which most other people have
259 Here I am indebted to Gray’s very insightful analysis of Raz's theory in Gray, J.; Two faces of 
Liberalism. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000) and in Gray, J.; Mill on Liberty: A Defence. 2nd Ed..
(London: Routledge, 1996), especially pp. 96 -104 and pp. 147 - 158 respectively.
260 Gray, J.; Mill on Liberty: A Defence. 2nd Ed.. (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 151
261 Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 369-370
262 Gray, J.; Mill on Liberty: A Defence. 2nd Ed.. (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.151-2
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that self-understanding'.263 Furthermore, it is rather unclear on which argument Raz puts 
most weight. Gray’s observation is very accurate since, indeed, on the one hand Raz 
claims that autonomy is particularly suited to the conditions ’in modem industrial 
societies', but on the other he holds that 'it would be wrong to identify the ideal with the 
ability to cope with the shifting dunes in modem society’ for ‘autonomy is an ideal of 
self-creation’.264 The validity of Gray’s observation is enhanced by Raz’s endorsement of 
the idea that autonomy has been a feature of the good life even in non-modem contexts. 
Even though for Raz autonomy is not a necessary ingredient of the good life in non­
modem societies, he still holds that it is an ingredient which could be found in valuable 
lifestyles which are situated in non-modem societies. For Raz, ‘there were autonomous 
people in many past periods, whether or not they themselves or others around them 
thought of this as an ideal way of being'265 while for him 'the value of autonomy is a fact 
of life' and it is ultimately the case that 'those who live in an autonomy-enhancing culture 
can prosper only by being autonomous'.266 An important omission in Raz’s exposition 
here is the fact that there are lifestyles which entail the pursuit of values which are 
actually incompatible with autonomy. Moreover, if one is autonomous in a non- 
autonomous environment, there might be repercussions against one’s well-being despite 
Raz’s claim that ‘the value of autonomy is a fact of life’. All these issues add weight to 
Gray’s previously mentioned observation both with regards to the existence of the two 
different arguments in favour the priority of autonomy in Raz’s system of ideas, as well 
as with regards to the ambiguity in terms of which argument takes priority.
263 ibid., p. 152
264 Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 370
265 ibid.
266 Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 394
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It appears to me, nevertheless, that the question regarding which argument has 
ultimately more weight is not of major importance for Raz. Apart from the role that the 
substance of these arguments has in supporting Raz’s liberal conclusions, the organic role 
they have for his overall project is of greater importance. This role is exemplified in that 
by arguing for the importance of autonomy in western societies, Raz contextualises his 
liberal theory so that its claim to universality is severely restricted.
2.2. The Functional Argument
The functional argument -  the claim that autonomy is a necessary instrument for leading 
a good life in an autonomous society -  has been vehemently criticised by Bhikhu
9 fnParekh. Parekh's main criticism is that the functional argument is empirically mistaken. 
He notes that many Asian countries have adapted to technological, economic and social 
change without embracing a lifestyle that centres on personal autonomy.268 Furthermore, 
he points out to the successful lives that many Asians are leading and have led in the west 
without fully adopting western values of autonomy or a western conduct of life. Raz's 
arguments seem to take for granted that the minority communities whose ways of life do 
not prescribe to liberal values will have to assimilate to the liberal majority cultures that 
host them.
Here, however, one may come to Raz's defence and recognise that it is reasonable 
to claim that Asians living in Britain tend to live more autonomous lives than their 
counterparts in, say, China. Maybe they have not adopted western values of autonomy as
267 In Gray, J.; Two Faces of Liberalism. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), pp.97-8
268 In Parekh, B.; ‘Superior People: The Narrowness of Liberalism from Rawls to Mill’ in Time Literary 
Supplement, 25 February 1994
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fully as their fellow westerners have done, but they are certainly more prone to these 
western values of autonomy than the Asians living in China. But, again, even if one is 
conciliatory enough to partly accept the above counter-argument, it is crucial to point out 
that the validity of this argument is dependent on complex empirical conclusions of a 
social nature. Raz's functional argument can still be proven indefensible under further 
empirical investigations.269 So even if  it is not plainly mistaken, as it stands, the 
functional argument is inadequate in substantiating Raz's claim for the importance to lead 
and promote an autonomous lifestyle which, in Raz's opinion, is better suited to promote 
well-being in modem liberal societies.
Moreover, Gray argues that it seems that 'the background idea of Raz's account of 
autonomy is a society in which the majority accepts its value, but in which there are 
minorities that do not'270 Raz pictures modem society as predominantly liberal with 
small enclaves of minorities. In spite of the fact that they do not honour liberal values and 
that the autonomy-based liberal argument that Raz advances might not apply to them at 
present271, he claims they will eventually have to adopt an autonomous lifestyle if they 
are to flourish. I think that not only is this not necessarily the case but, as has already 
been shown, it also seems that Raz's view on the nature of modem societies is empirically 
ungrounded. In fact, the diversity of modem societies is such that it refutes Raz's 
conception of their homogeneity. Furthermore, there is very little evidence that 
guarantees or even hints that they will converge on a 'liberal mono-culture'. As Gray puts
269 For a very detailed analysis on the issue look at Visram, R.; Asians in Britain: 400 Years o f History. 
(London, Pluto Press: 2002) especially Ch. 9. It is worthwhile to mention that Visram's conclusion is that 
Asians in Britain have been and still are an 'integrated and richly diverse community, with plural identities' 
which are engaged in a variety o f professions and careers' (p. 299).
270 Gray, J.; Two Faces of Liberalism. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 98
271 This is evident in Raz, J.; 'Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective', in his Ethics in the Public Domain 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1994), p. 181n. and p. 186n.
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it, 'if history is our guide, there is no enduring connection between becoming modem and 
valuing personal autonomy'.272 So the functional argument seems to fail in substantiating 
the crucial importance of autonomous lifestyles in modem societies.
If one, however, were to assume for the sake of the argument that autonomy is 
indeed crucial in leading successful lifestyles in modem western societies, where would 
this leave Raz’s argument for the centrality of autonomy? At best he would have made a 
valid contextual point that is neither strongly normative nor universal.
The proposition according to which the functional argument might still be valid in 
the sense that in modem societies autonomy is essential so as to enable individuals to get 
along with others who are different, is a view which is subject to two mistakes. Firstly, it 
does not appreciate the fact that acceptance of autonomy might contradict some of the 
fundamental values of the individuals in question. As a consequence, a commitment to a 
Razian conception of autonomy would imply that some of these values would have to be 
abandoned. Asserting that this is inescapable is a valid explanation of this situation, but 
only insofar as this assertion is followed by the proposition that Raz’s liberal 
perfectionism argues for the predominance of a specific set of values that are particular 
and contextual. This effectively amounts to an advocacy of some sort of conservatism. 
The exact content of this conservative tendency in Raz’s thought -  as well as its co­
existence with a more radical trait -  will the subject matter of the sixth chapter. Secondly, 
I find it implausible to make a modus vivendi argument out of Raz’s conception of 
autonomy. The content of the latter -  which I will examine in the third section of the 
present chapter -  is too Aristotelian and perfectionist to allow for the view that the role of 
Raz’s conception of autonomy is to just help people get along.
272 Gray, J.; Two Faces of Liberalism. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 98
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As a consequence, the functional argument which Gray identifies in Raz’s liberal 
theory is, at best, subject to further empirical investigation and evidence. At worst, it 
seems that the role that Raz has ascribed to the idea of autonomy fails to meet his high 
expectations in terms of its significance in modem societies.
2.3. The Cultural Argument
The cultural argument says, essentially, that autonomy is necessary for people whose 
liberal cultures have habituated them to making their own choices.273
If that were the case, the cultural argument would not apply to cultures that do not 
have a liberal majority. This consequence of the cultural argument is reminiscent of the 
last condition of Raz’s theory of well-being, which pays tribute only to goals that are 
available within a social context. So, as a person must choose his personal goals from 
socially available options, and since autonomy applies only in the context of western, 
already liberal societies, the priority of autonomy cannot be universalised. Hence, it 
appears to me that Raz would have to subscribe to a prescription regarding political 
action according to which, if a person lived in an illiberal society and were not allowed to 
choose a given valuable lifestyle -  even if she so desired -  because it is not part of the 
value fabric of that society, then nothing should be done to accommodate this person’s 
goal in terms of the promotion of the conditions of autonomy that would enable her to 
pursue her chosen lifestyle. An example of such a situation is the prohibition of gay 
marriage in many western liberal modem democracies.274 For my purposes here it is of
273 Gray, J.; Mill on Liberty: A Defence 2nd ed.. (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 155
274 Here I assume that gay marriage can be a valuable lifestyle. I discuss issues o f value theory in the next 
three chapters o f the thesis. Also, here as well as in a number o f previous instances, I refer and make use o f
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little importance whether the aforementioned description of political action is one which, 
in fact, closely represents the manner in which policy might be enacted in the real world. 
What is more important is the fact that Raz’s theory is incapable of making a strong 
normative moral case for the advocacy of a policy which would promote conditions of 
autonomy under such circumstances. This implication, however, seems to not be in line 
with the strong normative demands made by Raz’s revision of Mill’s harm principle.275
Moreover, Gray argues that the cultural argument ‘does not establish the value of 
autonomy even for such persons [ones who are habituated to a conception of themselves 
as authors of their own lives], since they may well be mistaken in their beliefs about the 
contribution made to their well-being by autonomous choice-making'.276
It must be acknowledged that this latter objection to the cultural argument is 
consistent with Raz's moral realism and his objective view of well-being. For Raz, as 
well as for other liberals, people's views are valid in virtue of their objective truth value. 
This latter rationalistic tendency in Raz’s theory is further enhanced by his claim that 
cultures must not be taken at their own estimation. This must surely be 'no less true of 
liberal cultures whose claims about the role of autonomy in the well-being of their 
members we are wise not to take at their face value'.277 The presence of a deep sense of 
rationalistic radicalism is very potent in the remarks above and it is uncertain to what 
extent it can be squared with the existence of the conservative thread in Raz’s system of 
ideas.
the idea o f modem societies. The concept o f modernity is a very widely and vigorously debated one and a 
specific clarification or definition of it is well beyond the scope o f the present work. I have been using the 
term modem -  and will continue to use it — in a common sense manner. Challenges on whether some 
societies meet my use of the term modem will have to be dealt with on an individual basis.
275 Raz, J.; The Morality o f Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 420-424
276 Gray, J.; Mill on Liberty: A Defence 2nd ed.. (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 155
277 ibid.
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One way of going about the issue is by attributing to Raz’s view a positivist 
account of societal development and the role of autonomy in it. But, as Gray correctly 
points outs, this would entail the acceptance of a 'Eurocentric history of philosophy, 
according to which modernisation entails the acceptance of western individualist 
values'.278
The burden placed on the cultural argument by the above issues is too strong to 
withstand. When pressed, it seems that Raz cannot make an adequate case for the cultural 
point regarding the priority of autonomy and he has to resort back to the claim that 
autonomy is needed in western liberal contexts. So, the cultural argument collapses into 
the functional one, which was shown to be inadequate for the fulfilment of Raz’s 
theoretical ambitions.
In this second section of the chapter I have argued in favour of Gray’s 
identification in Raz’s liberal perfectionism of the functional and cultural arguments. 
Gray argues that these arguments are flawed and cannot substantiate the perfectionist 
essence of Raz’s liberalism in terms of the promotion of autonomy. I have presented a 
number of defences in Raz’s favour and against Gray’s but to no avail since Gray’s 
objections seem to prevail. On the one hand, Raz’s argumentation relied too much on 
empirical observations which were either unfounded or, at the very best, subject to 
further investigation -  and as consequence not strongly normative. On the other hand, 
Raz’s theory of value comes into play and affects his arguments frequently. His value 
theory is ambiguous, not least because of his commitment to value pluralism and his
278 ibid., p.156
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simultaneous aspiration to moral objectivity.279 This ambiguity inevitably spreads to his 
arguments regarding liberal perfectionism and the primacy of autonomy that it entails. 
Also, I referred to the existence of a conservative tendency in Raz’s theory which further 
hinders his aim for strong normative political directives. These issues of Raz’s theory of 
value and the conservatism of his liberal theory will be central among the issues that I 
will discuss in the remainder of the thesis.
So far, I have not talked of autonomy in a manner that investigates directly and in 
detail Raz's comprehensive theory of it. Instead, I have talked about the position of 
autonomy in Raz’s more general liberal perfectionist framework. In the next section I will 
go on to examine the content of Raz’s conception of the autonomous agent. It is true that 
some aspects of what autonomy is, and of when one can be said to be an autonomous 
agent, have been implicit in the discussion so far. However, a more systematic evaluation 
of the issue will delineate the underpinnings of Raz's liberalism and put in better 
perspective the arguments that I have presented above as well as the ones which I am 
going to present.
Before that, however, it will be useful to explain more clearly Raz’s revision of 
the harm principle since it is an aspect of his theory which is both important and to which 
I have already referred to.
279 I have referred to the relationship between value pluralism and moral objectivity in the second chapter 
of the thesis.
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3. The Revised Harm Principle
Raz’s revised version of the Millian harm principle is the main exemplification of his 
liberal perfectionist theory. Even though aspects of it have been implicit in my discussion 
so far it will be useful to explicitly, if briefly, state my understanding of it.
Mill's harm principle states that the only justification for coercively interfering 
with a person is to prevent him from harming others. Raz thinks that this is a very narrow 
conception of harm. Roughly speaking one can be said to harm another when 'one's 
action makes the other person worse off than he was or is entitled to be in a way which 
affects his future well-being'.280
Obviously, Mill’s harm principle makes normative demands since, if it did not, it 
would be a formal principle lacking specific concrete content and could not lead to policy 
conclusions. Consequently, if coercive interventions are justified on the grounds of the 
harm principle, then they are interventions used to enforce morality. But why, asks Raz, 
stop with the prevention of harm and not enforce the rest of morality?
Indeed, Raz’s view on respectful treatment of individuals, as one which entails 
their treatment according to moral demands, urges Raz to argue from a perfectionist 
perspective. This means that he has to hold that if morality is not maintained and 
promoted, people are harmed. As a consequence, 'governments should promote the moral 
quality of the life of those whose lives and actions they can affect'.281 In order for this 
concession not to amount to a rejection of the harm principle, since the 'common 
conception of the principle' is that its function is to 'curtail' the governmental enforcement
ibid., p. 414
281 ibid., p. 415
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o f morality, the principle must be modified.282 Raz suggests a principle that fis deliverable 
from a morality which regards personal autonomy as an essential ingredient of the good 
life, and regards the principle of autonomy, which imposes duties on people to secure fo r
' J Q ' l
all conditions o f autonomy, as one of the most important moral principles’.
These autonomy-based duties never justify coercion where there is no harm. Still, 
the above principle implies that governments have a responsibility to provide the 
conditions of autonomy for people who lack them. If that is the case then it is wrong to 
view the duties of governments only under the prism of negative freedom. Sometimes,
JOARaz argues, ’failing to improve the situation of another is harming him’. As a 
consequence, in order to promote autonomy the government is allowed via the revised 
harm principle to use coercion both in order to prevent harm and in order to enable the 
prescription of actions which are required to safeguard any one of the conditions of 
autonomy. Since one of the conditions of autonomy is the existence of an ’adequate range 
of valuable options’,285 the harm principle, argues Raz, permits ’and even requires' 
governments to create morally valuable opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones.
This is an ingenious revision of the harm principle, although it is hard to 
qualitatively differentiate it from the familiar discussions about what is entailed in the 
ambiguous concept of harm.286
282 ibid., p. 415
283 ibid., p.415, emphasis is mine.
284 ibid., p.416
285 1 develop Raz’s view of autonomy in greater detail in the fourth section of the present chapter.
286 There is a plethora of work on the concept of harm, the difference between harm to oneself and harm to 
others, the difference between offense and harm, as well as the application of harm to morality. See, for 
instance, Fitzjames Stephen, J.; Liberty. Equality. Fraternity. White, R.J. led.], (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press: 1967), Feiberg, J.; The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 1: Harm to Others. (New 
York, Oxford University Press: 1987), Brown, D.G.; “Mill on Liberty and Morality”, Philosophical 
Review, 81 (1972), pp. 133-158, Rees, J.C.; John Stuart Mill’s “On Liberty”. (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
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Ingenious though it is, it is a revision of the harm principle which is far from 
flawless. By espousing a rather interventionist idea of the state and supporting 
intervention for the sake of autonomy Raz seems to be going contrary to his liberal roots. 
As has been noted, he himself commented that a *t>ig brother' state is undesirable and 
potentially hazardous.287 Nevertheless, he now advances an argument that undermines 
his initial claims on the repulsion of a strong state and thus opposes one of the most 
fundamental beliefs of most liberals. Furthermore, this commits Raz to a view that 
favours a rather strong form of paternalism -  which it is unlikely he would ultimately 
wish to adopt.288
Finally, and most importantly, the revised version of the harm principle that Raz 
offers fails to meet his own specifications. The revision of the harm principle was in part 
the result of an attempt to construct a 'sound practical principle to guide governmental 
action'.289 But, it is questionable whether the harm principle in its revised version is any 
more able to yield balanced judgements about autonomy than Mill's principle. If the 
revised version of the harm principle includes incommensurability, it seems that balanced 
judgements about the level of overall autonomy are not possible. In such a case, the 
revised version will be as hard to apply as Mill's version -  if not harder. Apart from the 
actual application of the normative demands of the revised harm principle, however, the 
normative nature of the said demands can be disputed because of the failure of the 
functional and cultural arguments to make strong normative requirements. This is an
1989), Hart, H.L.A.; Law. Liberty and Morality. (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1962), Gray, J. & 
Smith, G.W. [eds.J; J .S .Mill’s “On Liberty” in Focus. (London, Routledge: 1991).
287 In ibid., p.412
288 In ibid., pp. 422-3, he refuses to adopt a general pro- or anti- paternalistic approach.
289 Raz, J., Tacing Up: A Reply' in Southern California Law Review, 62 (1989), p. 1229n
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issue, however, to which I return in my discussion of Raz’s theory in Chapter Six, where 
I elaborate on its radical and conservative traits.
4. The Autonomous Agent: The Three Conditions of Autonomy
Accounts of what it is to be free and autonomous abound. Sartre held an open view of 
autonomy in which the idea of the use of reason to settle dilemmas is dismissed; for 
Sartre, beings were essentially 'condemned to be free'.290 Rawls advocates the Kantian 
interpretation of freedom according to which one acts freely and autonomously when one 
acts 'from principles that we would consent to as free and equal rational beings'291, that is, 
from principles that we would consent to were we to be in the 'original position'292. A 
close reading of Mill's On Liberty reveals a much more complicated picture since one 
can elucidate no less than four different conceptions of freedom from his writings: 
'negative freedom, rational self-direction, autarchy and autonomy'294. This is done in a 
way that a person enjoying the last possesses the three previous modes of freedom as 
well.295 Like Mill, it is to Raz's credit that he realises that the issue of an agent's 
autonomous status is a multidimensional question of much difficulty.
For a start, if one is to be an autonomous agent, one should be able to be 'a maker 
or author of his own life', that is he must have the mental abilities to form intentions of a
290 Sartre, J. P.; Being and Nothingness. (London: Routledge, 1958), pp. 433 - 556, especially 504 - 509
291 Rawls, J.; A Theory of Justice T2nd ed.l. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 197, [1999]), p. 453
292 ibid., §4: p. 15-19
293 Mill, J.S.; On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by Gray, J.,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991)
pp. 62-82
294 Gray, J.; Mill on Liberty: A Defence 2nd ed.. (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 77
295 For more on this look at the very insightful discussion on Mill's theory o f individuality in ibid., pp. 70- 
89
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sufficiently complex kind, and plan their execution'. The possession of mental abilities 
is a necessary but, of course, not a sufficient condition for fulfilling the conditions of 
Razian autonomy. Another condition of autonomy is freedom from coercion. Coercion 
prohibits autonomy in two ways. First, 'it reduces the coerced person's available range of 
options below adequacy' -  more will be said of one's adequate range of options shortly. 
Furthermore, loss of options through coercion is deemed to be a greater loss of autonomy 
than a similar loss brought about by other means. That is why slaves are thought to lack 
autonomy even if they enjoy a range of options which, were they free, would have been 
deemed sufficient.'297 Manipulation, for Raz, does not interfere with people's options but 
it 'perverts the way' a person 'reaches decisions'298 and to that extent he holds that 
manipulation ‘too is an invasion of autonomy whose severity exceeds the importance of 
the distortion it causes’.299 Here Raz touches again on the debate regarding the issue of 
coercion and manipulation. The extent to which manipulation actually entails coercion as 
well as the extent to which manipulation is entailed in many forms of social interaction 
are very ambiguous issues. It may be true that one may be able to give some very general 
guiding principles with respect to the cases where manipulation is actually coercive or 
where social interaction entails manipulative elements. However, the decisions on these 
ambiguous and difficult cases to which I refer to above are the ones that often define and 
help establish social trends. As a consequence, Raz’s view is subject to further 
clarifications since there is much more to be said about it in terms of the crucial issue of 
the boundaries of both of the above concepts. The clarification of these boundaries,
296 Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 372
297 ibid., p. 377
298 ibid.
299 ibid.
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however, is beyond the scope of the present thesis as a preoccupation with this vast topic 
will prevent the development of the arguments that I have set to address in this work. As 
a result, the acknowledgement of this issue concerning Raz’s first condition of autonomy 
will suffice.
The possession of mental capabilities and the freedom from coercion -  or 
manipulation -  are two necessary and rather uncontroversial preconditions of autonomy. 
They are, nevertheless, even when they are put together, still not sufficient in spelling out 
a full account of what it is to be an autonomous agent.
A third, very important precondition of autonomy is that the autonomous person 
needs an adequate range of valuable options to choose from. It is crucial to stress that for 
Raz, it is not enough that a person can choose from just any adequate range of options. In 
order for the third condition of autonomy to be fulfilled, the available range of options 
has to be a worthwhile one. Raz is here referring to the creation of nothing less than an 
environment for action. He thinks that autonomy requires a choice between good options 
because he regards the choice between good and evil as no choice at all. In Andrei 
Tarkovsky’s The Sacrifice, Alexander, the main character of the film, is faced with the 
choice between abandoning all that he holds dear -  his friends, family, house and normal 
life -  and experiencing nuclear war and the subsequent death of his loved ones. 
Tarkovsky’s take on Alexander’s eventual choice for withdrawal and abandonment, may 
be akin to Sartre’s existential take on freedom to which I have referred to at the beginning 
of the chapter. For Raz however, Alexander is not choosing autonomously if he chooses 
the option of withdrawal, for his choice is forced.
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It is also worthwhile noticing that the argument for the availability of valuable 
options as a condition of autonomy is consistent with Raz's convictions as they are 
expressed elsewhere in his liberal theory -  such as his commitment to an objective theory 
of value. Despite -  or because of -  the fact that he is a value pluralist, he does not 
embrace relativism or subjectivism. Instead, as already mentioned, he is committed to an 
objective theory of value which, as I have discussed in the second chapter of the thesis, 
he is right to insist can be compatible with value pluralism.
Moreover, Raz's claim that autonomy should include an adequate range of 
valuable options is consistent with his argument of plural perfectionism. The mere 
availability of a range of any kind of options is not sufficient to establish Raz’s claim. 
One can envisage a situation in which a person has to choose between a range of bad 
options and one good option. In this situation Raz would claim that the agent is not 
choosing autonomously.
Raz is right in asserting that in order for a person to be autonomous, she would 
have to be able to choose from among a range of valuable options since one can easily 
envisage a situation in which one has an adequate range of options to choose from, but 
the majority of which are evil, immoral or unworthy. It can hardly be the case that such a 
person is an autonomous agent.
The question however arises of whether it should also be the case that one should 
make evil and repugnant actions available so that one might have an even bigger range of 
overall choices. There are a number of arguments in support of such view. For instance, 
by being able to choose between an adequate range of options, some of which are 
valuable while some others are not, one will have the chance to refine one’s moral
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judgement through choice. Furthermore, people often test and prove themselves by 
choosing good rather than evil. In both of the above cases, repugnant options have a 
worthwhile role since they develop the mental capabilities and the capacity of human 
beings for moral contemplation through choice and judgements between good and bad. 
Raz would resist such a view. His counter-argument being that if one does away with the 
repugnant options, the overall range of options might be curbed, but the negative 
significance of such a reduction in the personal autonomy of the agent would be minimal 
since 'autonomy requires the availability' of 'morally acceptable actions' only.300
But I think that since Raz recognises the value of autonomy, he also ought to 
recognise that the autonomy to choose from a range of options that include repugnant 
ones would contribute to the development of certain moral virtues which could not be 
otherwise developed. Since Raz's liberalism does not rest on utilitarian claims and since 
Raz is a value pluralist, he ought to recognise the desire of some persons to develop their 
moral stature by having the autonomy to choose between both evil and good options.
The paternalistic issue that arises from the restriction of the availability of choices 
to only the ones that are worthy is also addressed by the reasonable claim that Raz's 
objective theory of value is not radically pluralistic. This criticism touches on the 
question of whether an autonomy-based perfectionism is consistent with value-pluralism, 
an issue that I have discussed extensively in the previous chapter. Even though Raz tries 
to give an 'open' and not very hierarchical conception of autonomy, his endorsement of 
personal autonomy as the value which should be prioritised points towards a hierarchical 
objective theory of value. As a consequence, liberal perfectionism is compatible with 
restricted versions of value pluralism.
300 ibid., p.381
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Moreover, even if Raz's view on the availability and promotion of worthy options 
is consistent with his objective theory of value, this objective theory of value is, at the 
end of the day, never explained. Even if Raz believes in the true, objective validity of 
some options and in the moral repugnance of some others, he does not give us a set of 
criteria with the aid of which we would be able to identify worthy options from unworthy 
ones. How is one to identify which options are good and which not?
The answer, according to Raz, lies in the recognition that social conventions and 
social forms play a deciding role both in setting the value of a goal and in determining its 
availability. The truth of this view, to which I have also referred to previously in this 
chapter, will be examined in the following chapters in the context of one of the two grand 
problems in Raz’s theory that have been evident in my discussion so far and which I 
summarize below.
5. Conclusion: The Problems
In the first part of the chapter I examined Raz’s three arguments against anti­
perfectionism. In the process of doing so I identified Raz’s advocacy of an objective 
theory of value, while I deemed that the three arguments in question are unconvincing. 
Even though this does signify a challenge for Raz’s liberal theory, it is a challenge that 
relates to two deeper and interrelated problems in liberal perfectionism, which I will 
discuss extensively in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. These problems are, firstly, 
the ambiguities that arise from his theory of value and, secondly, his assumptions about 
unanimous moral agreement.
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In the second section, I argued for the validity of Gray’s identification of the 
functional and the cultural arguments in Raz’s liberal system of ideas. Furthermore, 
Gray’s criticism of the arguments in question was persistent and difficult to defend 
against. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the truth of the functional and the 
cultural arguments is subject to further empirical evidence; this is an aspect to which I 
will refer no further. Secondly, these arguments are closely related to aspects of Raz’s 
theory of value and as a consequence, they suffer from the ambiguities to which I have 
referred to in the first section of the chapter. These ambiguities are partly the result of 
Raz’s simultaneous commitment to both moral objectivism and pluralism and to his 
assumptions on moral agreement. Finally, it is in this section that I also identified the 
possibility of the existence of a conservative trait in Raz’s liberal system of ideas. 
Moreover, during my further discussion regarding the element of conservatism in Raz’s 
system of ideas, I will also revisit the issue of the role and nature of the functional and 
cultural arguments in Raz’s liberalism.
In the third section of the chapter, I presented Raz’s revision of the harm 
principle, which is central in his argument for the obligation of the state to promote 
autonomous conditions.
In the fourth section of the chapter I presented Raz’s theory of autonomy. This, 
along with the presentation in the previous three sections of my interpretation of the other 
aspects of Raz’s ideas, was crucial since I will often refer back to them in my discussions 
henceforth. Furthermore, by discussing Raz’s idea of autonomy I highlighted again the 
prevalence of the challenges that Raz’s liberalism faces in terms of its ambiguous theory 
of value. Also, the importance of social conventions in the Razian conception of
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autonomy further highlight both the ambiguity of his value theory -  which seems to 
oscillate between universals and particulars -  and the conservative tendency of his 
liberalism.
There are two main directions towards which Raz’s theory can be improved or 
clarified so as to meet the challenges posed by these problems. The first has to do with 
the compatibility between his radical pluralist aspirations and his tendency to want to not 
just promote but also prioritize autonomy. The second has to do with the exact nature of 
his objective theory of value which is both ambiguous in terms of its content as well as, 
in some instances, incompatible with the aims of his liberal project.
The solution I have already proposed to the first problem is an instantiation of my 
general argument in the thesis regarding the possibility of compatibility between different 
pluralisms and different liberalisms. However, since liberal perfectionism is one of my 
main focuses in the thesis, I will complement my discussion in the previous chapter with 
a few more remarks regarding the compatibility between liberal perfectionism and 
pluralism. Moreover, these remarks will lead the discussion into the second problem 
which regards Raz’s theory of value.
The solution to this problem necessitates the clarification of Raz’s value theory in 
two different ways. Firstly, in terms of the clarification of the exact nature of the value of 
autonomy, as at times Raz refers to is as socially dependent while at times he refers to it 
as objectively valuable. Secondly, the previously mentioned ambiguities of Raz’s theory 
of value have to be cleared up. In doing so, the problem of moral agreement will be 
solved, while at the same time the relation between liberal pluralism and conservatism -  
and at some instances radicalism -  will be clarified.
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5LIBERAL PERFECTIONISM, RADICAL PLURALISM AND PAROCHIAL 
VALUES IN RAZ’S LIBERALISM
1. Weak and Strong Pluralism in Raz’s Liberal Perfectionism
Raz defines ‘weak moral pluralism’ as ‘the view that there are various forms and styles of
) A t
life which exemplify different virtues and which are incompatible’ and he 
differentiates it from ‘strong moral pluralism’.302 By the term ‘strong pluralism’ Raz 
effectively refers to a pluralism that has the Berlinian radical pluralist features. In his 
opinion, weak pluralism can become strong pluralism if either one or all of the following 
characteristics are attributed to it. First, Raz thinks weak pluralism turns into strong 
pluralism if ‘the incompatible virtues are not completely ranked relative to each 
individual’.303 In light of my elaboration regarding lexical pluralism and its distinction 
from the Berlinian untamed version of value pluralism in the third chapter of the thesis, I 
take Raz’s view here to effectively point towards the distinction between the two 
aforementioned pluralist variations.
Raz’s second qualification for the weak understanding of moral pluralism to 
become a strong one is the thesis that ‘the incompatible virtues are not completely ranked 
by some impersonal criteria of moral worth’.304 In a way, this is another form of the 
Berlinian pluralist rejection of value hierarchy on the grounds I mentioned in the second
301 Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1986) p. 395
302 ibid. p. 398
303 ibid. p. 395
304 ibid. p. 397
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chapter. More specifically, I discussed the ranking of values with reference to two 
different methodologies in the context of my discussion of Kekes’ ethical doctrine. One 
methodology was the substitution of the value with some numeric standard so as to make 
comparisons possible. The other way of going about the issue, I argued, was via a 
rationalistic appeal that necessitates the prioritization of one value over others (in the case 
of monism) or a number of primary values over other secondary ones (in the case of 
Kekes’ ethical doctrine). Raz’s second qualification states that if either one of the 
previous two methodologies are incorporated into strong pluralism, then the resulting 
pluralism has the characteristics of weak pluralism.
Thirdly, weak pluralism collapses into strong pluralism if virtues ‘do not derive 
from a common source, or from common ultimate principles’.305 It appears to me that this 
statement can be read as a disagreement with Dworkin’s position which reduces ethical 
conflict into an ultimate principle that makes the solution of the conflict possible and 
meaningful in terms of that ultimate principle. I have, also, examined this position and 
the implications for value pluralism in the second chapter of the thesis.
When I elaborated on Raz’s conception of value pluralism in Chapter Three I 
concluded that it exemplifies the traits of Berlinian value pluralism. For this reason I did 
not make explicit reference to Raz’s argument in favour of non-linear pluralism when I 
examined the compatibility between different liberalisms and different pluralisms, since 
what was the case for Berlin’s untamed value pluralism would also be the case for Raz’s 
non-linear value pluralism. The latter is best exemplified by Raz’s strong -  rather than 
weak -  understanding of moral pluralism since non-linear pluralism demonstrates the 
traits that in Raz’s view turn a weak moral pluralist view into a radical one. There are two
305 ibid.
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further means of revealing the similarity between Raz’s non-linear pluralism and his 
understanding of strong moral pluralism. First, since non-linear pluralism is similar to 
Berlinian pluralism and since Berlinian pluralism is similar to what Raz calls the strong 
conception of pluralism, it follows that non-linear pluralism is similar to this strong 
conception of value pluralism. The other way to go about the issue is to use the 
conclusion of my earlier discussion of Raz’s view on the incommensurability of values. 
The latter -  in favour of which Raz argued on the grounds of non-linear preferences -  is 
so radical that the resulting pluralist ethical doctrine is a radical one.
Raz himself acknowledges that the arguments he has presented on 
incommensurability are arguments that support strong pluralism since they combine all 
the three conditions he gives in order for weak pluralism to qualify as strong pluralism. 
However, he goes on to state that when he supports the idea for an autonomy based 
freedom in the last chapter of The Morality o f Freedom he does so from a weak value 
pluralist point of view.306 The fact that Raz brushes aside his argument for radical value 
pluralism and decides to construct the liberal perfectionist doctrine on a watered down 
and more timid pluralist version raises -  amongst others -  two issues which are of 
particular interest to the present thesis.
The first has to do with the methodology I have been using regarding my 
argument on the relationship between pluralism and liberalism. The second deals with the 
exact argument that Raz gives for the relationship between weak moral pluralism and 
liberal perfectionism.
With regards to the first issue, the methodology I have used in my argument on 
the subject of the relationship between pluralism and liberalism seems to have similarities
306 He argues this in Ibid. p. 398
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with the one that Raz is using in his argument for liberal perfectionism. That is, in the 
third chapter where I refer to the existence of pluralist variations, I argue for the 
consistency between some watered down variations of agonistic pluralism -  i.e. forms of 
weak pluralism -  and different liberal doctrines. Yet, there is still a difference between 
Raz’s approach and mine and I believe this difference to be an important one.
My argument is based on the idea that no one of the pluralist variations that I 
presented has been yet proved to be wrong. In contrast, Raz makes an explicit argument 
for the truth of strong value pluralism -  via his endorsement of a very radical conception 
of incommensurability. Even if the reasons for which he abandons this strong conception 
of pluralism have their merits -  since perfectionist liberalism and untamed value 
pluralism are incompatible -  the case remains that he really thinks that it is the strong 
pluralist outlook that best represents the ethical universe. In other words, whereas I make 
an agnostic point about which pluralism is the true one, Raz explicitly argues for the truth 
of strong pluralism. As a consequence, his subsequent attempt to ground liberal 
perfectionism on weak pluralism is altogether an attempt to ground his political theory on 
an ethical view other than the one he considers to be true.
The second point of interest regards Raz’s overall project and its relation to weak 
and strong pluralism. Since Raz argues for the priority of autonomy, it becomes apparent 
that if one is to value autonomy, as Raz does, then in turn one would be committed to a 
weak form of pluralism. In other words, it is not the case that commitment to a weak 
conception of pluralism safeguards autonomy, but instead that the priority of autonomy 
safeguards a weak conception of pluralism. This is what I understand by Raz’s claim that
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‘valuing autonomy commits one to weak pluralism’.307 However, as Raz has argued for 
the truth of strong pluralism, and as this -  as I have argued -  implies that weak pluralism 
is false, then it would necessarily be the case that if one values autonomy, then one would 
commit oneself to a wrong pluralist theory. Raz’s argument might have been more 
successful if it claimed that valuing autonomy committed one to at least weak pluralism. 
This formulation of the argument does not necessarily commit Raz to a version of 
pluralism other than the one which, in The Morality o f Freedom, he argues is true.
Apart from the two points above, I find the claim that an autonomy based 
liberalism safeguards weak pluralism to be a crude one since the term ‘weak pluralism’ 
can refer to many different types of pluralism -  unlike the term ‘strong pluralism’ which 
quite clearly refers to a radical Berlinian type of pluralism. Weak pluralism, i.e. watered 
down radical pluralist variations, can include Kekes’ pluralism, hierarchical pluralism, 
Larmore’s reasonable pluralism or even Aristotle’s theory of value. As a consequence, 
my argument in Chapter Three that liberal perfectionism is compatible with either lexical 
pluralism or with a Kekesian theory of value -  rather than weak pluralism in general -  
makes a more subtle and accurate suggestion on the issue of the compatibility between 
liberal perfectionism and pluralism. I will discuss this issue in greater detail below. This 
is because my discussion of the priority of autonomy within liberal perfectionism in 
terms of Raz’s theory of parochial values inevitably touches on the issue of the 
compatibility between liberal perfectionism and pluralism. Moreover, as liberal 
perfectionism is the main focus in my thesis, further elaboration on its compatibility with 
pluralism will complement my previous discussion on the issue.
307 ibid.
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2. Liberal Perfectionism and Berlinian Value Pluralism
The general argument so far has been that no liberal doctrine can be compatible with the 
Berlinian untamed version of value pluralism. This was the case for Mill’s liberalism 
where its distinction between higher and lower pleasures as well as its advocacy of the 
specific meliorist Millean theory of human progress contradicted fundamental 
characteristics of Berlinian pluralism. This was also the case for Rawls’ liberalism in A 
Theory o f Justice which was not compatible with agonistic pluralism on the grounds that 
the latter could not accommodate the harmony of the basic liberties that Rawls sees as 
fundamental to his theory -  let alone other different and intrinsically valuable lifestyles 
which could be part of a society organized according to the principles of Justice as 
Fairness. In addition, Rawls’ liberal doctrine in Political Liberalism is incompatible with 
untamed pluralism as, if it is a political doctrine, it suffices for it to adopt a relativistic 
modus vivendi approach to public decision making. On the other hand, if it is a normative 
doctrine, untamed pluralism cannot guarantee a prioritization of the public over the 
private sphere. The relationship between Raz’s liberalism and radical pluralism seems to 
be on terms as difficult as those of the relationships between the previous liberalisms and 
untamed pluralism.
Raz’s liberal perfectionism is incompatible with Berlinian pluralism for two 
reasons. The first reason has to do with Raz’s conceptualisation of personal autonomy. 
The second has to do with the place that this conception of personal autonomy holds in 
his liberal theory.
In the previous chapter I have referred extensively to Raz’s elaboration of 
autonomy. According to Raz, if an agent is to be considered autonomous, she has to be
194
free from coercion, to have the appropriate necessary mental capabilities to make 
informed choices on her own, and to have an adequate range of valuable options 
available to her so as to exercise her freedom of choice in order to use one or -  when 
possible -  some of these choices in a manner which will allow her to lead an intrinsically 
valuable lifestyle.
There are three issues with regards to the compatibility o f the content of Raz’s 
view of autonomy and radical pluralism. The first has to do with the issue of what 
constitutes a bad option, the second has to do with the rationalistic tendency that is 
present in Raz’s conception of autonomy, while the third has to do with the radical 
pluralist claim that not all objectively good options can coexist harmoniously.
At the core of these concerns is Raz’s assertion that ‘since autonomy is valuable 
only if  it is directed at the good it supplies no reason to provide, nor any reason to protect, 
worthless let alone bad options’. The problem with this claim is that in the context of 
modernity with its local and international multicultural characteristics, what constitutes a 
bad option is highly contested. For a moral objectivist, of course, an option that was bad 
in the past is going to be as bad in the present as well as in the future. What the context of 
modernity presents the moral objectivist with is not something new in ontological terms, 
but something novel in terms of moral epistemology and the ability to grasp or find the 
moral truth entailed in divergent and often conflicting ontological statements. Modernity 
then is even more important for an objectivist who also advocates pluralism because, as I 
have argued in Chapter Two, phenomenology and observation are much more important 
for pluralists than they are for other objectivists. It is because of the special importance 
that observation has for radical pluralism that modernity becomes a double edged knife 
308 Raz, J.; The Morality o f Freedom. (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1986), p. 411
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for it. On the one hand, radical pluralism can re-evaluate its stance on many ethical issues 
and values that might have been considered culpable but can now be viewed as 
worthwhile. On the other hand, the fact of this intense and ongoing revision with regards 
to which values may be considered to be bad and which values may be considered to be 
good has handicapped radical value pluralism considerably in terms of being able to 
prescribe which options are truly bad and which options are truly good. As a 
consequence, Raz’s view on the -  if not necessarily direct, then at least subtle or indirect 
-  elimination of bad options is problematic not so much in terms of how this aspect of his 
theory would work under ideal and perfect epistemological conditions -  which most 
probably can never be achieved -  but in terms of how it actually works in a modem, 
diverse environment.
Nevertheless, it is to Raz’s credit that he takes a brave, albeit difficult to maintain, 
stance regarding problems which might not be new and exclusive to modernity, but 
which are at the very least accentuated by it. There is, for instance, a moral fact of the 
matter which regards the practice of arranged marriages for a pluralist society; they are 
either condemnable or acceptable. Then there is the question of whether arranged 
marriages should be allowed in a western liberal democracy or whether they should be 
banned or filtered out from it. The same question applies to whether they should be 
filtered out from non-secular religious societies. What Raz effectively proposes with his 
claim that bad options should not be part of the range of adequate options that one has at 
their disposal, is that public policy and societal affairs in general must be viewed and 
conducted as a necessary extension of ethical concerns. In other words, the answer for 
Raz to the question regarding the morality of arranged marriages determines the answer
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to the question regarding the manner or the extent to which a society ought to tolerate 
arranged marriages.
Radical pluralists however, because of their conviction of the agonistic nature of 
many worthwhile values and lifestyles would be reluctant to adopt such a view with 
regards to the potential of philosophical contemplation and its application to politics. The 
nature of the radical pluralist ethical theory is such that it recognizes greater limitations to 
philosophy than implied by Raz’s theory of the autonomous agent. One may push the 
argument further to allege that because of its radical incommensurability and its aversion 
to rationalism, the only recommendation in terms of political and social action that 
untamed value pluralism can give is one along the lines of modus vivendi. This is because 
for the radical value pluralist moral wrongdoing is often inescapable and, as a 
consequence, normative demands or guidance for the undertaking of particular actions 
when facing dilemmas, is very hard to produce. Furthermore, it cannot allow for decision 
making on the grounds that some options are truly bad because of the challenges posed 
by modernity. Even if an option is indeed morally culpable but, nevertheless, an agent 
still wrongly considers it to be a worthwhile one, making the agent dismiss this option 
might be too rationalistic and restrictive for a radical value pluralist.309 As I have argued 
in Chapter Two, radical value pluralism is a theory that can allow for certain world views 
or assessments of one’s lifestyle to be considered false; however, due to radical value 
pluralism’s general aversion to rationalism, this does not necessarily mean that a value
309 The restrictiveness o f attempts to disperse the wrong moral beliefs o f certain moral agents depends both 
in the means employed to achieve that end as well as on the actual wrongness of the said belief. The 
boundary between persuasion and coercion, however, is very hazy and as such widely debated. An 
endeavor into the issue, albeit relevant, is impermissible for the purposes o f my thesis. As a consequence, I 
have referred to the aforementioned only briefly in the previous chapter and I will only briefly refer to the 
issue subsequently.
197
pluralist will necessarily prescribe a practical course of action that is the direct outcome 
of an attempt that tries to challenge an agent’s or a group’s false consciousness. In this 
case, the only available foundation for social action will have to necessarily be that of 
modus vivendi. This is very similar to Rawls’ elaboration in Political Liberalism, if one 
approaches the latter as a political -  rather than a normative -  doctrine.
So, Raz’s elaboration of autonomy and, consequently, an autonomy based liberal 
perfectionism is one that sees the relationship between ethics and politics in an 
Aristotelian fashion whereas radical value pluralism cannot allow for such a conception 
of the connection between the two. As a consequence, the compatibility between liberal 
perfectionism and Berlinian value pluralism is undermined.
This reasoning further underlines the lack of appreciation in Raz’s elaboration of 
autonomy of the element of radical incommensurability that is so dear to a Berlinian 
value pluralist. The Aristotelian relationship between ethics and politics that is adopted 
by Raz assumes the lack of these conflicts and implicitly accepts the harmonious 
coexistence between different worthwhile options. This assumption of harmony was the 
one on the basis of which Rawls’ liberal doctrine was found to be incompatible with 
radical pluralism.310 As a consequence, it is not only Raz’s view of the relationship 
between the moral and the political that is Aristotelian; the assumption of harmony 
between different objectively valuable lifestyles is an assumption that is also
< > t i
characteristic of an Aristotelian ethical outlook. Again, the Aristotelian aspects present 
in Raz’s theory are visible in terms of Raz’s perfectionism and his view about the 
application of morality in the political sphere. The perfectionism that Aristotle and Raz
310 I argued for this position in Chapter Three.
311 See Chapter Two.
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advocate is very similar, despite Raz’s commitment in some parts of The Morality o f 
Freedom, and in some of his other works, to a radical understating of pluralism which he 
eventually -  and, I think, unpredictably -  abandons in favour of weak pluralism.
It is important to keep in mind that Raz’s theory of value is highly ambiguous. 
Despite the fact that he argues for radical incommensurability, he then abandons it and 
turns to a weak pluralist perspective without ever explaining clearly his reasons for this 
change of direction. In this sense, his sporadic advocacy of radical incommensurability is 
less compatible with the Aristotelian traits of his theory than is his advocacy of weak 
pluralism elsewhere in The Morality o f Freedom. However, since in The Morality o f 
Freedom there is an oscillation between strong and weak pluralism, it is safe to conclude 
that, at least in some instances, Raz’s pluralist commitments contradict some aspects of 
his theory in the manner that I have discussed above.
Even if one takes the view that there are no Aristotelian traits in Raz’s theory of 
value -  a view with which I disagree -  there is still not much change regarding the issue 
of the compatibility between Raz’s doctrine and radical pluralism. The reason for this is 
that if  rationally irresolvable value conflicts occur and, yet, society still makes a decision 
on which of these conflicting values to keep in the range of available valuable options, 
then it will have to do so either on metaphysical terms or by the substitution of some 
common medium by which to contrast these values. These methods however, cannot be 
accommodated within a radical pluralist ethical doctrine for reasons that have been 
discussed elsewhere.
So far, I have presented the reasons for which I find Raz’s liberal perfectionism to 
be inconsistent with untamed value pluralism in terms of the incompatibility between
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untamed value pluralism and Raz’s conception of autonomy. The exact argument of the 
compatibility between Raz’s liberal theory and radical pluralism in terms of the priority 
which is enjoyed by autonomy within his liberalism depends on the kind of value that 
autonomy really is. Before I investigate the exact nature of the value of autonomy, 
however, there are two important qualifications that have to be made.
First, it is true that in Chapter Three I argued that the prioritization of autonomy is 
consistent within liberal perfectionism only if it is done in the context of lexical pluralism 
or in the context of a Kekesian theory which classifies values in two categories in which 
the values of one override the values of the other. Moreover, I argued that the 
prioritization of autonomy is inconsistent with radical pluralism. In the elaboration that 
follows, I do not refute any of these arguments. Instead, I complement them by further 
specifying the reasons for which I think liberal perfectionism is inconsistent with radical 
pluralism. The expansion of my argument will lead my discussion to the issue of Raz’s 
theory of parochial values, to the nature of the value of autonomy and its prioritisation 
and, as a consequence, to the issue of what the above entail for the compatibility between 
liberal perfectionism and pluralism.
Second, my discussion of theory of value issues should be approached both as 
setting the ground for the argument of the next chapter and, at the same time, as 
complementary to that argument. In the course of my discussion of some of the 
characteristics of Raz’s theory of parochial values I at times inevitably examine whether 
it is true. This, however, is not the main purpose of my argument as my central object of 
enquiry is liberal perfectionism. As a consequence, the question of how liberal
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perfectionism fairs if it is committed to Raz’s theory of parochial values, and not whether 
the particular theory of value is true or false, is my core concern.
3. Autonomy: What Kind of Value?
The main question, whose answer will determine what kind of value autonomy really is, 
has to do with the magnitude of the exact impact in terms of value on a choice or action 
depending on whether this choice or action is autonomously rather than non- 
autonomously chosen. In other words, is it the case, as Griffin puts it, that ‘loss of 
autonomy is the loss of an essential component of morality?’312 Central in the answer to 
this question is the extent to which self-creation through autonomous choice, or 
autonomy understood as ‘personhood’,313 is intrinsically valuable.
Thinkers such as Locke, Mill and Kant have paid tribute to the importance of self- 
creation through the exercise of rational choice in the conquest of true freedom; they all 
deemed external freedom from constraints and institutional freedom not to be sufficient 
conditions to reach that end. Most thinkers support the idea that true freedom needs both 
ingredients for it to flourish, and as a consequence present the relationship between 
external freedom and self-creation through reflective choice as a very intimate one. 
Kant’s view of autonomy refers to the ability to form decisions and carry out actions that 
are in accordance with reason and to not to be swayed by contingencies and unreason. 
There are existential or even religious doctrines that hold that this type of individual 
emancipation is all there is to the idea of freedom. Comprehensive liberal doctrines, like
3,2 Griffin, J.; Value Judgment - Improving Our Ethical Beliefs. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
p. 78
313 ibid., p.117
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the ones I examine in the thesis, propose that the personal exercise of rational choice 
between different options and values is only one condition of true autonomy. This is true 
of Mill’s liberalism whose aim to develop autonomous men and women can only be 
realized in conditions that are uninhibited from coercive forces and in which choice is 
exercised in line with moral concerns. In Locke’s theory the two ideas of autonomy are 
also interrelated since it is only those that are in accordance with Natural Law and a pre­
political sense of freedom that eventually will be able to enjoy external freedom.
Similarly, for Raz, one of the three conditions of an autonomous agent is that the 
agent has the capacity for autonomy -  the other two being that she is free from coercion 
and that she has an adequate range of valuable options to choose from.314 Specifically, 
Raz holds that an agent ‘must be capable of understanding how various choices will have 
considerable and lasting impact on his life’.315 In other words, Raz holds that for a person 
to lead an autonomous life he would have to exercise his human mental faculties -  e.g. 
rational deliberation, reflection etc. I believe this first condition of the Razian conception 
of autonomy to be very similar to autonomy as self-creation, or as Skorupski refers to it, 
internal autonomy. Moreover, I will argue that, ultimately, in liberal perfectionism 
autonomy is an objective value not because it is universal, but because it is intrinsic for 
moral agents in certain cultural and historical contexts.
At first glance this should not be surprising since Raz’s advocacy of some kind of 
moral objectivity at the expense of emotivism or relativism is expected once one takes 
into account two aspects of his system of ideas the bits and pieces of which are scattered 
throughout his work and which have to be drawn together if they are to make sense.
314 See Chapter Four.
315 Raz, J.; The Morality o f Freedom. (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1986), p. 371
316 Skorupski, J.; Ethical Explorations. (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1999), p. 225
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The first aspect regards Raz’s apparent oscillation between the view that 
autonomy is objectively valuable and the view that it is culturally specific. One indication 
that Raz sees autonomy as culturally specific are the functional and cultural arguments 
that Gray identifies in Raz’s elaborations in The Morality o f Freedom, to which I have 
referred to in the previous chapter. Furthermore, in his Ethics in the Public Domain, and 
in the context of his discussion on the importance of autonomy on an individual’s well­
being, Raz writes that his ‘argument is confined to modem industrial societies. Moreover, 
as it stands, it does not apply to enclaves of traditional premodem communities within 
our societies’.317 This points to a cultural relativist direction, a view that is further 
supported by Raz’s claim that he does not ‘see that the absence of choice diminishes the 
value of human relations or the display of technical skills...scholarship, creativity or 
imaginativeness, which can be all encompassed in such [non-autonomous] lives'.318 That 
is, it is Raz’s view that people can lead non-autonomous yet intrinsically valuable 
lifestyles when conditions of modernity do not apply to the social context in which the 
agents operate or when the modem social context is too -  and truly -  remote from them.
In The Morality o f Freedom, however, Raz makes remarks that point towards a 
direction that indicates that autonomy is objectively valuable. There Raz claims that 
autonomy ‘cannot be valuable just because it is wanted. On the contrary, those who 
desire it do so because they believe that it is valuable, and only on the condition that it is 
valuable’.319 The above remarks are essentially an exemplification of a problem that I 
have identified in the previous chapter, which is now time to be tackled, regarding the
317 Raz, J.; Ethics in The Public Domain: Essays in the Morality o f Law and Politics (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press: 1995), p. 124, n.30
318 Raz, J., ’Facing Up: A Reply* in Southern California Law Review, 62 (1989), p. 1227.
319 Raz, J.; The Morality of Freedom. (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1995), p. 390
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consistency of the different aspects of Raz’s system of ideas. To make remarks that point 
to the cultural specificity of the value of autonomy and the role that it has in an 
individuals’ well-being and then to follow these remarks by further ones that point to the 
objective value of autonomy might appear to be contradictory -  this was, in a nutshell, 
one of the problems that I identified in Raz’s work in the previous chapter.
A way out might be available for Raz if  one saw his theory of autonomy as one 
which combines elements of both an objective as well as a relativist value status; that is, 
as one in which the value of autonomy were neither simply objective nor a mere 
consequence of sentiment, whim, habituation, or social and historical contingencies. If 
this were the case, the answer to what appears to be a contradictory oscillation in Raz’s 
system of ideas between universalism and particularism might, ultimately, be an attempt 
to award a somewhat special status to the value of autonomy.
This brings me to the second aspect of Raz’s system of ideas which can be found 
in Engaging Reason320 where he develops his theory of parochial values. Parochial 
values, according to Raz ‘cannot be mastered at all, not even by everyone capable of
' X 0 1knowledge’. Furthermore, the possession of parochial values ‘requires having 
particular perceptual capacities (such as colour concepts), and not merely the possession 
of some perceptual capacity or other’.322 That is, the understanding of parochial values 
requires social or emotional habituation which, even if it were translatable to other 
cultures and languages -  i.e. even if this habituation had the cognitive realist 
characteristics of Berlin’s thought, to which I have referred to in the second chapter -  its
320 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press:
1999), mainly Chapters Six and Eight.
321 ib id ., p. 132
322 ib id .
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acquisition is a very slow and tedious process so that only a limited number of parochial 
concepts will ever be accessible to any given individual. Moreover, it must be stressed 
that Raz holds that parochial values often refer to interests which are ‘in principle 
impossible for us to understand’.323 I believe that the theory of parochial values can be 
linked -  indeed, should be linked -  with the special status of the value of autonomy 
which pervades Raz’s arguments in The Morality o f Freedom.
Even though an explicit reference to the link between liberal perfectionism and 
the theory of parochial values is hard to find in Raz, it is sensible to approach Raz’s work 
on the latter as an extension of the former. The reason for this is that his work on value 
theory tries to develop and defend a conception of value which is objective on the one 
hand, but which is also sensitive to contingency and cultural particularities in the other. 
This is the same characteristic which permeates the liberal perfectionist theory with 
regards to its oscillation between moral objectivism and ethical particularism. This view 
is further reinforced by the chronological order of the development of the two theories. 
The theory of parochial values, as it was mainly developed in Engaging Reason, came 
after the development of his liberal perfectionism in The Morality o f Freedom, which is a 
further indication that some of the arguments it makes could be taken as responses to the 
shortfalls and ambiguities of liberal perfectionism.
Before I discuss the application of the theory of parochial values to Razian 
autonomy and its prioritization, however, it is sensible to make a few remarks about the 
theory of parochial values itself. This will be useful both in fleshing out the theory itself 
as well as in identifying ambiguities to which I will refer in the remainder of the thesis.
323 ibid.
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4. The Problems of Epistemology and Contingency in the Theory of Parochial 
Values and their Importance for Liberal Perfectionism
Raz develops his theory first by presenting his understanding of what constitutes the 
classical view of the ideas of objectivity and subjectivity. He writes that what is entailed 
in these terms is effectively a ‘distinction between classes of thoughts that can constitute 
knowledge and can be mistaken and those which cannot by calling the first objective, and 
the others subjective’.324 Raz’s account of the meaning of objectivity and subjectivity is 
similar to the Nagel’s definition of these terms, which Nagel developed specifically with 
reference to values. Furthermore, and as Raz here does not only refer to the idea of value 
or moral objectivity but to the idea of the objective/subjective contrast in general, he goes 
on to give a list of the conditions that a domain will have to fulfill in order for it to be 
considered objective. Raz summarizes these conditions as: (1) the possibility of 
knowledge condition, (2) the possibility of error condition, (3) the possibility of epistemic 
objectivity, (4) the relevance condition, (5) the independence condition, (6) the single 
reality condition and (7) the possibility of irrationality condition. It appears to me, 
although this is not explicitly stated as such by Raz, that the central aim of these 
conditions is to safeguard objectivity against two criticisms, which under closer 
inspection, appear to be one.325
On the one hand, these conditions can be approached as an attempt to safeguard 
the idea of moral objectivity against the criticism that the distinction between objectivity 
and subjectivity is not a clear one. On the other hand, they can be seen as directed against 
the criticism that objectivity entails characteristics which can, ultimately, be found to be
324 ibid., p. 118
325 ibid., pp. 119-127
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incompatible with some aspects of the liberal perfectionist doctrine. However, the above 
two objectives are interconnected to the extent that they can be approached as unitary, 
since the characteristics that give rise to the second objective are inextricably related to 
the first one, which regards the clear distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. 
Even so, an examination of these two seemingly separate issues on distinct terms is still 
relevant once the possibility of the issue with regards to the distinction between 
subjectivity and objectivity collapsing into the issue of the compatibility of Raz’s value 
theory with liberal perfectionism is accounted for and taken seriously. The value of this 
method will become evident during my elaboration on Raz’s theory of value and the 
obstacles it faces in terms of what it entails for the political realm.
An instance, for example, of the latter issue which Raz aims to disperse, is the 
argument that objectivism is a conservative theory since it does not allow for the re- 
evaluation of established beliefs that have a claim to objectivity. The relationship 
between liberal perfectionism and conservatism has arisen up previously in my 
discussion with regards to the challenges faced by liberal perfectionism. As I will go on 
to show in the next chapter, where I will examine this question in detail, liberal 
perfectionist theory might be all too weak to overcome this conservative challenge. In 
any case, Raz’s counterargument against this proposition is that due to consequences that 
emanate from the condition of relevance and the condition for the possibility of error, 
there is a guarantee that his theory of objectivity ‘is not essentially a conservative one, 
[and] that it is open to challenges which can form revisions, or even the abandonment of, 
established aspects of common discourse and thought’.326 With regards to the first 
instance, the independence condition attempts to make sure that the knowledge which has
326 ib id ., p. 129
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a claim to objectivity is not ‘too internal’ ; that is, it attempts to make sure that 
knowledge with a claim to objectivity is clearly distinct from knowledge which belongs 
to a subjectivist domain of inquiry. Hence, Raz argues that his theory of value is both 
open to re-examination and re-evaluation.328
In terms of the issue with regards to the distinction between moral objectivity and 
subjectivity in the theory of parochial values, it is not my aim here to give a 
comprehensive account or a detailed evaluation of all the conditions of Raz’s theory of 
objective domains. This is because, no matter how interesting and important a topic it 
may be, the subject matter of the thesis is not to present a comprehensive theory of 
objectivity. That is an extremely large project that cannot be accommodated within this 
work. What can, however, be incorporated into the thesis is a discussion about Raz’s 
attempt to disperse the doubts that a commitment to parochial values would entail for 
liberal perfectionism and vice versa. This should not come as a surprise, as it is consistent 
with my elucidation of Raz’s system of ideas so far in the sense that I went to great 
lengths to try and emphasize Raz’s intention -  whether successful or unsuccessful -  to 
construct a doctrine which is based on moral objectivity. Accordingly, what also belongs 
to the argument I make in the thesis, is my response to the question of whether a 
subscription to moral objectivity will not insult deeply seated and fundamental 
commitments of the liberal perfectionist doctrine.
Raz himself acknowledges that his list of conditions for objectivity does not 
ensure the clear and undisputed distinction between objective and subjective domains of
3f ibid*
328 I discuss this aspect o f Raz’s theory in detail later on in the chapter. For the time being, my sole purpose 
is to highlight the main issues involved in my examination of his theory o f value and its relation to liberal 
perfectionism and the different approaches I can adopt in addressing them.
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enquiry nor the disposal of problems, such as the previously mentioned accusation of 
conservatism. The essence of this admission is not that it is the specific list that does not 
guarantee the clear distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, but that no feasible 
list can be made that would ensure the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity or 
the immunity of objectivity from other failings. In essence, Raz ascribes a dynamic 
attribute to his theory of objectivity in that it ‘deals with problems as they are 
encountered, and denies the feasibility of producing a definite list of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for objectivity, the (epistemic) possibility that factors may emerge 
which defeat the objectivity of domains of thought which meet the above conditions 
cannot be ruled out’.329 Furthermore, Raz writes that ‘all we can do is to examine specific 
doubts regarding the objectivity of practical thought’.330 In this sense, my methodology 
here is similar to that of Raz’s; i.e. I do not offer a comprehensive critique or discussion 
about the essence of what it is to belong to an objective domain of enquiry -  moral or 
other. Instead, I examine aspects of the theory of objectivity which are relevant to my 
investigation at hand.
I have agued so far that liberal perfectionism entails values that alternate between 
moral universalism and moral particularism. The main concept in terms of which this 
duality is exemplified is the concept of autonomy upon which the liberal perfectionist 
doctrine is built. Now, if liberal perfectionism were assumed to be true, then it would 
mean that what would have to be defended is the claim that despite the oscillation 
between universalism and particularism, liberal perfectionism must support an objective 
theory of value. If the question is considered in these terms, it breaks down into two
329 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press:
1999), p. 131-2
330 ib id .
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further and more specific issues. First, is the issue regarding the epistemology of moral 
knowledge and second is the issue of the extent to which social practices influence moral 
values. As a matter of fact, the challenges presented by these two issues resonate with the 
two instances against which, I have argued, Raz attempts to defend moral objectivity. The 
epistemological question relates to the question of whether it is ever possible to make a 
clearly objective statement which is unmistakably not subjective. The question on the 
relevance of social determinants in the emergence of objective values which are shared 
by the whole of society resonates with the issue of the extent to which an advocacy of 
objectivity is paired with a necessary adoption of a conservative or any other doctrine that 
might contradict liberal perfectionism.
Consequently, the two main issues regarding Raz’s theory of value are firstly, the 
extent to which it can create an adequate epistemological case for an objective theory of 
value which can allow for the selective promotion of values such as the one of autonomy; 
and secondly the extent to which its proposed theory of objectivity can accommodate for 
the sensitivity that the liberal perfectionist doctrine aims to portray towards social and 
cultural contingencies.
5. Parochial Values and the Priority of Autonomy
According to parochial value theory, our knowledge of the different forms of the good is 
limited by our perceptual capabilities since not all human beings will have the chance to 
familiarise themselves with all the different values. This is even more the case if one -  
contrary to Berlin -  accepts cognitive relativism. In this state of affairs some of the values 
in question would not be translatable into terms that are comprehensible for everyone’s
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domain of understanding. This latter point is much stronger than the proposition which 
holds that it is difficult, but ultimately plausible, to understand the objective values that 
are dear to people who belong in different epistemic domains. The parochial suggestion, 
according to which there are objective values that might possibly never be accessible by 
some persons or groups of a certain identity, contradicts Berlin’s cognitive realism and as 
such he would oppose it. For Raz, culture, religion and nationality are at the same time 
gateways as well as obstacles to one’s understanding of the different forms of the 
good.331
Raz’s parochial values do not depend on the satisfaction of human interests. 
Instead, they are meant to be objective and the agent’s input with respect to their worth is 
none. The agent dependency which parochial values do recognise is exhausted on the 
agent being a possessor of the capacities which are necessary for the perception of the 
said values. For Raz, when we do something we do it not because it fulfils our interests 
but because it is intrinsically good. In Raz’s words, ‘we know what is good and conclude 
that that is good for people, that it is in their interest to spend time with the good’.332 
What Raz essentially claims here is the fulfilment of our interests is safeguarded not by 
trying to fulfil them directly, but by fulfilling them via acting in accordance with those 
values which are good. In short, Raz seems to claim that by acting in accordance with the
331 It is noteworthy that Raz gives another argument against moral convergence according to which, 
situations can be found where rational agents can disagree (in Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory of 
Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 1999), p. 138). This however, would be a type o f  
refutation of convergence with which Berlin would have no problem agreeing. This type of refutation is 
based on an untamed value pluralist conception of the ethical universe which, as I discussed in the second 
chapter of the thesis, finds its most forceful advocacy in the writings of Isaiah Berlin. Secondly, this lack on 
convergence in terms o f moral judgment is one that Berlin accounts for, in the sense that the rational agents 
in question would both realize that the agonistic conflict o f values on which they have to decide regards 
objectively worthwhile concepts. Thus, the fact that their judgment does not converge is reflected in 
Berlin’s advocacy o f radical value pluralism.
332 ibid., p. 200
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good, one also fulfils one’s interests. This position is consistent with Raz’s concept of 
respect towards others -  to which I referred to elsewhere in the thesis -  which entailed 
the view that one treats another with respect not by being neutral with regards to the 
promotion of values but by promoting and making available worthwhile lifestyles and 
options since it is only through them that human beings can lead truly worthwhile and 
meaningful lifestyles. As a consequence, the promotion of autonomy in modem contexts 
is consistent with the aforementioned view in the sense that autonomy can be intrinsically 
valuable333 while at the same time and in the specific political, cultural and social 
conundrum the promotion of autonomy satisfies human interests.334
The difficulty with this view is making sure that what one considers to be an 
objective good truly corresponds to what is actually an objective good. In other words, 
how do we know when we are correct about our judgements about objective goods and 
when not? With respect to the case of autonomy, which is at the centre of liberal 
perfectionism, I have indicated that Raz thinks that it is not recognised as a necessary 
ingredient of the good life by all people. A pluralist, however, would hold that there 
might even be cases in which autonomy is mutually exclusive with other values -  such as 
those the fulfilment of which presupposes non-liberal traditional lifestyles. Is it the case 
then that autonomy is valuable in some cultural and special contingency but not in 
another? If the value of a good depends ultimately and primarily on the promotion of 
human interests, then the conclusion would be that, indeed, human interests -  or at least 
some of them -  in different circumstances can be said to be promoted when the fulfilment 
of different needs is achieved. As a consequence, something that is valuable now, might
333 Although Raz claims that autonomy cannot be valuable in itself, his idea o f autonomy does, in fact, 
implicitly acknowledge the existence of some intrinsic value in it.
334 This is the case providing that one accommodates for the critique from modernity and its consequences.
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not have been valuable in the past and may not be valuable in the future, or vice versa. In 
a similar fashion, then liberal perfectionism would have to hold that the value of 
autonomy changes from context to context. It is at this point that some of Raz’s critics 
recognise a slide to moral relativism.
These relativistic tendencies and the view -  inherent in this theory -  that value is 
created can be incorporated into both conservatism and radicalism as it can reinforce 
existing beliefs about what best serves human interests as much as it can re-evaluate these 
beliefs and, as a consequence, alter the value ascribed to given practices. This is a very 
vivid exemplification of the critique that liberal perfectionism oscillates between 
universalism and particularism. In a sense, this apparent oscillation can be considered 
somewhat of an asset for liberal perfectionism, as it renders it more sensitive to 
observation and empiricism, thus pushing it away from the strong rationalistic tendencies 
that liberalisms like Rawls’ in A Theory o f Justice exemplify. The complications that 
such an oscillation would cause for liberal perfectionism could be partly accommodated 
by Raz’s theory of parochial values.
One reason for how parochial value theory could diminish the power of the 
relativistic critique of liberal perfectionism is if the worth of parochial values, such as 
autonomy, is not created but, discovered. This seems to be Raz’s view of autonomy. It is 
true that parochial values can be said to be less objective than simple objective moral 
values and closer to relativism in the sense that their dependence on experience is greater 
than the dependence of simple objective values on experience. They do, however, aspire 
to make an objective statement about the moral universe. Whether they succeed in doing 
so is another matter. What has to be appreciated at this point is that parochial value
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theory has characteristics which at least prima facie allow liberal perfectionism to make 
objective statements about values which are at the same time sensitive to contingency.
It appears that Raz’s argument in Engaging Reason is that in the literature in the 
theory of value one can identify three different types of values: simple objective values, 
simple subjective values and parochial values. Raz ultimately abandons the distinction 
between the different categories of values and argues for the prominence of parochial 
values only. For Raz, this is as objective a statement about values as can be made.
He argues in favour of this by refuting Williams’ thesis in Descartes335 that non- 
parochial concepts should have priority over parochial ones. Williams held that ‘there are 
possible descriptions of the world using concepts which are peculiarly ours, and not 
peculiarly relative to our experience’.336 Such a contention, Williams argues, is the one 
given by Pierce who claims that scientific enquiiy fits such a description. Furthermore, 
because it fits such a description, i.e. because it is not influenced by local contingencies 
or interests, it could be understood and, thus, become part of the knowledge of any agents 
irrespectively of their background.337'
This convergence cannot result in terms of parochial concepts since many of these 
concepts, in spite of them being objective, cannot be recognised as such by everyone. 
That is, ‘in the nature of things if the convergence is to encompass all those capable of 
knowledge then it must exclude thoughts which essentially depend on parochial concepts
335 Williams, B.; Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry. (Hassocks, Harvester Press: 1978)
336 Quoted in Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press: 1999), p. 136
337 It is noteworthy that this view contrasts with the views of many post-modernist constructivist theories 
which advocate that even scientific enquiry -  let alone ethical or political enquiry -  is a direct product o f  
our cultural or other conditioning. See Kuhn, T. M; The structure o f scientific revolutions. (Chicago, 
University o f Chicago Press: 1962) and Foucault, M.; The Birth o f the Clinic: An Archeology o f Medical 
Perception trans. by Sheringham Smith, A. M. (London: Tavistok Publications, 1973). Popper asserts that 
scientific enquiry is conditioned by pre-theorizing even though he is not clear how this process is initiated 
in the first place (Popper, K.; The Logic of Scientific Discovery. (London, Routledge: 2002).
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for their expression’.338 That is, if the prioritization of a parochial value has a scope 
which is wide enough, there will be non-convergence with respect to the perception of 
the worth of such prioritization -  for instance autonomy in non-liberal subcultures. On 
the contrary, no matter how wide the scope of the prioritization of a non-parochial 
objectively worthwhile value is, convergence regarding the acknowledgement of its 
worth amongst normal moral agents under normal conditions is guaranteed. These ideal 
conditions, nevertheless, are rarely -  if ever -  fulfilled. As a consequence, it appears to 
me that autonomy cannot be prioritised in the context of a value theory that recognises 
solely the existence of parochial values because, since it would be a parochial value, 
autonomy would not be recognised by everyone as a value which should be granted 
priority. This, in fact, is liberal perfectionism’s argument for the priority of autonomy. 
Hence, the inability to make a universal normative claim for the promotion of autonomy 
can be accommodated within liberal perfectionism via the advocacy of a parochial value 
theory. The normative claim for the prioritisation of autonomy is now made on the 
grounds that autonomy is intrinsically valuable for agents in modem liberal contexts.
Raz’s argument, according to which non-parochial values are not prioritised over 
parochial ones, serves the interests of liberal perfectionism in terms of better 
safeguarding the promotion of autonomy. The main thrust of this counterargument to the 
priority of non-parochial concepts over parochial ones is that in fact, the idea of non- 
parochial concepts is a chimera. In fact, this argument goes, the only form of moral 
knowledge that human beings can ever have is parochial knowledge. Raz endorses this 
view when he asserts that it is ‘reasonable to conclude that abstract normative concepts
338 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press:
1999), p. 137
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too are parochial’.339 As a consequence, what is at stake here is not the promotion of non- 
parochial concepts over parochial ones but the promotion of objectively worthwhile 
parochial concepts over worthless or repugnant parochial ones. Contrary to Raz’s critics, 
because of the parochial nature of moral knowledge, one could make a normative case for 
the promotion of some values in one context and different values in another without the 
accusation o f relativism. In such a state of affairs it would, indeed, follow that Raz’s 
revised Harm Principle, which makes a normative demand for the priority of autonomy, 
is after all true. This is because, even though the prioritization of autonomy occurs only 
on the basis of what Gray identified as the somewhat relativistic cultural and functional 
arguments, its prioritization is still a normative demand as autonomy is intrinsically 
valuable for the agents on behalf and for the benefit of whom it is promoted.
In the context then of a parochial theory of value the claim that the functional and 
cultural arguments are devastating for Raz’s revised harm principle does not hold. It is 
true that liberal perfectionism tries to make a normative case for the promotion of 
autonomy on the particularistic cultural and functional arguments. The problem to which 
I referred to in Chapter Four with respect to the above was that Raz made a categorical 
case for the prioritisation of autonomy -  i.e. a claim that failure to promote autonomy is 
harmful and thus immoral -  on grounds that were only applicable to modem liberal 
society. The claim against liberal perfectionism contends that such arguments could only 
support the limited applicability of the principle of the prioritisation of autonomy. That 
is, if the priority in the promotion of autonomy is based on arguments of this 
particularistic sort, only a relativistic account for the promotion of autonomy could be 
given. This account would be based on political, cultural, religious or other constructivist
339 Ibid., p. 133
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and equally valid criteria. Nevertheless, liberal perfectionism aspires to claim that failure 
to promote autonomy in a modem context is actually immoral whereas failure to promote 
it in contexts in which autonomy is not a necessary ingredient of the good life is not 
immoral.
It should be obvious from the arguments that I presented in this chapter that an 
advocacy of parochial value theory will arm liberal perfectionism with the characteristics 
to make claims like the one above. Moreover, an advocacy of parochial value theory 
defends liberal perfectionism against the implications of Gray’s account of the functional 
and cultural arguments, which I discussed in the previous chapter. This is because an 
advocacy of parochial value theory provides liberal perfectionism with the possibility to 
make normative demands for the promotion of autonomy in some contexts while making 
the allowance that in some others -  in which autonomy is not valued -  failure to promote 
it does not constitute a moral failure.
This is, indeed, a promising approach for overcoming the oscillation between 
universalism and particularism. Nevertheless, it is still one which needs to be qualified 
even further. It appears to me that the “middle ground”, so to speak, between 
universalism and particularism which is offered by parochial values and the resulting 
refutation of Gray’s objections to liberal perfectionism, would have been more plausible 
if Raz had adopted a fulfillment of interests approach to morality. If that were the case, 
then it would be straightforward that the promotion of autonomy for those who deem it 
important is morally worthwhile, whereas failure to promote it in these contexts would 
constitute a moral shortfall. Likewise, failure to promote autonomy in contexts in which 
the agents do not deem it as intrinsic to their well-being -  as they perceive it -  would not
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be morally wrong. Such an approach to the issue, however, moves away from moral 
objectivism towards a more relativistic direction. It is true, on the one hand, that very 
often the moral worth of an action is evaluated against the common denominator of the 
extent to which it contributes to the fulfillment of agents’ interests. On the other hand, 
such an account allows for a very fluid and relativistic approach to what constitutes 
human prosperity and ethics in general. Even though liberals, such as Mill or Berlin, 
would think twice before they approach a very rigid and rationalistic approach to what 
constitutes a human interest, as Kekes does, they would also be reluctant in advocating 
such a fully relativized view on this issue.
Likewise, Raz does not adopt a view of morality solely based on the fulfillment of 
human interests. For Raz, fulfillment of interests goes hand in hand with the fulfillment 
of what is intrinsically valuable. A necessary consequence of this view is that people’s 
views about what constitutes their interests should not be taken at face value; what is in 
their interests is determined by what is morally worthwhile. This is a rather rationalistic 
approach to the issue that resembles Kekes’ conservative pluralist ethics.340
This conclusion, however, is not plausible given Berlinian value pluralism. This is 
because Berlinian value pluralism is both objective while at the same time anti- 
rationalistic and radical in the sense that it recognizes that there may be many divergent 
moral considerations that have equal weight in the well being of a group of people or 
even within one individual. Prioritizing some of them over others *- as liberal 
perfectionism does with autonomy -  is not rationally possible.
This would leave liberal perfectionism in the position of arguing for the 
promotion of autonomy in modem liberal democracies (on the grounds on which Gray
340 As I will show in the next chapter, this is not the only similarity between Kekes’ and Raz’s theories.
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identifies) with reference to the fulfillment of human interests. As I have shown, 
however, this is too relativistic a position for liberal perfectionism to accept. 
Consequently, it is safe to argue that liberal perfectionism and radical pluralism cannot 
coexist within a single system of ideas.
To conclude this section, the idea of a parochial theory of value aids the liberal 
perfectionist project in overcoming one major obstacle. It allows it to claim that failure to 
promote Razian autonomy in certain societies is morally condemnable while at the same 
time liberal perfectionism can also hold that failure to promote autonomy in contexts in 
which it is not known or valued does not necessarily constitute a moral shortfall. This, 
however, is not the case when liberal perfectionism operates under the assumption of 
radical pluralism.
7. Conclusion
To conclude, I started this chapter by elucidating what I considered to be a problematic 
ambivalence in Raz’s position in The Morality o f Freedom between radical and more 
tamed pluralist variations.
I then examined Raz’s theory of parochial values and argued that autonomy could 
be considered to be a parochial value. By doing so, I argued that, assuming parochial 
value theory, the oscillation which some critics identify in Raz’s liberal perfectionism 
between objectivity and relativism is only apparent.
My prime aim in the chapter was not to render a judgement on whether parochial 
value theory is true. I did nevertheless examine a number of its aspects -  often in a 
critical light. In the course of this examination, I discussed the characteristics which make
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parochial value theory suitable for liberal perfectionism. More specifically, I paid tribute 
to some of its assets, such as its ability to make normative demands for the prioritisation 
of autonomy without necessarily making a claim about its universality. However, by 
critically examining parochial value theory and appreciating its various shortfalls or 
ambiguities I highlighted a number of contentions which are reflected in liberal 
perfectionism and in response to which I will further develop my argument in the next 
chapter.
Moreover, I discussed further the application of parochial value theory on the 
relationship between liberal perfectionism and radical pluralism. I believe that the 
following three conclusions can be derived from this discussion. The implications of 
these conclusions are such that they render any help that the theory of parochial values 
might give to Raz’s theory void, since they will go against the very pluralist convictions 
on the very basis of which his doctrine is built.
First, radical pluralism allows for conditions of false-consciousness only in a 
rather weak sense. It is true that in my analysis of radical pluralism341 I argued that even 
though radical pluralism allows for the possibility of false-consciousness, it does so 
reluctantly and to an extent which is not clearly demarcated. In any case, the close 
relationship of radical pluralism with moral empiricism is such that it renders a strong 
conception of false-consciousness approaches to ethics unwelcome for radical pluralism. 
Liberal perfectionism on the contrary, allows for a very strong conception of false- 
consciousness according to which agents’ desires can be morally irrational and false even 
when the agents themselves are convinced about their personal moral priorities.
341 See discussion in Chapter Two.
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Second, as a consequence of this, it is hard to imagine how an ethical doctrine that 
is based solely on parochial values can avoid its eventual collapse into subjectivism. If 
this is the case, then such a view would contradict Raz’s advocacy of any variation of 
value pluralism -  not just radical pluralism -  and, hence, his endorsement of an objective 
theory of value. Of course, as I have repeated before, I have not presented either a 
refutation or a definite verification of parochial value theory. To the extent, however, that 
some ambiguities about the theory still remain unsolved, the implications of this second 
consequence which I just described must be acknowledged.
The third conclusion that one may draw is evident when one is faced with a 
decision between two incommensurable parochial values, one of which is Razian 
autonomy. Often states or institutions, aside from individuals, are faced with such 
dilemmas in which there is no escaping from having to make a choice in favour of one of 
the two values. There can be two explanations for such a situation by a liberal 
perfectionist who advocates a parochial value theory. First, the resulting choice is not 
rational. This is a view with which a radical pluralist would be sympathetic with. 
Nevertheless, liberal perfectionism cannot endorse such a perspective as, if it did, the 
normative thrust of the argument behind the prioritization of autonomy would be lost. 
Second, the resulting choice can be rationally accounted for. In order for this to happen 
however, the two values will have to be, one way or another, commensurate; that is, there 
will have to be a refutation of the claim that they are incommensurable in the first place. 
However, recourse to some common medium against which the incommensurable values 
are being considered -  even if this is something as general as the worth to one’s life342 -
342 This is Griffin’s suggestion for an common medium of commensuration in Griffin, J.; Value Judgment 
- Improving Our Ethical Beliefs. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)
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is a position which is not compatible with radical pluralism since it points towards a more 
timid version of incommensurability.343
343 See discussion in Chapter Two.
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6LIBERAL PERFECTIONISM, PAROCHIAL VALUES AND LIBERAL 
PERFECTIONISM’S RELATION TO EVOLUTIONISM AND CONSERVATISM
So far I have argued that no liberal doctrine can be rendered compatible with radical 
ethical pluralism. Instead, within the writings of different thinkers one can identify 
different watered down pluralist variations which can be consistent with different liberal 
theories. The inevitable conclusion of the above is that if  a pluralist liberal theory is to 
have a claim to consistency then it ought to play down its radical pluralist aspirations. 
Despite the fact that this argument can stand on its own, its purpose in the thesis is to be a 
prelude to Raz’s liberal perfectionism and to support my argument that if the latter is to 
be valid, it must subscribe to certain characteristics which put it at odds with radical 
pluralism.344
In the previous two chapters one of my observations was that a major criticism 
advanced against liberal perfectionism is that it vacillates between moral objectivity and 
ethical particularism. One response to the above is to argue that this is an inconsistency 
that renders the liberal perfectionist project void. This is a view that -  at least in a first 
instance -  I resisted adopting. Instead, I presented an alternative theory of value which 
may accommodate both moral objectivity and particularism within Raz’s liberal theory 
by making a normative case for the promotion of autonomy on the grounds that it is 
intrinsic, but not universal. I have not taken a definite stance on the truth of this theory of 
value. Instead, I have merely presented it as an alternative with promising credentials in
344 I expand on the reasons for this in the Introduction to the thesis.
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assisting Raz’s system of ideas and examined its truth in an indicative, yet not conclusive, 
manner.
In this chapter, I will expand more on the implications that the theory of parochial 
values has for liberal perfectionism. These implications, I will argue, are twofold. Firstly, 
even if liberal perfectionism advocates a watered down pluralist variation, it might still be 
an indefensible liberal doctrine as it cannot accommodate the critique from modernity -  
which, it must be acknowledged, is a critique which applies to other liberal theories as 
well. Secondly, the commitment of liberal perfectionism to objectivity at some instances, 
and its deep appreciation for moral and cultural contingencies at others, makes its 
commitment to any one of the ethical pluralist theories that I have presented elsewhere in 
the thesis ambiguous.
Moreover, I shall also examine whether liberal perfectionism is receptive to some 
aspects of Popper’s, Hayek’s, Oakeshott’s and Kekes’ theories and what -  if anything -  
these theories could offer to the liberal perfectionist system of ideas.
1. Parochial Values in Liberal Perfectionism
Aspects of Raz’s arguments on parochial values are similar to the arguments that have
also been advanced by Scanlon who in What We Owe to Each Other focused mainly on
the manner in which moral agents claim to perceive moral facts and make moral
demands, rather than on the ontological question of whether moral facts are objective or
subjective.345 It is this idea that Raz points towards when he writes that ‘identifying what
is the good is not the same as explaining what it is which makes it good, or why it is good
345 See Scanlon, T. M.; What We Owe to Each Other. (Cambridge, Mass., London, Belknap Press of  
Harvard University Press: 1998)
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rather than bad’.346 Furthermore, the argument that one can only conceive the natural and 
the moral world via empirical or parochial means is reminiscent at times of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism as well as of Hegel’s objective idealism. Even though the only 
way we can access the objective moral universe is via our already value ridden and pre­
theorised conceptions, Raz’s parochial value theory holds that we can still access 
objective facts about the moral universe. The similarities that parochial value theory has 
to Hegel’s and Kant’s theories extend to the issue of the exact nature of objectivity which 
is embodied in these theories. This further discussion of the nature of objectivity in 
parochial concepts will further illuminate the question of the truth of parochial value 
theory and the extent to which it in fact aids liberal perfectionism in overriding its 
obstacles.
Raz argues for the theory of parochial concepts partly by using Putnam’s 
argument against Williams’ claim for the priority of non-parochial concepts over 
parochial ones.347 For Raz, the main thrust of this argument is the claim that Williams’ 
priority condition is ‘incoherent and inconsistent in its aim of establishing some limited 
credentials of knowledge which relies on parochial concepts’.348 It seems to me that the 
extent to which this claim is similar to Popper’s proposal, which states that it is 
impossible to theorize about anything in the real world and as a consequence the social, 
political or moral worlds, without being based on some -  even instinctive and unintended
346 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
1999), p. 153
347 Putnam, H.; ‘Bernard Williams and the Absolute Conception of the World’, in Reviewing Philosophy 
(Cambridge, M ass.:Harvard University Press, 1992), 80
348 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory o f Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
1999), p. 137
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-  pre-theorising about the world or subject matter under investigation, is an interesting
349question.
It is interesting because no matter how distinct Raz’s (and as a consequence 
Putnam’s) and Popper’s theories appear to be, they have some important similarities. The 
consequence of Popper’s theory of scientific knowledge holds that no matter how much 
one tries to prove a scientific statement, one is engaged in a futile effort. Statements can 
never be proven; they can only be verified and re-appraised in light of newer evidence 
because there can never be an absolute epistemic certainty about one’s inquiry. Very 
much like Popper, Raz also argues that there are no epistemic absolutes. He writes that ‘if 
people must diverge in their epistemic baggage then path-dependence is a necessary 
feature of human existence, one which cannot be overcome under any conditions, 
however ideal’.350 As a consequence, he infers that there is ‘no reason to make 
submission to a luck-free ideal test a condition of autonomy’.351 Furthermore, similarly to 
Popper who thinks that scientific knowledge can be advanced, Raz also thinks that moral 
knowledge can also be advanced.
One of the main problems liberal perfectionism faces is its inability to give a 
detailed and comprehensive account of societal input into the -  let us assume -  discovery 
(not creation) of objective moral values.352 If it cannot, then there will be practices 
which, albeit repugnant, are going to be difficult to condemn or change when there is 
societal agreement on their practice -  such as the burning of witches in medieval Europe
349 In Popper, K.; Conjectures and Refutations. (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2002)
350 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press:
1999), p. 141
35; ibid.
352 A theory of value according to which moral values are created, would relativise liberal perfectionism too 
much.
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or the criminalisation of homosexuality. Popper’s theory gives criteria on the basis of 
which one could distinguish science form pseudo-science but this aspect of his theory 
does not give anything in the way of criteria on the basis of which condemnation of 
socially accepted but repugnant actions could occur. The aspect of his theory, however, 
that refers to the advancement of scientific knowledge does have many similarities with 
Raz’s conception of moral change. Moreover, as I show below, it will become apparent 
that the counter-arguments advanced against Raz’s and Popper’s positions also have 
similarities.
Raz acknowledges that one of the main obstacles that his theory of parochial 
values is faced with is its inability to make certain, clear and unambiguous prescriptions 
about objectivity. Raz finds a possible way out of this conundrum in the claim that ‘our 
concepts can be subjected to rational evaluation, which may lead to revision’.353 This 
proposition, Raz argues, is compatible with the denial of the claim that this evaluation ‘is 
in the light of any absolute test, like the tests of convergence’.354 The above is very 
similar to Popper’s view regarding progress of scientific knowledge.
The similarities between Popper’s idea of the progress of scientific knowledge 
and Raz’s idea of moral change and progress, although not explicitly stated, also become 
evident in Raz’s comparison between his view on the re-evaluation of moral beliefs to 
that of the re-evaluation of the means of scientific inquiry. ‘The history of the practice of 
science’, Raz argues, ‘provides examples of how epistemic standards change, often in the 
light of rational reflection and criticism, but without any master test which is held
353 ibid., p. 143
354 ibid.
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constant and governs the changes’.355 This is in line with Popper’s argument that the 
means of testing a scientific theory can be re-evaluated in light of new evidence or 
techniques that reappraise the previous method -  these new techniques also being subject 
to pre-theorising and to the possibility of further revisions and refinement.356
If Raz’s account of moral change were comparable and similar to Popper’s 
account of the progress of scientific knowledge, one of the three main riddles that liberal 
perfectionism faces would have been solved as Raz would have a clearer account than he 
has at present of how moral change occurs and what is the role of contingencies in moral 
change. This point would also reflect on how close a parochial theory of value is to an 
Archimedean approach to moral objectivity and to what extent parochial value theory 
would be acceptable to objectivists like Nagel.
Moreover, two further issues, arise with respect to the above. The first has to do 
with the extent to which Popper’s theory is successful in making a convincing case for 
the aforementioned points so that they can be used by Raz’s theory. The second has to do 
with the extent to which Raz’s theory of parochial values actually allows for moral 
change.
A detailed analysis of Popper’s theory is beyond the scope of the present work 
because Popper’s theory is only relevant for my purposes in the sense that it demonstrates 
some similarities with that of Raz’s. The above two points, however, arises because there 
are a number of critiques both about the extent to which Popper’s account of objectivity 
is valid, as well as about the extent to which his idea of the accumulation of scientific 
knowledge is actually an accurate representation of how scientific advances actually
355 ibid.
356 Look at Popper, K.; The Logic of Scientific Discovery. (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 
2002)
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occur. If Raz’s theory committed to such a view - 1 will argue that it ultimately cannot -  
then the discussion would move partly into a discussion of these aspects of Popperian 
theory. As a consequence, even if a detailed discussion of Popper’s theory is beyond the 
scope of the present work, since it is not the main subject matter of my investigations, it 
is within my scope to elaborate on a few of its features since I argue that they exemplify 
similarities with some of the features of Raz’s theory of parochial values.
With regards to the second point, i.e. the extent to which Raz’s account of moral 
change is similar to Popper’s view in terms of the accumulation of scientific knowledge, 
the answer will have to be an overall negative one. This is because Popper offers the 
master test of falsifiability with reference to which the accumulation and improvement of 
scientific knowledge and the means to acquire it occur. By contrast, even though Raz has 
a theory of moral change, this does not occur with resort to a comprehensive theory like 
the one that Popper offers. Notwithstanding the fact that both of them reject any 
comprehensive theory of objectivity, Popper still offers a fairly comprehensive account of 
how scientific knowledge changes whereas Raz thinks that the best one can do in terms 
of evaluating the emergence of new moral beliefs or in terms of the re-evaluation of 
already existent ones is to carry out ‘fruitful enquiries into the objectivity of one area or 
another when specific doubts arise regarding their status’.357
This entails much more that a simple distinction between scientific enquiries and 
enquiries about moral knowledge. It seems to me that such a simplistic distinction cannot 
be made with regards to Raz’s theory since he espouses, as I have mentioned previously, 
Putnam’s criticism of Williams’ argument that scientific theories are free from
357 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press:
1999), p. 144
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contingencies. The above commits Raz to a critical view of both scientific inquiry as well 
as the natural and moral world. Even though Popper would agree with such a view, he 
deals with it in a comprehensive manner that Raz does not wish to follow, as he claims 
that no holistic comprehensive theory can be advanced in favour of moral objectivity.
Raz gives no clear and precise criteria of how the re-evaluation of moral beliefs 
can take place. Of course, this is exactly what a non-comprehensive moral theory is all 
about; the lack of any clear and holistic normative explanation of how its predictions or 
claims could come about. Nevertheless, I do not think that this is sufficient explanation as 
it can argue convincingly neither for the certain repugnancy of some actions nor can it 
offer solid guidance about how a new belief or behaviour is better and should override an 
already existent one. Parochial value theory cannot make a definite statement on why 
tolerance should override homophobia since its appeal to the objective worth of tolerance 
is always open-ended.
It is, I believe, at this point that parochial value theory finds common ground with 
another trait of Popper’s theory; the belief in some sort of a theory of progress. This, 
however, is as far as the commonality goes since, as I have indicated earlier, Raz’s 
account of moral change does not recognise the formalistic and comprehensive account 
of accumulation of knowledge that Popper’s account proposes. There are, nevertheless, 
some indications in Raz’s work that designate a commitment to a theory of moral 
progress that is stronger than, for instance, Berlin’s theory of moral progress to which I 
have referred in the second chapter of the thesis.
It springs from the fact that Raz seems to think that the objective content of the 
ethical universe cannot change. He argues that if something is objectively worthwhile it
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cannot be valuable at one point in time and non-valuable or repugnant at another. It 
cannot, in other words, be the case that the practice of slavery was valuable up to the 
1807 Abolition of the Slavery Act and repugnant thereafter or that a novel was a good 
novel at one point in time but not in another. It is more the case that slavery was always 
repugnant, that its practice always entailed a moral wrongdoing and that it was the moral 
perceivers that thought it as valuable that were mistaken. In this sense, one should not 
refer to the idea of moral change in the context of Raz’s system of ideas ‘in a minimal 
sense, according to which morality changes when a moral statement which is true at one 
point is no longer true’. One should ‘distinguish between a change in the rights, duties 
etc., which are the consequences of applying (possibly an unchanged) morality to 
changing circumstances, and a change in morality itself.359 If the minimal sense of moral 
change is maintained, Raz claims, then it would ground social relativism.360 When Raz 
refers to moral change then, he really refers to changes in moral judgement; that is, how 
moral perceivers claim that they have discovered that something practiced or valued in 
the past or in a different context is in fact mistaken and that the belief in another value 
should take its place.
If this is the case, the previously mentioned non-comprehensive character of the 
manner in which this moral change in parochial value theory occurs makes the 
communication of the fact of moral change extremely difficult -  if not impossible -  to 
transmit to disagreeing moral agents unless it can be accounted for ‘as an application of
358 ibid., p. 166
359 ibid.,
360 However, as I will go on to discuss later, one could espouse a value theory, such as Kekes’, which 
allows for a needs-dependent account of objectivity. As I discussed in Chapter Three, Kekes’ theory is 
ultimately unsuccessful in fully insulating itself from the accusation that it collapses into relativism. 
Nevertheless, it is not as straightforwardly relativistic as Raz’s view of this minimal sense of moral change.
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an unchanging moral principle’.361 It is for this reason, the need for unchanging principles 
to which one can appeal in order to make moral change intelligible to others, that radical 
moral change -  that is moral change which occurs even with respect to these basic 
principles -  is not plausible. I will partly refer back to this position when I examine the 
relationship between conservatism and liberal perfectionism. The rejection of radical 
moral change might jeopardise the idea of the possibility of moral change when that is 
needed the most, i.e. in cases where changing practices that are wrong and deeply 
imbedded in the social fabric would be considered radical. It is obvious that this state of 
affairs affects the possibility of promoting valuable options. The positive side of laying 
such importance on social contingencies, as parochial value theory does, is that the 
accusation of rationalism, which in the second chapter of the thesis I identified as a 
theory towards which liberal and pluralist ethical theories are usually hostile, is avoided.
Moreover, in Raz’s case, rationalism would contradict his earlier claim that 
absolute moral convergence is impossible -  due to different cultural, religious and other 
backgrounds. This contradiction, nevertheless, could be overcome if Raz’s system of 
ideas held that there might be moral convergence on some basic moral principles with 
reference to which all other moral principles can be conceived and apprehended.
Furthermore, very much like Kekes, who would not tolerate radical moral change 
to the extent that it would tamper with primary values, Raz also claims that radical moral 
change is impossible since it would be unintelligible. Again, this goes back to the idea of 
the close relationship between conservatism and liberal perfectionism -  with which I will 
deal in the third section of the chapter. For the time being, the overarching question with 
which Raz is faced is how exactly moral change would occur in his theory of parochial
361 ibid., p. 172
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values. It appears to me that Raz’s answer to this question is a conception of moral 
progress that has both the melioristic features of Mill’s theory and the deterministic 
features of Hayek’s evolutionary theory of knowledge.
2. Liberal Perfectionism, Parochial Values and Moral Change
It is to a sense of moral progress that Raz appeals to when he writes that
‘as the conditions of life change we come to discover new, more abstract principles which explain 
the limited durability of moral verities hitherto believed to be eternal, and, at the same time, we 
come to believe that the previous generations were in part mistaken about morality, and that what 
we now see as the lapsed principles were not exactly as people then believed them to be’.362
This sense of progress is not, for the reasons that I have argued before, supplemented 
with a comprehensive elaboration along the Popperian lines. Instead, Raz claims that 
‘morality continuously and endlessly develops towards unchanging moral principles, 
since every change is subsumed under a principle, old or new, which is of greater scope 
and generality’.363
There are two interesting points with respect to the above. Firstly, it seems that if 
the converging moral principles of which Raz talks about become greater in scope and 
generality, then I cannot see why this greater generality cannot be something similar to 
the commitment in the advancement of human well-being -  with all the problems that 
this entails for his system of ideas. Secondly, it appears to me that what Raz effectively
362 ibid., p. 176
363 ibid., p. 179
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says in the comments above is that in time and under rational reflection upon experience 
and abstract moral notions, moral knowledge will advance and tend to converge towards 
a certain general direction. Structurally, this is very similar to Hayek’s idea of social 
evolutionism and the progress of history.
Hayek claims that ‘institutions and morals, language and law, have evolved by a 
process of cumulative growth and that it is only with and within this framework that 
human reason has grown and can successfully operate’.364 Gray describes this argument 
o f Hayek’s as an ‘evolutionist turn’ and in effect it entails the claim that ‘distinct 
traditions and social systems, each of them a bearer of information about man and the 
world, enter into a practical competition with each other in which there is a tendency for 
error to be filtered out and an approximation to truth to occur’.365 In a similar vein with 
Hayek, and despite his initial proclamations against full convergence and strong 
cognitive-realism, Raz seems to hold that there is some direction -  albeit abstract and 
general -  to moral change. That is, in the long run, the truly valuable options will persist 
and the repugnant ones will be filtered out. This, of course, is not going to eliminate 
moral conflicts since some sort of lack of convergence and disagreement will persist 
amongst rational agents because of ethical pluralism. This type of non-convergence, 
however, does not threaten the application of the structure of the Hayekian evolutionary 
theory in Raz’s theory of value. On the contrary, Hayek welcomes the convergence only 
in general political and theoretical terms because, if his argument of the deterministic 
approach to social evolutionism was much more specific than -  let’s say -  a general 
commitment to market values and liberalism, he would have to put a curb on the impact
364 Hayek, F.A., The Constitution of Liberty: (London and New York, 1960 [1999]), p. 57
365 Gray, J., Havek on Liberty: (London and New York: Routledge, 1998 [3rd ed.]), p. 135
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of spontaneity and the inherent element of disagreement and conflict that the latter 
entails. Similarly Raz, qua his commitment to moral objectivism, would wish to set a 
boundary within which moral non-convergence can be allowed and tolerated. It is on the 
basis of this wish that I argued previously that Raz’s theory of value may end up 
resembling that of Kekes’.
Despite Hayek’s explicit assertion of his commitment to evolutionism at the 
expense of rationalism366 he does, at the end of the day, have to advocate some sort of 
rationalistic belief with regards to the conviction that natural selection will give rise to an 
outcome which is more robust and more likely to be free of error than its defeated and 
void counterpart. As Gray puts it, ‘Hayek’s evolutionist view of human social 
development, in imposing a naturalistic scheme of interpretation on history, may...do 
violence to the sheer contingency of historical events’.367 In a similar manner, and in spite 
of Raz’s attempt to accommodate social and cultural contingency, the belief in the 
evolutionary progress of moral change will have to presuppose a commitment similar to 
Mill’s belief in meliorism.
For instance, I believe that Raz would argue that the imprisonment of Oscar 
Wilde, which was effectively - albeit not explicitly -  due to his homosexuality, was 
wrong and that such judicial practices should not be practised let alone promoted 
nowadays. I have already discussed, however, that Raz’s theory of parochial concepts is 
such that it makes the communication of any moral truth to disagreeing moral perceivers 
an open-ended endeavour. It seems to me that the only way for Raz to safeguard the 
claim to the truth of the statement that one ought not to be persecuted for their sexual
366 In Hayek, F.A., The Constitution of Liberty: (London and New York, 1960 [1999]), pp. 59-67.
367 Gray, J., Hayek on Liberty: (London and New York: Routledge, 1998 [3rd ed.]), p. 138
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preferences per se, is to appeal to a view according to which our moral beliefs have 
progressed enough so as to be able to consider practices, such as the persecution in 
question, for what they actually are, i.e. repugnant.
Such an account would not explain how, but only why -  i.e. due to a belief in 
meliorism -  and in what direction moral change would occur. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of an adequately clear account of how moral change might occur, scepticism 
about Raz’s parochial value theory is legitimate -  since moral change appears to be an 
integral part of it. Moreover, Raz’s discussion of moral change is at the same time subject 
to a number of other shortfalls. The first shortfall, which refers to the tension between the 
rationalist and sceptical elements, is shared by both Hayek’s and Raz’s theories. Gray, 
writes with respect to Hayek’s argument that
‘it is after all, a rational insight of his social theory that allows Hayek to identify some 
components of modem morality as destabilising the market order. If the rational claims of his 
social theory are in this way to take precedence over important elements in the fund of tacit 
understanding shared by modem populations, then the evolutionist endorsement of man’s random 
walk in historical space has been withdrawn’.368
As a consequence, Gray adds, ‘the unity of Hayek’s thought is endangered by the 
uncertainty at its very centre as to the relations of tacit knowledge with theoretical insight 
in political life’.369 Similarly, if Raz’s thought were to advocate an evolutionary theory of 
moral progress, then it would also be subject to the tension between rationalism and its 
appreciation for diversity and particularism. This tension would be even more severe if
368 ibid., p. 139
369 ibid.
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his system of ideas advocated an evolutionism, such as Hayek’s, which is in turn already 
subject to the very same problem.
Related to this is also the extent to which Raz would like to commit to an idea of 
moral progress similar to Hayek’s evolutionary conception of it. Some of the pluralist 
variations discussed previously in the thesis, such as lexical pluralism and the 
comprehensive variant of reasonable pluralism, would allow for the adoption of such a 
position. Others, like Kekes’ pluralism, would be less friendly to an evolutionary theory 
of moral change, since no matter what people think, the primary values are fixed under 
any milieu in time and space. The verdict on whether liberal perfectionism is consistent 
with an evolutionary approach to moral progress would depend on which one of these 
pluralist variations Raz would decide to base his doctrine on.370
Furthermore, an advocacy of such an evolutionary perspective on moral change 
would accentuate the oscillation of the Razian project between conservatism and 
radicalism -  which I will fully specify in the next section -  very much as it does in 
Hayek’s case. In Hayek’s theory of knowledge, its reliance upon existing social practices, 
its endorsement of social constructivism and the implications it has for his concept of 
social evolutionism were responsible for the criticism that it is a conservative theory. This 
is because if one subscribes to any sort of evolutionary theory, the outcome of which 
would be the survival of the fittest, the most righteous etc., then one would have to hold 
that the order of things should be allowed to proceed with no intervention, since the
370 If Raz were to insist that his moral doctrine develop on the basis o f an untamed version of pluralism, 
apart from the fact that it would be inconsistent, it would also have to limit itself to the advocacy of a 
theory o f moral progress similar to Berlin’s. This approach is positivistic in a sense, since it entails the 
belief that, ultimately, all human beings will have access to the moral knowledge regarding which actions 
are repugnant. It is, nevertheless, much more subtle and limited in its aspirations from what one would 
expect from a positivist theory of progress.
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outcome of the evolutionary process is self-emerging and self-defined. The consequence 
of this would be an over reliance on existing social practices in the shaping of future 
outcomes.
Hayek denies this attribution of conservatism in the sense that ‘though the 
position [he has] tried to define is also often described as “conservative”, it is very 
different from that to which this name has been traditionally attached’.371 This, in 
Hayek’s view, ought to be evident because the traditional understanding of conservatism 
‘may succeed in its resistance to current tendencies in slowing down undesirable 
developments, but, since it does not indicate another direction, it cannot prevent their 
continuance’.372 Another reason for the above criticism, Hayek believes, is due to the 
prevailing conception in the history of ideas with regards to the meaning of the terms 
“conservatism” and “liberalism”.373 The response of Hayek’s system of ideas to the 
above is to underline within it the presence of a very strong radical element which can be 
affiliated with rationalism. Gray recognises instances in his work374 in which Hayek 
‘does not view the free society as a necessary or inevitable terminus of cultural 
evolution...and acknowledges that the trend to liberty may always be defeated’. In this 
sense, one could argue for the active involvement in the evolutionary process of trial and 
error in a manner that would rest on the rationalistic appreciation of the value of liberty.
371 Hayek, F.A., The Constitution o f Liberty: (London and New York, 1960 [1999]), p. 397
372 ibid., p. 398
373 I have implicitly and frequently referred to issues o f the history of ideas with regards to the theories of 
“conservatism” and especially “liberalism” in this thesis, and I will continue to do so until the end o f my 
thesis. I have approached the projection o f  a number o f similarities between different moral and political 
theories as a secondary purpose o f my discussions and I have used the conclusions derived from the said 
discussion to formulate my main arguments. However, an explicit elaboration on these issues is a vast and 
complicated task which falls outside the main purposes o f my arguments in the thesis.
374 In Hayek, F.A., Law. Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and 
Political Economy. Vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice: (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), 
referred to in Gray, J., Hayek on Liberty: (London and New York: Routledge, 1998 [3rd ed.]), Chapter six.
375 Gray, J., Hayek on Liberty: (London and New York: Routledge, 1998 [3rd ed.]), p. 122
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This involvement, for Gray, might at times necessitate the breakage of linkages with 
practices and habits of the past. At times, however, it might entail the tolerance -  if not 
the promotion -  of primordial natural instincts and morals that would oppose the 
Rousseauesque ideal of a society guided by rationalistic principles. Moreover, one can 
surely envisage instances in which the liberal commitment to individuality and the value 
of tradition could come into conflict. In these instances, it is far from clear which side of 
the argument Hayek would endorse. This is a problem which extends to liberal 
perfectionism.
Ultimately, it may be that liberal perfectionism fails to address the problems of 
moral objectivity, moral change and modernity because it finds itself trapped between the 
Scylla of radicalism and moral rationalism and the Charybdis of particularism and 
conservatism. Liberal perfectionism along with other liberal doctrines, as I argued in the 
first part of the thesis, must account for the incompatibility between radical value 
pluralism and liberalism by playing down their expectations on how pluralist, and at the 
same time consistently liberal, they can be. Again, on the altar of consistency and the 
unitary character of its system of ideas, liberal perfectionism will have to choose between 
the cost of either being radical or conservative. It cannot be both and at the same time 
overcome the obstacles it faces. The question then turns into the issue of which cost 
liberal perfectionism should bear -  the cost of radicalism or that of conservatism?
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3. Radicalism or Conservatism?
My argument in this section will be directed specifically at the proposal that liberal 
perfectionism must side with conservatism rather than radicalism. I will support this 
assertion both on the grounds that liberal perfectionism cannot give a clear account of 
moral objectivity as well as on the grounds that it cannot accommodate the idea of moral 
change in a parochial value theory unless it commits itself to an Oakeshottian 
underpinning.
Previously in the thesis, and with respect to the critique of modernity, I referred to 
the liberal perfectionist claim that it is the moral obligation of a state to filter out the bad 
options and promote the good ones. Whereas many would agree on the fact that the 
occurrence of utter poverty in some parts of the population is wrong and thus should be 
eliminated,376 there is widespread disagreement about the wrongness or value of a great 
number of other options. Even more so, and despite the functional and cultural 
arguments, the promotion of autonomy even in a liberal democratic context has become a 
practice that lacks consensus. To the extent, however, that the values which are entailed 
within a social domain are accessible only via parochial means, there can be no guarantee 
that the values which are perceived as true are actually true. Furthermore, as Raz is a 
value pluralist, he will have to acknowledge -  at least to some extent -  the possibility of 
irresolvable clashes of different worthwhile values. In a modem multicultural context, 
these clashes are much more frequent and immediate.377 In these cases, although the 
value of a practice is an ontological matter, with epistemological concerns coming into
376 Although, even in this case, one can find extreme economic neo-liberals who would hold that the 
endurance of extreme poverty on behalf o f some parts of the population should be tolerated.
377 The same can be the case an international level where the clash o f incommensurable values embodied 
by different cultures is more obvious than ever. This is not to say that it has not been there in the past. This 
is only a point about the immediateness of the conflict.
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play only in terms of demarcating the limits of one’s ability to access this value, the 
decision on which practice has to be advanced and which has to be curtailed will be 
ultimately based on epistemology. That is, it is the value the worth of which is perceived 
via parochial means to be higher or more relevant in a context -  i.e. autonomy in liberal 
democracies for liberal perfectionism -  that will be prioritised either directly or 
indirectly. And since, as Raz puts it, ‘the old is the source of the new’,378 a value and its 
parochial understanding is largely conditioned by already existent political, social, 
religious, ethnic and other contingencies. As a consequence, it becomes greatly attached 
and affiliated to already established practices in society. When the society in focus is the 
liberal democratic one and it is faced with the input of different values and beliefs that 
contradict its basic premises, then a decision in favour of these basic premises -  for 
instance, promotion of autonomy -  coincides with established practices and is in this 
sense conservative.
This characterization is further supported by Raz’s view that there may be 
contexts in which autonomy is not a necessary ingredient of the good life and as such it 
need not be promoted.379 This constitutes an exemplification of the fact that liberal 
perfectionism is based on a theory the prescriptions of which are the outcome of the 
specific liberal perfectionist locale. Theories whose locale is a different one, the liberal 
perfectionist holds, can very well prioritize values other than that of autonomy. 
Moreover, this conservative behaviour is consistent with that of an ethical pluralist who, 
despite the fact that she cannot insulate herself completely from rationalistic and more
378 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory o f Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
1999), p. 193
379 1 have discussed this in Chapter Five.
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radical accounts of morality, such as Platonic morality, values moral empiricism and 
particularism.380
In effect, I argue that the reason liberal perfectionism cannot face the critique 
from modernity is due to the fact that it does not openly endorse the strong element of 
conservatism that permeates it. This is not to say that it ought to give up on the radical 
and more rationalistic aspect of its thought. Instead, it goes on to say that when the two 
conflict, if it still wants to make the normative prescriptions that it aspires to make, 
conservatism must prevail.
Obviously, this is a choice that entails all the costs associated with a conservative 
moral and political outlook. However, an acceptance of conservatism will at least make 
liberal perfectionism workable in the context of modernity.
In addition, the existence of a radical tendency does not have to be suppressed 
altogether; it will just have to allow itself to be supervened by the conservative one when 
the two conflict. This latter proposition is supported by Raz’s claim that radical moral 
change is unintelligible and that there have to be a set of values which remain fixed in 
order for any moral change to become intelligible. I will discuss this point in further 
detail very shortly, but for the time being it is important to note two things. Firstly, that 
Raz’s theory of parochial values is one that, at least prima facie, accommodates my 
argument on the conservative characteristics of liberal perfectionism. Secondly, the 
relationship between conservatism and radicalism within liberal perfectionism, could 
allow the latter to make assessments both in terms of false consciousness and at the same 
time present a more radical approach to moral change than the merely simple 
conservative one.
380 See my discussion in Chapter Two.
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Raz is right in saying that the impossibility of radical moral change does not 
necessarily entail the existence of only one principle which remains unchanged in the 
face of all other changing principles. This is only the case ‘if one believes in a monolithic 
ethic’, and is not the case for pluralists. For the latter, Raz claims, ‘the message is that
<JJ>1
many principles must persist through any moral change, however far reaching’. This is 
a rationalistic statement that stands against moral empiricism in the sense that even if 
everyone changes their view about a (necessarily parochial) value which had been 
considered worthwhile in the past, the suppression of this value or the undesirability to 
promote it ought to not be tolerated. This rationalist trend, however, is certainly not 
strong enough to characterise Raz as an adamant rationalist. On the contrary, Raz’s 
resistance to vast, sudden and all encompassing moral changes would demarcate him as 
an opponent of rationalism. In this sense, and taking into account that even in the 
instances where moral change is gradual rather than abrupt and sudden Raz still holds 
that radical moral change is impossible,382 Raz’s system of ideas exemplifies a 
conservatism similar to Oakeshott’s.
Oakeshott’s respect for tradition stems from his specific theory of knowledge 
which vehemently attacks and rejects the abstract and rationalistic method of acquiring 
different types of knowledge -  including moral -  in favour of a tacit understanding of
' i Q ' i
knowledge in general, and moral knowledge in particular. Oakeshott claims that
381 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
1999), p. 180. Italic is mine.
382 ibid., pp. 179-181
383 He argues this In his essays ‘Rationalism in Politics’ and ‘Rational Conduct’ in Oakeshott, M., 
Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991).
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‘the morality of the Rationalist is the morality of the self-conscious pursuit of moral ideals and 
the appropriate form of moral education is by precept, by the presentation and explanation of 
moral principles. This is presented as a higher morality (the morality of the free man: there is no 
end to die clap-trap) than that of habit, the unselfconscious following of tradition of moral 
behaviour. In morality, as in everything else, the Rationalist aims to begin by getting rid of 
inherited nescience and to fill the blank nothingness of an open mind with the items of certain 
knowledge which he abstracts from his personal experience, and which he believes to be 
approved by the common ‘reason’ of mankind’.384
Oakeshott’s dislike for rationalism is so intense that even Raz’s claim to moral 
objectivity in the context of a parochial value theory might have appeared suspect. 
Nevertheless, the above statement against ‘getting rid of inherited nescience’ is in line 
with Raz’s rejection of radical moral change. In Oakeshott’s case the rejection of 
rationalistic radicalism takes place on the grounds that the practice of what Popper would 
call canvas-cleaning fails to appreciate the graveness of the loss of tacit knowledge that is 
inherent in already existing traditions and institutions and of which nearly everyone 
makes unconscious use. Similarly, as I have already mentioned, Raz thinks that radical 
moral change -  even when it is gradual -  cannot occur because it will be unintelligible. It 
has to be said, however, that this can by no means be regarded as a definitely valid and 
conclusive claim since it might be disproved in light of new evidence. For some it might 
have even been disproved already if one accounts for radical changes in the value
384 ‘Rationalism in Politics’ in Oakeshott, M., Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays. (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1991), p. 40.
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domains of non-Christian communities after their contact with Christian values. 
Whether this change happened due to an imposition or due to the active and willing 
endorsement of the values in question is of no significance for the argument here. What is 
important is that, in consequence, radical moral change -  if  such it were -  became 
intelligible.
Yet, there is an important difference between Oakeshott’s conservatism and Raz’s 
argument against radical change which, nevertheless, I believe can ultimately be 
overcome. Oakeshott seems to claim that radical change should not occur because it 
entails great loss of tacit knowledge. This knowledge cannot be retrieved after the 
occurrence of radical social or moral change, since it cannot be theorised and can be 
found only imbedded within existing institutions. When the latter perish, the knowledge 
that they involve will also be lost. Raz, in contrast, seems to suggest that radical moral 
change is not something which is undesirable; for him, it would be meaningless to think 
such a proposition. Instead, Raz seems to suggest that radical moral change is, actually, 
impossible.
In fact, though, this is a position to which Oakeshott would be very sympathetic. 
Oakeshott’s conviction stems from his appreciation of tacit knowledge and in his 
conviction of the wide -  often unconscious and not actively intended -  use that is made 
of it. As a consequence, when Oakeshott refers to moral knowledge and its influence and 
importance to moral behaviour, he rejects the claim that moral behaviour can be based on
385 See for instance Mullins, M., Susumum S. & Swanson, P. L. [eds.J; Religion and Society in Modem 
Japan. (Berkeley, Asian Humanities Press: 1993) for essays on the encounter between Shinto, Buddhism 
and Christianity in Japan. Also, see Collins, W.J.H.; ‘Common Ground in Christianity and Buddhism’, 
Japanese Religions, 7(3): 1972, pp. 29-41 for an argument that the change o f the moral code introduced by 
Christianity was not completely alien and radical to the local one rooted in Buddhism -  which in this 
context would verify Oakeshott’s argument.
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moral knowledge that springs up from a tabula rasa position. Moral behaviour will have 
to make use of what moral knowledge has been provided by the past. Thus, Oakeshott 
thinks that,
‘the notion that a knowledge of how to behave can be permanently replaced by something else 
just as good, and the notion that the patient must be allowed (or even encouraged) to die in order 
that he may start life again on new and firmer foundations, will be entertained only by those who 
are wholly ignorant of the nature of moral activity’.386
As a consequence, in the same essay, ‘Rational Conduct’, Oakeshott proposes that the 
remedy for a disrupted moral activity which is attributed to either some sort of natural 
disaster or ‘to mechanical intervention’, is the transfusion of ‘ideals, principles, 
etc...[which] are themselves drawn from the ailing moral tradition’.387 The above are a 
very strong indication that in Oakeshott’s theory of moral knowledge, extreme radicalism 
is not only undesirable but, also, impossible. Raz, like Oakeshott, holds that ‘values are 
an acquired taste’ and an ‘acculturation’ to these values ‘presupposes social practices into
* 0 0  ^
which one grows, or which one acquires later by habituation’. As a consequence, it is 
safe to conclude that both theories pay tribute to the importance of the tacit and the local 
elements in the understanding of morality for similar reasons.
386 ‘Rational Conduct’ in Oakeshott. M.. Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays. (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1991), p. 128
387 ibid.
388 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action, (Oxford, Oxford University Press: 
1999), p. 193. Raz is not alone in this view since amongst others it is advocated by McDowell with regards 
to the translatability and intelligibility of moral values in Gadamer’s work in McDowell, J., ‘Gadamer and 
Davidson on Understanding and Relativism’, in Malpas, J., Answald, U. and Kertscher, J. [eds.J, 
Gadamer’s Century. Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer: (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 
173-193
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Furthermore, it is worth noting here that the two theories are similar in their 
limitations as well. For instance, neither the Oakeshottian theory of tacit knowledge nor 
the Razian theory of parochial values explain how moral values come into being. In 
addition, none of the above theories offer any very explicit or clear idea of how moral 
change occurs. To the extent that they do, Oakeshott’s theory seems to offer a more 
explicit, albeit far from neat, explanation than Raz’s theory does. Oakeshott maintains 
that there are two different ways to incorporate the moral knowledge passed on by 
tradition into moral behaviour. The first is to do so dogmatically and unreflectively. The 
second is to contemplate on the knowledge of the said moral propositions and to try to 
embody them successfully into actual moral behaviour; a task which is by no means easy.
So far I have argued that even though liberal perfectionism oscillates between 
conservatism and radicalism, when it does have to choose only one of the two, the overall 
outlook of its system of ideas best fits that of conservatism. In this respect, the 
conservatism that the Razian system of ideas exemplifies is very similar to that of 
Oakeshott’s.
One crucial difference between the two, however, is that in spite of the high 
importance that Raz places on the claim that ‘values are creatures of culture’, and as such 
it is through culture that we approach them, he also claims that there are ‘basic values’
‘l O Q
which ‘have roots in human nature (as do basic human vices)’. There is no such 
account of basic human values that are derived from a specific conception of human 
nature in Oakeshott. The closest thing to such a claim that Oakeshott’s theory might have 
would be the -  far from unproblematic -  argument that some such values have been
389 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press:
1999), p. 193
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carried on and are embodied in the existing institutions of liberal democracies. An 
account of values which have roots in human nature, however, can be found in the theory 
of another conservative thinker, that of John Kekes. In Chapter Two I referred 
extensively to Kekes’ theory of primary and secondary values and the manner in which 
this theory categorised the importance of values according to the importance of the 
human needs which they fulfilled. Raz here seems to point in a similar direction.
However, a dilemma, according to which Raz’s system of ideas must choose to 
side either with Oakeshott’s or Kekes’ theory, is inappropriate. In fact, it seems to me that 
the two can complement each other expertly in the context of parochial value theory and 
its application to liberal perfectionism. Specifically, Raz can hold a parochial value 
theory which is underpinned by an Oakeshottian theory of moral knowledge on the basis 
of which he can then go on to argue for a pluralist ethical theory of primary and 
secondary values which in turn can be used as a basis for the construction of his liberal 
perfectionist doctrine. That is, the liberal perfectionist argument for the promotion of 
autonomy can be made on the grounds that through tradition, long established practices 
and habits in the modem liberal context, we have found that if one is to flourish as a 
human being, one can do so -  in the context of the particular milieu -  only when one 
operates under conditions of the Razian autonomy. That is, by using a combination of 
Oakeshottian conservatism and a Kekesian pluralist structure in terms of the 
classification of values, a liberal perfectionist can make a case for the inclusion of 
autonomy in the domain of primary values in certain cultural contexts. As a consequence, 
the promotion of autonomy in this context is normatively obligatory and failure to 
promote it constitutes wrongdoing.
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Of course, this thesis is subject to the critique from modernity. In the argument 
above, however, Raz can brush this critique aside as the point he makes is in essence a 
parochial one that has affinities to an Oakeshottian conservative theory and, as a 
consequence, does have solid claims to the objectivity of the value of autonomy. Even so, 
he is still able to present a liberal perfectionism which characterises the failure to promote 
autonomy in modem liberal democracies as moral failure.
There is a cost in such an approach. Liberal perfectionism does not face head on, 
and does not argue its way out from, the critique of modernity. It just accepts and learns 
to live with the costs that this critique entails. The critique of modernity is not dispersed 
by the stance that I propose liberal perfectionism should adopt. What I have proposed, 
nevertheless, offers a manner of accommodating the critique in question, which is 
consistent with Raz’s overall system of ideas. This is because the view that autonomy 
ought not to be promoted on the grounds that it is not a necessary ingredient of the good 
life would be considered a radical moral change from the already established moral code 
of a liberal society, and as such it could not be made intelligible to those raised and 
acculturated in a modem liberal context.
Earlier, I effectively argued that given that for Raz values are necessarily 
parochial ones, there can be no case made according to which primary values are derived 
by appeal to human nature alone. Parochial value theory demands that it is derived by 
appeal to human nature with the simultaneous realisation that the latter is conceived via 
parochial means. This means that a Kekesian view about values may have either one -  
but not more than one at the same time -  of the following three statuses. First, Kekes -  or 
any other theory using the basic framework of his primary/secondary value distinction
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but not necessarily the exact content of the primary and secondary value domains that 
Kekes uses -  is right about what constitutes our human nature and his account of it is the 
only true one. Second, such an account is wrong about human nature and, hence, about 
primary values. Third, the Kekesian view is right about what constitutes our human 
nature, but is not unique in its rightness. Human nature can have many instantiations 
some of which are accounted for by theories with which the Kekesian moral outlook is 
not acculturated with and whose views with regards to human nature are equally valid to 
those of the Kekesian moral theory.
One of the problems with the Razian account of parochial morality and the 
similarities that I have argued it bears to the Popperian theory of knowledge is that, 
strictly speaking, it can never rule out the possibility of the occurrence of the second 
status. That is, it can never make an irrefutable argument for the objectivity of any moral 
view. Furthermore, irrespectively of whether it is actually possible or not to present such 
an objective theory of value, the fact remains that i f  it is not, then many of the important 
and basic values advocated by a group of moral agents -  no matter how this is defined -  
will never be intelligible and successfully communicated to different groups. This is 
because it is both the case that some of these different groups lack the epistemic means to 
access some of these values and also because -  even if the mastering of the epistemic 
means were possible in theory -  the long process of acculturation and familiarization 
with different world views about morality would be a practical impossibility. As Michael 
Stocker puts it in his discussion on the intelligibility of bad acts in Raz’s thought, ‘what is 
good in the present sense...does not make the act good at all in any way whatsoever; or,
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not to beg the question, in any other way whatsoever’.390 What Stocker points at here is 
Raz’s claim that the fact that the appreciation of a value on a local level does not imply 
that it is valuable only in a socially relativistic manner,391 under no circumstances 
safeguards the attribution of objectivity to any kind of moral judgement. In this sense, 
Gray’s critique of Raz’s thought with respect to the particularistic character of the 
functional and cultural arguments is still relevant.
I partly discussed the validity of the third status of Kekes’ approach to values in 
my discussion of his theory of primary and secondary values. There, I referred to the 
likelihood of the existence of incommensurable and competing values within the primary 
domain. On the contrary, Kekes -  wrongly, I argued -  acknowledges the existence of 
such values only within the secondary domain. The problems which I identified from my 
discussion of this issue and the problems that this third status of the Kekesian moral 
claim can cause for Raz’s system of ideas are very similar. Furthermore, they are very 
similar to the problems that were presented in the situation where the second status of the 
Kekesian moral claim was given. That is, there is no improvable or indisputable claim to 
simple moral objectivity which can be made by liberal perfectionism on behalf of the 
values that it considers to be part of the primary domain. This is exemplified in two 
distinct manners.
On the one hand, one could be presented with competing incommensurable 
primary values between which there is no rational way to decide. On the other hand, one
390 Stocker, M., ‘Raz on the Intelligibility of Bad Acts’ in Wallace, R., J., Pettit, P., Scheffler, S., Smith,
M. feds.], Reason and Value: Themes from the Philosophy of Joseph Raz: (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2004), p. 331
391 I have previously discussed this argument with relevance to Gray’s critique o f Raz’s thought with 
respect to the particularistic character of the functional and cultural arguments.
392 See Chapter Two.
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may be presented with different primary values in one context from the ones that would 
be presented in another.
Moreover, in the context of modernity, the divergent opinions on the content of 
the primary value domain can exist within the same social and political context. When 
none of these divergent views is mistaken, i.e. when they both conform to objectively 
valuable moral truths, the value-pluralist situation of competing and incommensurable 
values within the primary domain will occur, thus posing an obstacle for the liberal 
perfectionist claim for the promotion of autonomy. This stalemate, however, can be 
overcome by advocating a conservative outlook similar to the Oakeshottian one that was 
discussed previously in the chapter. What this implies, effectively, is an advocacy of a 
less radical pluralist outlook which would allow the overriding of one value for the sake 
of another. As I have agued in the first part of the thesis, this can be done in many ways -  
some of them being more rationalistic than others. An advocacy of Oakeshottian 
conservatism will accommodate liberal perfectionist values in a costly, yet more 
satisfactory manner to all other possible alternatives (monism, radicalism etc.), which are 
unsuccessful in supporting a valid liberal perfectionist theory.
The occurrence of the first status, i.e. the situation in which a moral claim that 
recognizes the structure of the primary/secondary distinction makes a statement that is 
tme -  and no other statement on the issue in focus can have a claim to truth -  is in fact 
the one whose truth Raz is most likely to recognize. This is because, as I have discussed 
elsewhere in the chapter, Raz holds that there are some general principles towards which 
morality tends to converge in the long run via a process of moral clashes and continuous 
re-evaluations between and within different moral outlooks. I have also claimed,
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however, that evidence so far does not support the view on the convergence towards 
some abstract — but not necessarily commensurable and harmonious — principles. On the 
contrary, modernity and multiculturalism make an argument for the ever escalating 
divergence of moral beliefs. Furthermore, the arguments for this eventual convergence 
which Raz seems to advocate are very unclear within his writings, whereas the arguments 
of how exactly this convergence will come about are non-existent. Again, the conclusion 
here is that what Raz exemplifies through his belief in the emancipation of moral 
progress in the form of convergence in general moral principles, is a melioristic belief 
similar to the one espoused by Mill.
In addition, the meliorist element in Raz’s theory is crucial for the working of his 
liberal perfectionist system of ideas in terms of moral change, as its absence would 
signify the crossing over from a conservative ethical and political doctrine that can be 
suspicious to moral change and reactionary to radical moral change into a stagnant and 
rigid doctrine in the context of which, moral change, and thus ultimate convergence of 
moral beliefs, would be scarce. Raz asserts that ‘some moral philosophers regard ethics 
as limited by tradition, with the conversation of the deaf being conducted across the 
boundaries of traditions.’393 A necessary consequence of that, he goes on to say, would be 
that ‘multiculturalism imports the existence of a moral chasm between different traditions 
and communities in society’.394 As indicated elsewhere in the chapter, however, Raz had 
argued against this position since he believes that ‘there is a morality which applies to all
O Q C
the traditions and the cultures, a morality which bridges the divide between them’.
393 Raz, J.; Engaging Reason: On the Theory o f Value and Action. (Oxford, Oxford University Press:
1999), p. 181
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Without this qualification, Raz’s political doctrine would be virtually identical to the 
conservative one espoused by Oakeshott, since moral and political practice -  both in the 
international and increasingly in the national societal arena -  indicate that the 
convergence is but a figment of the imagination.
Moreover, an ethical pluralist is very likely to hold that people with divergent 
views on morality base their beliefs on equally rational approaches. Of course, a moral 
pluralist does allow for both simple and ephemeral, as well as for deep and fundamental, 
epistemic wrongness but then, as I have argued before, the transmutability of such a
I Q /
position to the party which is in the wrong is often impossible. As a consequence, any 
normative recommendation given by liberal perfectionism, such as the priority of the 
promotion of autonomy, would be particular to the group that generates the said 
recommendation. This will be either because autonomy is promoted only because it is 
objective from an -  unattainable according to parochial value theory -  Archimedean 
point of view, or because it is particular -  or also happens to be particular -  to the 
western liberal context. If the former is the case, the ethical pluralist would have to dive 
too deep into her rationalistic inclinations in order to claim that it is her belief -  and not 
the opposing one -  which is actually morally true. In the context of a parochial theory of 
value which Raz advocates, however, making such a proposal is near impossible due to 
the parochial nature of all moral knowledge. On the contrary, if she acknowledges that 
this is an impossible thesis to hold, she effectively subscribes to a conservative moral
396 Here I assume that if  the other party were to accept the thesis that it is wrong about a moral view, it 
would mean that the moral view in focus is, indeed, wrong. Of course, this is not always the case since two 
or more dissenting parties could agree on a false moral view. So it is worth stressing here that I am actually 
referring to rational individuals who, when they form a group, that group is rational as well. As a 
consequence, their consent on the view that their epistemology is wrong would make it wrong. The same 
holds that two agreeing rational parties could not agree on a wrong moral view.
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theory along the Oakeshottian line. The Oakeshottian line also offers a rather elaborate 
theory of moral knowledge which pays tribute to the close relationship between ethical 
pluralism and empiricism397 but fails to address the Razian belief in some sort of -  even 
loose -  convergence on pan-human general moral principles. This is why it needs to be 
also complemented by Raz’s theory of parochial values.
Liberal perfectionism must advocate a non-rational -  albeit not necessarily 
irrational -  sense of optimism about the prospects of the convergence of moral beliefs. 
This will result into the shaping of Raz’s basic framework of ethical values into one that 
recognizes the Kekesian-style dichotomy between primary and secondary values, in the 
context of which autonomy would belong to the primary domain.
In a nutshell, Raz has to inject the element of meliorism in his theory of moral 
progress, and in doing so share all the criticisms which can be directed against Mill’s 
commitment to meliorism. By doing so, his conservatism acquires the tools to tolerate 
within it some variety of moral beliefs and is open to gradual re-evaluation within the 
limits of an already existent morality, which is understood in terms of parochial value 
theory.
4. Conclusion
A great deal of my investigation in this chapter had to do with my attempt to establish the 
presence of a theory of moral progress within Raz’s theory of parochial values. 
Moreover, I discussed the issue of how one grasps objectively worthwhile values 
according to Raz’s parochial value theory. In this respect I found parochial value theory
397 See my discussion in Chapter Two.
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to be not as convincing as Raz would have hoped. The main reason for this was the 
inability of parochial value theory to make a case which could be insulated from the 
danger of an eventual collapse into moral subjectivism. Moreover, if the objectivist traits 
in Raz’s theory were reinforced, the resulting doctrine would be too strongly objectivist 
and rationalistic for it to pay adequate tribute to the sensitivity that liberal perfectionism 
and parochial value theory aim to show towards the contingencies surrounding and 
influencing moral agents.
Furthermore, an application of parochial value theory in liberal perfectionism 
further intensifies the oscillation between radicalism and conservatism. I argued that for 
the sake of the coherence of the liberal perfectionist system of ideas, this oscillation must 
be resolved. This can happen by liberal perfectionism endorsing either radicalism or 
conservatism. Liberal perfectionism cannot feasibly be based on the former because of 
Raz’s refutation to the effect that radical moral change is impossible. On the contrary, 
after I examined a number of similarities between liberal perfectionism and Popper’s and 
Hayek’s theories, I concluded that if liberal perfectionism is to be a valid theory it will 
have to necessarily advocate a conservatism which resembles aspects of both the 
Oakeshottian and Kekesian conservatisms as well as an advocacy of some kind of 
meliorism in the context of parochial value theory.
The latter cannot result from a process according to which moral knowledge 
accumulates like scientific knowledge accumulates in Popper’s theory, because Raz 
would resist the adoption of an approach which tends to equate scientific and moral 
knowledge. Similarly, Raz’s system of ideas could not allow for a Hayekian evolutionist 
view about the advancement of moral knowledge either. The exact mechanism of such
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advancement would be very hard to exemplify while Hayekian evolutionist theory has 
implications with which liberal perfectionism would be ill at ease.
Of course, by advocating the amalgamation of variable theoretical inputs, liberal 
perfectionism will share the merits as well as the weaknesses and ambiguities of these 
theories. But this is a price that needs to be paid.
257
7CONCLUSION
1. A Brief Overview of the Argument
The main aim of the thesis, which was prompted by Raz’s attempt to reconcile pluralism 
and liberal perfectionism, was to deal with the pluralist critique of liberalism which 
claims that pluralism and liberalism are incompatible. There have been many responses 
to the above critique all of which overlook the fact that Berlin’s discussion of value 
pluralism, though important, does not exhaust the terrain. Without turning the thesis into 
a discussion of meta-ethics and the proof or disproof of value pluralism, in the first part 
of the thesis I investigated a variety of candidate pluralist theories other than the 
Berlinian one and their relation to different liberal theories. I did this as a prelude to 
examining Raz’s own peculiar approach to pluralism and liberalism and their potential 
reconciliation. My discussion of Raz’s attempt to reconcile pluralism and liberalism 
extends to the discussion of this view of autonomy and his theory of value as these are 
relevant.
It is important to stress that, even though the argument which I present in the 
second part of the thesis follows from that in the first part, some aspects of the argument 
in either one of the two parts can also stand independently. Such aspects of my argument 
are, for instance, my discussion of Raz’s theory of parochial values in the second part, or 
my argument that different value pluralisms are compatible with different liberalisms in 
the first part.
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My argument in the thesis developed as follows. First, I discussed Berlin’s idea of 
value pluralism and identified some of its strengths and weaknesses. Amongst other 
things, I elaborated on the relationship between Berlinian value pluralism with relativism 
and monism. More importantly, though, I delineated an area of pluralist discourse in the 
context of which my elaboration and evaluation of other pluralist doctrines took place.
Then I presented pluralist variations which were less radical than the untamed 
Berlinian view on pluralism and I went on to examine the compatibility of these pluralist 
variations with different liberal theories. I argued that Mill’s liberalism is compatible 
with a Kekesian pluralist morality or with lexical value pluralism, an argument which I 
also made for Rawls’ liberalism in A Theory o f Justice. Moreover, if it is to be considered 
a comprehensive doctrine, I found Rawls’ liberal theory in Political Liberalism, to be 
compatible with lexical pluralism and reasonable pluralism -  or even with some aspects 
of Kekes’ pluralism. If it is to be considered a political doctrine, Rawls’ theory in 
Political Liberalism can be compatible with a modus vivendi understanding of 
reasonableness. I also examined the compatibility of Raz’s liberal perfectionism with 
different pluralist positions. Like the previous liberalisms that I examined, the liberal 
perfectionist system of ideas exemplified similarities with Kekes’ pluralism. This is an 
important observation as the above similarity becomes apparent again in my more 
detailed examination of liberal perfectionism in the second part of the thesis where I 
examine in greater detail the reasons for the incompatibility between liberal 
perfectionism and radical pluralism.
This concluded the first part of the thesis. At the beginning of the second part I 
presented my understanding of Raz’s liberal perfectionism and I identified three main
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problems with it. The first had to do with the compatibility between his perfectionist 
aspirations and his commitment to non-linear pluralism. The second problem had to do 
with the exact role of autonomy in the liberal perfectionist system of ideas. The third 
problem had to do with the exact nature of the value of autonomy; an issue which 
extended into the more general issue of the theory of objectivity which is advocated by 
liberal perfectionism.
The issue of the compatibility between liberal perfectionism and radical pluralism 
had a straightforward negative answer. The second issue refers to whether Raz attaches 
an intrinsic, a universal, or an instrumental value to autonomy. I argued that at the very 
least Raz hints implicitly that autonomy is valued not universally, but intrinsically. 
However, one cannot dismiss some explicit references in his work which state that 
autonomy is valuable instrumentally. This discussion led my argument to the third issue 
which regards the ambiguities within parochial value theory -  since it appears that the 
characteristics that Raz attributed to the value of autonomy are those of a parochial value. 
As a consequence, the ambiguities of parochial value theory also affect liberal 
perfectionism and, hence, its reconciliation with pluralism.
My conclusion that parochial value theory is not fully compelling was not 
followed by a comprehensive solution regarding the challenges that parochial value 
theory and, as a consequence, liberal perfectionism face. After all, even if some of these 
challenges are indicative of philosophical shortfalls, the very same shortfalls can also be 
approached as strengths in the sense that they attempt to combine moral objectivity with a 
respect for the moral deliberation of agents under non-ideal conditions.
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My final argument in the thesis is that the ambiguities in Raz’s theory exemplified 
themselves as a wavering between radicalism and conservatism which can only be settled 
by the admission that, if Raz’s theory is to be coherent, it will have to commit itself to 
either radicalism or conservatism. My conclusion on this issue was that it is a version of 
the latter that liberal perfectionism should ultimately advocate.
2. Some Challenges
The argument I presented in the thesis, a summary of which I stated above, is not immune 
from challenges. Some of these have come up during the development of my argument 
while others are stated and defended here for the first time. This is not to say that what 
follows is an exhaustive list of all the potential criticisms. It is, nevertheless, a list of 
issues which I deem must be acknowledged explicitly and answered directly.
Some early challenges to the argument in the thesis might appear as early as my 
elaborations on Berlinian value pluralism. One could claim that by not taking a stance on 
the truth or falsity of the theory of radical pluralism I undermine my assertion that 
different liberalisms are compatible with different pluralisms. This is because the truth or 
falsity of Berlinian pluralism would affect the truth or falsity of any one of the other 
pluralist variations which I presented, as if pluralism is to make any credible claims to 
objectivity, it could not be the case that more than one pluralist theory is true at the same 
time. Similarly, this challenge goes on, even if it is assumed that Berlinian value 
pluralism is not true, it would still be wrong to present as credible alternatives to radical 
pluralism all the pluralist variations together the way I did. This would be due to the fact 
that, again, if pluralism is to make a serious claim to objectivity, then only one of these
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pluralist variations -  if any -  ought to be true. As a consequence, my argument might be 
based on premises which, at least in some cases, are wrong. So, for instance, if lexical 
pluralism is a true ethical theory, then the compatibility between a form of liberalism and 
another pluralist variation ought to be uninteresting since the compatibility in question 
would be one between a liberal theory and an already false ethical pluralist theory.
By no means do I take this challenge lightly in the thesis. To my knowledge, 
however, there has been no final proof or disproof of either Berlinian, lexical, or 
reasonable pluralism, as there has also been no proof or disproof of Kekes’ pluralist 
theory of primary and secondary values. Should an argument of this sort ever present 
itself, then parts of my assertions in the thesis can be considered void or in need of 
revision in light of the philosophical evidence in question. Nonetheless, in the absence of 
such compelling arguments, it is legitimate for me to examine the compatibility between 
different liberalisms and all the different pluralist variations that I have discussed, since 
any one of the latter might be true.
Another challenge that can be advanced against my arguments in the thesis deals 
with the use I make of my elaboration of Berlinian value pluralism in Chapter Two. In 
order to make this challenge intelligible it is necessary to offer a brief overview of my 
intended use of the ideas presented in that chapter. My discussion of Berlinian value 
pluralism served four purposes. First, it examined the most widespread conception of 
value pluralism which, I then argued, is not unique. Second, I argued that Berlinian 
pluralism is incompatible with any type of liberalism. Third, I used radical value 
pluralism as a basis for my expansion on Kekes’ pluralism and on the pluralist variations 
I presented in Chapter Three of the thesis. Fourth, through my discussion of radical value
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pluralism I came up with a minimal general area of value pluralist discourse from which 
no liberal theory that aims to have pluralist allusions should fall outside.
The critique I am referring to here has to do with the fourth use of my elaboration 
on Berlinian value pluralism. This is because I do not actually come up with a specific set 
of criteria that a pluralist theory should fulfill in order for it to be considered pluralist. For 
instance, although I discuss the issue of the relation between radical pluralism and 
rationalism, I do not come up with a specific proposal as to how much rationalism a 
theory can withstand for it to still be considered pluralist. Furthermore, when I discuss the 
relation between radical pluralism and moral relativism, I do not make precise claims 
about how relativistic a pluralist theory could be -  given that a pluralist theory is 
objective yet more relativistic than a Platonic monistic one. Since, the critique in question 
claims, I do not make such precise and explicit remarks about the relation between 
radical pluralism and other ethical theories and since, as a consequence, I do not delineate 
a clear domain of value pluralist criteria, the issue of how I can make use of my 
elaborations in order to delineate an area of pluralist discourse arises.
The answer to this is that I do so with approximation and on a case by case basis. 
So, for instance, my assertion that lexical pluralism is much closer to monism than 
Berlinian pluralism is not quantifiable in terms of the exact extent to which the two 
pluralist positions differ with regards to their relation with monism. Instead, I make a 
claim which is approximate on the one hand, but also indicative of the characteristics and 
the implications of the two theories, on the other. As a consequence, a case by case 
approach on the issue of which theory qualifies as pluralism is defensible.
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Another challenge which could be advanced against my assertions in the thesis is 
the one which claims that I do not offer a definite assessment on the truth or falsity of 
parochial value theory. Again, this challenge can be rebutted in the same way I rejected 
the challenge regarding my elaborations on the theory of value pluralism. That is, I have 
appreciated the strengths and weaknesses of parochial value theory and discussed both 
the difficulties that it faces as well as what it has to offer to the liberal perfectionist 
theory. An actual rendering of judgment on the truth or falsity of parochial value theory 
would be an extremely large project which would go well beyond the scope of the present 
thesis. My discussion of parochial value theory took place because it was relevant to the 
nature of the value of autonomy, which was in its turn relevant to the priority of 
autonomy within liberalism, and as a consequence, to the reconciliation between liberal 
perfectionism and some form of pluralism.
In this section of the conclusion I have presented and defended my arguments in 
the thesis against some challenges that I deemed might be advanced against them. 
Moreover, as I have mentioned at the beginning of the section, this is by no means an 
exhaustive account of the possible — nor, maybe, the most forceful -  criticisms that can 
be proposed against the arguments in question.
3. The Contributions
My aim in this section is to outline some of the contributions that the argument in the 
present thesis offers both in terms of the pluralist critique of liberalism as well as in terms 
of the other issues which are discussed in the thesis and which pertain to Raz’s value 
pluralism and liberalism.
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First, I presented in a very explicit manner alternative pluralist theories which 
have on the one hand been very much prevalent in the writings of pluralist liberal 
thinkers but which, on the other, apart from very few instances,398 have not been 
explicitly referred to or had their significance recognized. In this way I argued that 
Berlin’s view of pluralism, though important, is not unique.
Also, by applying this observation to the pluralist critique of liberalism, I argued 
that different liberal theories are compatible with different pluralisms. In doing so I 
offered a way out of the deadlock which appears in the debates on the compatibility 
between radical pluralism (which is the version of pluralism to which the debates in 
question implicitly refer to) and liberalism. I claimed that no liberal theory -  including 
Berlin’s -  can be compatible with Berlin’s radical version of pluralism and that attempts 
to disprove this position are bound to fail -  because of the deeply radical and untamed 
character of Berlin’s ethical theory. Instead, I proposed that a more constructive way of 
going about the issue is to argue for the compatibility between different liberalisms with 
different versions of pluralism in the sense that different liberal theories must commit 
themselves to pluralisms which are less radical than the Berlinian one and whose 
individual characteristics also differ from those of other pluralist variations. This 
compatibility comes at a cost, for in the situation that I describe liberal theories must play 
down their pluralist allusions -  different liberal theories to different degrees, depending 
on the pluralist variation to which they are compatible.
More importantly, even if one disagrees with the specific compatibilities between 
liberalisms and pluralisms that I propose, the originality and validity of the contribution
398 Newey in Newey, G., After Politics: The rejection of Politics in Contemporary Liberal Philosophy: 
(Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave, 2001), Chapter Four, is such an instance.
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which I presented above is, I believe, still compelling. This is because, even if one 
assumes an error in the specific arguments that I make with regard to the compatibility 
between different liberalisms and different pluralisms, the overall thrust of the argument 
can still be retained despite its exemplification in different specific terms with regards to 
the compatibility in question.
In addition, the arguments in the second part of the thesis make specific 
contributions to the debate on Raz’s system of ideas. In Chapter Five I argued that Raz’s 
simultaneous commitment, on the one hand, to non-linear pluralism and the use of what 
he calls ‘weak pluralism’ as a basis for his liberal perfectionism, on the other, is 
problematic. It has to be noted, nevertheless, that I found this position to be problematic 
insofar as Raz argued for the truth of one ethical theory (non-linear pluralism) but based 
his liberalism on another (weak pluralism). The claim that liberal perfectionism is 
compatible with weak pluralism is in itself to some extent consistent with the argument I 
proposed in the first part of the thesis.
With reference to this claim, I further refined Raz’s assertion that liberal 
perfectionism is compatible with what he calls weak pluralism, by specifying the exact 
pluralist variations with which liberal perfectionism is compatible. Also, even if one 
disagrees with the actual conclusion of my analysis of the compatibility in question, my 
assessment, according to which Raz’s view on this compatibility is in need of further 
refinement along the general framework that I proposed, is still valid.
Furthermore, my assessment that if Raz’s theory of liberal perfectionism is to be 
coherent, it will have to resolve its wavering between radicalism and conservatism is 
another contribution to the liberal perfectionist debate. After a comparative analysis of
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Raz’s theory to those of Popper, Hayek, Oakeshott and Kekes I concluded that liberal 
perfectionism is permeated by a strong conservative thread.
4. Directions for Further Research
As is evident from the above, and as it might have been evident in some parts in the main 
body of the thesis, there have been a number of topics which were scarcely touched upon, 
briefly mentioned, brushed aside altogether or not discussed to their full potential. This 
was either because those issues were beyond the scope of the essay (i.e. the truth or 
falsity of value pluralism) or because due to space constraints they could not be covered 
in the present work.
As a consequence, there are a number of issues related to the ones covered in the 
thesis which have the propensity to be further investigated, either because this could not 
be done here or because the arguments in thesis have provided the fertile background 
with reference to which these issues can be expanded.
In a number of instances I have referred, whether implicitly or explicitly, to the 
issue of the application of Raz’s liberal perfectionist theory to an international domain. I 
have scarcely made a distinction between the national and the international or the 
consequences that this may have for Raz’s overall system of ideas. This is a very 
interesting topic which is worthy of further research.
It must also be obvious from some of my other remarks in this conclusion that, 
even though there has been a lot of work on the topic of pluralism, a definite 
philosophical proof of its truth or falsity is still lacking. Such a proof might be an 
unattainable objective but, to the extent that its unassailability -  or lack thereof -  are also
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uncertain, and by taking into consideration the fact that the production of arguments 
which further enlighten the theory of value pluralism might alter the arguments that I 
make in the thesis, any work in the direction that I just described is valuable and 
welcome.
Moreover, the same holds for the theory of parochial values, since what I offered 
in the thesis in terms of the discussion of its truth was problems and challenges without a 
definite conclusion on their success. More research that would focus on an attempt to 
defend parochial values against the criticisms that I discussed, if successful, will do Raz’s 
liberal perfectionism, and liberal theory in general, a great service.
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